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ABSTRACT
Yang, Weining PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Improving the Eco-system of Pass-
words. Major Professor: Ninghui Li.
Password-based authentication is perhaps the most widely used method for user authen-
tication. Passwords are both easy to understand and use, and easy to implement. With these
advantages, password-based authentication is likely to stay as an important part of security
in the foreseeable future. One major weakness of password-based authentication is that
many users tend to choose weak passwords that are easy to guess. In this dissertation, we
address the challenge and improve the eco-system of passwords in multiple aspects. Firstly,
we provide methodologies that help password research. To be more specific, we propose
Probability Threshold Graphs, which is superior to Guess Number Graphs when compar-
ing password models and password datasets. We also introduce rich literature of statistical
language modeling into password modeling and show that if used correctly, whole-string
Markov models outperform Probabilistic Context Free Grammar models. Secondly, we im-
prove password policies and practice used by websites by studying how to best check weak
passwords. We model different password strength checking methods as Password Rank-
ing Algorithms (PRAs), and introduce two methods for comparing different PRAs: the
β-Residual Strength Graph and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph. Finally, we
examine the security and usability of commonly suggested password generation strategies.
We find that for mnemonic sentence-based strategies, differences in the exact instructions
have a tremendous impact on the security level of the resulting passwords. For word-based
strategies, security of the resulting passwords mainly depends on the number of words re-
quired, and requiring at least 3 words is likely to result in passwords stronger than the
general passwords chosen by typical users.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Password-based authentication is perhaps the most widely used method for user authenti-
cation. Passwords are both easy to understand and use, and easy to implement. With these
advantages, password-based authentication is likely to stay as an important part of security
in the foreseeable future [1]. Considering the large number of systems that require pass-
words and the fact that some systems mandate password changes, it is apparent that many
users will face hundreds or more password-creation situations over a lifetime.
It is well known that there is an inherent tension between the security and usability
of passwords [2, 3]. More precisely, secure passwords tend to be difficult to memorize
(i.e., less usable) whereas passwords that are memorable tend to be predictable. Gener-
ally individuals side with usability of passwords by choosing predictable and weak pass-
words [2, 4–7]. Users tend to choose weak passwords that are easy to guess is a major
weakness of password-based authentication. Addressing this challenge has been an active
and important research area in recent years.
In this research, we improve the eco-system of passwords in multiple aspects.
Providing Methodology to Help Password Research Researchers have studied the
quality of users’ password choices under different scenarios [8–13]. In this area, earlier
work uses either standard password cracking tools such as John the Ripper (JTR) [14], or
ad hoc approaches for estimating the information entropy of a set of passwords. One such
approach is NIST’s recommended scheme [15] for estimating the entropy of one password.
The entropy estimation is mainly based on passwords’ length. Weir et al [16] argued that
entropy estimation methods are inaccurate metrics for password strength. Instead, they sug-
gest measuring the strength of user-chosen passwords by password models and rejecting
passwords with high probabilities.
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Later, probabilistic model-based methods and guess numbers became the standard
method to measure the strength of passwords. Probabilistic models of passwords work
by assigning a probability to each string. Some models divide a password into several
segments, often by grouping consecutive characters of the same category (e.g., lower-case
letters, digits, etc.) into one segment, and then generate the probability for each segment
independently. Examples include the model in [17], and the Probabilistic Context Free
Grammar (PCFG)-based approach developed in [18]. A whole-string model, on the other
hand, does not divide a password into segments, e.g., the Markov models in [19, 20].
The guess number of a password according to a password model is defined to be the
rank of the password in the order of decreasing probability. To compare two sets of pass-
words, one plots the number of guesses vs. the percentage of passwords cracked by the
corresponding number of guesses in the testing dataset. Such guess-number graphs are
currently the standard tool in password research. Plotting such graphs, however, requires
the computation of guess numbers of passwords, which is computationally expensive. For
many password models, this requires generating all passwords with probability above a
certain threshold and sorting them.
We find the current state of art unsatisfying. First, Markov models are known as n-gram
models in the statistical language literature, and there exist a large number of techniques
developed to improve the performance of such models. However, Password modeling re-
search has not taken advantage of such knowledge and techniques. Second, passwords
differ from statistical language modeling in that passwords have a very definite length dis-
tributions: most passwords are between lengths 6 and 12, and there are very few short and
long passwords. Therefore, assuming uniform length distribution, which is the assumption
in n-gram models is suboptimal. Finally, different password modeling approaches have not
been systematically evaluated or compared against each other.
In Chapter 3, we propose probability-threshold graphs, which have important advan-
tages over guess-number graphs. They are much faster to compute, and at the same time
provide information beyond what is feasible in guess-number graphs. Based on that, we
conduct an extensive empirical study of different password models using 6 real-world plain-
3
text password datasets totaling about 60 million passwords, including 3 from American
websites and 3 from Chinese websites. We consider three different normalization ap-
proaches: direct, which assumes that strings of all lengths are equally likely, distribution-
based, which uses the length distribution in the training dataset, and end-symbol based,
which appends an “end” symbol to each password for training and testing. We consider
Markov chain models of different orders, and with different smoothing techniques. We
compare whole-string models with different instantiation of template-based models, and
find that Markov models, when done correctly, perform significantly better than the Proba-
bilistic Context-Free Grammar model proposed in Weir et al. [18], which has been used as
the state-of-the-art password model in recent research.
Improving Password Policies and Practice Used by Websites To deal with weak and
predictable passwords chosen by users, the most common approach is to forbid the use of
weak passwords, or give warnings for passwords that are “somewhat weak”. This approach
requires an effective way to identify weak passwords.
How to best check weak passwords is still an open question. A study in 2014 [21] ex-
amined several password meters in use at popular websites and found highly inconsistent
strength estimates for the same passwords using different meters. The report did not an-
swer the question of which meter is the best, nor what methods should be used to compare
them. Designing an effective password meter requires solving two problems: (1) How to
accurately assess the strength of passwords chosen by the users; and (2) How to commu-
nicate the strength information to and interact with the users to encourage them to choose
strong passwords. These two problems are largely orthogonal. In this research we focus on
solving the first problem.
In Chapter 4, we model different password strength assessing methods (including com-
position policies) as Password Ranking Algorithms (PRAs), which assign a rank to every
password. One state-of-the-art method for comparing PRAs is the guess-number graphs
(GNG), which plots the number of guesses vs. the percentage of passwords cracked in the
test datasets. However, GNG measures only the total density of the uncracked passwords,
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but not their distribution, which is critical in assessing the effectiveness to defend against
guessing attacks after deploying the PRA. To address this limitation of the GNG, we pro-
pose the β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG), which measures the strength of the β most
common passwords in the test dataset, after forbidding the weakest passwords identified by
a PRA. When a PRA forbids a large number of passwords that users are extremely unlikely
to use, it performs poorly under β-RSG. To limit the influence of these passwords, we also
propose Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG), which ignores how passwords
that do not appear in the testing dataset are ranked. β-NRSG also has the advantage that
we can use it to evaluate blackbox password strength services for which one can query the
strength of specific passwords, but cannot obtain all weak passwords.
We compare the Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar (PCFG) [18] method, Markov
chain models with and without backoff [17, 19], blacklists based on training datasets, the
Combined method proposed by Ur et al. [22], password composition policies, as well as
two versions of zxcvbn [23]. We also show how GNG, β-RSG, and β-NRSG differ. We
find that when one places no limit on the mode size, several methods including the blacklist
approach, Markov M=models, and the Combined method have similar performance.
When one wants to check the strength of passwords on the client side, without sending
passwords over the network, the model size must be limited. We find that a blacklist with
a limited size still provide the most accurate strength measurement for the most popular
passwords. However, only a limited number of passwords are covered. We then propose
a new client-end PRA that uses a hybrid method; it uses a small blacklist to assess the
strength of most popular passwords, and evaluates the other passwords based on a limited
size Markov model with backoff. We show that the hybrid method inherits the advantages
of both methods, and consistently outperforms the other client-end PRAs.
Improve Understanding Password Generation Strategy Another solution for avoiding
weak passwords is to encourage users to choose strong passwords by educating users with
password creation strategies.
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The security community has been trying to come up with password generation strategies
that can help users generate secure and usable passwords. Candidate strategies have been
suggested by sources ranging from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [24] to online comics [25], and from security experts’ essays [26, 27] to online
help forums. However, these suggestions are often based on intuitions instead of scientific
knowledge. Little is actually known about which strategies are effective in helping users
create usable and secure passwords.
In Chapter 5, we study the mnemonic sentence-based strategy (for short, the mnemonic
strategy), which is the most widely recommended and studied strategy. It appears that the
general assessment is that this is a good strategy. It is recommended by NIST [24] and by
security experts [26, 27].
We conduct a large study to evaluate 6 variants of the mnemonic strategy and com-
pare against a control group. When assessing the security of the strategies, we go beyond
the methods used in existing studies in two ways. First, we adopt the approach of using
statistical quantities to measure the distributions of the passwords, as articulated by Bon-
neau [28]. In particular, we chose to use the β-guess-rate (λβ) [29], which measures the
expected success for an attacker limited to β guesses per account. We chose to use β = 1
and β = 10, both because they were suggested in [30] as appropriate for defense against
online guessing attacks and because a larger β is not very meaningful for our sample sizes.
Second, we develop a method specific for attacking passwords resulted from the mnemonic
strategy, and demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack.
The usability of the variants is evaluated in a separate user study, in which password
creation time, short-term and long-term password memorability, and the workload required
in both password creation and retention are evaluated.
We find that in terms of security, while metrics similar to guess numbers suggest that all
variants provide highly secure passwords, statistical metrics tell a far more interesting and
nuanced story. In particular, differences in the exact instructions have a tremendous impact
on the security and usability of the resulted passwords, and a tradeoff between security and
long-term memorability of the passwords is observed.
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In Chapter 6, we evaluate variants of word-based strategies, which are also recom-
mended by the security community [24, 25, 31]. In word-based strategies, a password is
generally created in a two-step process: first choose some unrelated or random words (usu-
ally 2 to 4), then combine the words into a password. Despite the popularity of the strate-
gies, to the best of our knowledge, the strategies have not been evaluated in any human
subject studies and little is known about the effectiveness of them in helping users create
usable and secure passwords.
We examine the security and usability of 7 variants of the strategy in a series of studies
conducted on Mturk. The evaluation metrics are identical to that used in Chapter 5.
We find that the security of the variants depends on the number of words required.
While the variants requiring two words are likely to produce passwords with similar secu-
rity level to the baseline, strategies based on 3 or 4 words significantly reduce the number
of word combinations that are chosen more than once, suggesting significantly stronger
resulted passwords, where the variant requiring 4 words performs better. In terms of us-
ability, 3-word based strategies and 4-word based strategies have similar performance in
long-term password recall, and both of them underperfrom the baseline. We also observe
that requiring the fourth word results in more difficulty in password creation.
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we briefly review background and related work on password strength eval-
uation metrics, evaluations on passwords and password policies, and password generation
strategies.
2.1 Password Strength Evaluation Metrics
The quality of passwords has traditionally been measured using a combination of stan-
dard password cracking tools, such as John the Ripper (JTR) [14], and ad hoc approaches
for estimating the information entropy of a set of passwords.
In 1990, Klein et al. [4] proposed the concept of a proactive password checker, which
checks the strength of newly created passwords and prevents users from choosing weak
passwords. Since then, multiple blacklist-based proactive password checkers were pro-
posed. Spafford et al. [32] and Bergadano et al. [33] developed methods for filtering pass-
words based on efficiently stored password dictionaries. Manber et al. [34] described an
approach that refused not only exact words in dictionaries but also passwords that are a
single insertion, deletion, or substitution from a dictionary word. Yan et al. [35] suggested
that besides dictionary checking, password checker should consider length and character
types of passwords as well.
Bonneau [28] criticized the comparability and repeatability of past password cracking
results using tools such as John the ripper and/or dictionaries. He proposed metrics for
studying the overall level of security in large password datasets, based only on the distribu-
tion, and not on the actual password strings.
In terms of entropy estimation, Florencio and Herley [6], Forget et al. [36], and
Egelman et al. [37] used the formula where the bit strength of a password is consid-




for alphabet Σ; for example, a 9-character password that con-
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tains both upper and lower case characters and digits is considered to have bit strength of
log2(26 + 26 + 10)
9 ≈ 53.59. A more sophisticated approach, known as the NIST guide-
lines [15], calculates password entropy using several factors, including how many numbers,
symbols, and uppercase letters are used and where they appear. The NIST guidelines work
by estimating the strength of password creation policies using Shannons entropy. In partic-
ular, for a password creation policy with a required length, it assigns entropy to characters
at each position and the total entropy score is the sum of them with some additional bonus
entropy if a composition rule is required or a dictionary check is performed. The entropy
score for each character is assigned using the following criteria:
1. The entropy of the first character is taken to be 4 bits;
2. The entropy of the next 7 characters is 2 bits per character; this is roughly consistent
with Shannons estimation that “when statistical effects extending over not more than
8 letters are considered the entropy is roughly 2.3 bits per character”;
3. For the 9th through the 20th character the entropy is taken to be 1.5 bits per character;
4. For characters 21 and above the entropy is taken to be 1 bit per character;
5. A “bonus” of 6 bits of entropy is assigned for a composition rule that requires both
upper case and non-alphabetic characters. This forces the use of these characters,
but in many cases these characters will occur only at the beginning or the end of the
passwords, and it reduces the total search space somewhat, so the benefit is probably
modest and nearly independent of the length of the password;
6. A bonus of up to 6 bits of entropy is added for an extensive dictionary check. If
the attacker knows the dictionary, he can avoid testing those passwords, and will in
any event, be able to guess much of the dictionary, which will, however, be the most
likely selected passwords in the absence of a dictionary rule. The assumption is that
most of the guessing entropy benefits for a dictionary test accrue to relatively short
passwords, because any long password that can be remembered must necessarily be
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a pass-phrase composed of dictionary words, so the bonus declines to zero at 20
characters.
In 2010, Weir et al. [16] measured the strength of password creation policies by using
large-scale real-world datasets and showed that entropy values would not tell the defender
anything about how vulnerable a policy would be to an online password cracking attack.
They also showed that many rule-based policies performed poorly for ensuring a desirable
level of security. Instead, they suggested measuring the strength of user-chosen passwords
by password models and rejecting passwords with high probabilities. Schechter et al. [38]
also suggested allowing users to choose any password they want, so long as it was not
already too popular with other users.
Later, probabilistic model-based methods became the standard method to measure the
strength of passwords. Probabilistic models of passwords work by assigning a probability
to each string. Some models divide a password into several segments, often by group-
ing consecutive characters of the same category (e.g., lower-case letters, digits, etc.) into
one segment, and then generate the probability for each segment independently. Exam-
ples include the model in [17], and the Probabilistic Context Free Grammar (PCFG)-based
approach developed in [18]. A whole-string model, on the other hand, does not divide a
password into segments, e.g., the Markov chain model in [19, 20].
Narayanan and Shmatikov [17] proposed a template-based model, with Markov chain
being used for assigning probability to letter-based segments.
The PCFG model was proposed by Weir et al. [18]. In the approach, one divides a
password into several segments by grouping consecutive characters of the same category
(e.g., letters, digits, special symbols) into one segment. Each password thus follows a pat-
tern, for example, L7D3 denotes a password consisting of a sequence of 7 letters followed
by 3 digits. The distribution of different patterns as well as the distribution of digits and
symbols are learned from a training dataset. PCFG chooses words to instantiate segments
consisting of letters from a dictionary where all words in the dictionary are assumed to be
of the same probability. The probability of a password is calculated by multiplying the
probability of the pattern by the probabilities of the particular ways the segments are in-
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stantiated. The PCFG approach was later improved by introducing semantic patterns [39],
or by using specialized data in training [8].
N-gram models, i.e., Markov chains, have been applied to passwords [19]. A Markov
chain of order d, where d is a positive integer, is a process that satisfies
P (xi|xi−1, xi−2, . . . , x1) = P (xi|xi−1, . . . , xi−d)
where d is finite and x1, x2, x3, . . . is a sequence of random variables. A Markov chain with
order d corresponds to an n-gram model with n = d + 1. For example, a 2-order Markov
chain, in which the probability assigned to a password “c1c2 · · · cℓ” is
P (“c1c2 · · · cℓ”) = P (c1|c0)P (c2|c1)P (c3|c2) · · ·P (cℓ|cℓ−1),






where count(ci−1·) denotes the number of occurrences of ci−1 where it is followed by
another character (i.e., where it is not at the end of password), and count(ci−1ci) gives




Dell’Amico et al. [40] compared the cracking effectiveness of Markov models on the
“Italian”, “Finnish”, and “MySpace” datasets by computing the estimated probabilities for
each password in the datasets and using an approximation algorithm to compute the num-
ber of guesses for each threshold. They did not consider normalization, smoothing, etc.
Furthermore, their results showed very small search spaces for higher-order Markov mod-
els, which seemed to suggest that their approximation algorithm underestimated the search
space.
Other commonly used password strength measurement tools include John the Rip-
per [14] and zxcvbn [23].
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John the Ripper [14], one of the most popular password cracking tools, has several
modes for generating password guesses. The wordlist mode uses a dictionary plus various
mangling rules. The incremental mode uses trigraph frequencies, i.e., frequencies for the
triple of character, position, and password length. The Markov mode uses Markov chains
of order 1.
Zxcvbn is an open-source meter designed to run entirely in clients’ browser developed
by Wheeler [23]. It decomposes a given password into patterns, and then assigns each
pattern an estimated “entropy”. The entropy of each chunk is estimated depending on
the pattern of the chunk. The candidate patterns are “dictionary”, “sequence”, “spatial”,
“year”, “date”, “repeat” and “bruteforce”. For example, if a chunk is within the pattern
“dictionary”, the entropy is estimated as the log of the rank of word in the dictionary. Ad-
ditional entropy is added if uppercase letters are used or some letters are converted into
digits or sequences (e.g. a⇒@). There are 5 embedded frequency-ordered dictionaries:
7140 passwords from the Top 10000 password dictionary; and three dictionaries for com-
mon names from the 2000 US Census. After chunking, a password’s entropy is calculated




A password may be divided into chunks in different ways, Zxcvbn finds the way that yields
the minimal entropy and uses that.
In October 2015, a new version of zxcvbn was published. The new version of zxcvbn
also divides a password into chunks, and computes a password’s strength as the “minimal
guess” of it under any way of dividing it into chunks. A password’s “guesses” after being








where l is the number of the chunks. The factorial term is the number of ways to order l
patterns. The 10000(l−1) term captures the intuition that a password that has more chunks
are considered stronger. Another change in the new version is that if a password is decom-
posed into multiple chunks, the estimated guess number for each chunk is the larger one
between the chunks’ original estimated guess number and a min guess number , which
is 10 if the chunk contains only one character or 50 otherwise. While these changes are
heuristic, our experimental results show these changes cause significant improvements un-
der our methods of comparison.
Dell’Amico and Filippone [41] proposed a method to estimate the number of guesses
needed to find a password using modern attacks and probabilistic models. Given a proba-
bilistic model, the strength of a passwords is estimated by sampling from the model, i.e.,
generating random passwords according to the probabilities assigned by the model. This
motivates our work to find a way to compare password models, as a better probabilistic
model will produce a more accurate estimation.
Recently, Ur et al [22] compared cracking approaches used by researchers with real-
world cracking by professionals. They found that semi-automated cracking by profes-
sionals outperformed popular fully automated approaches, but could be approximated by
combining multiple approaches and assuming the rank of a password was its highest rank
among the approaches examined.
2.2 Evaluating User-chosen Passwords and Password Policies
One active research area in recent years is to study the quality of users’ password
choices under different scenarios, e.g., when facing different password policies [8, 9, 42],
when presented with different password strength meters [11, 37], when forced to change
passwords due to organizational change of password policies [10], when forced to change
passwords due to expiration [12], when creating passwords for different sites [43], when
allowed to replace some characters from a randomly generated password [13], and when
facing different guidance and feedback [44].
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The effect of different password composition policies was studied in [8, 9]. They both
suggested passwords generated under the policy “Password must have at least 16 charac-
ters” provide the most entropy.
In a similar study, Mazurek et al. [42] collected over 25,000 real passwords from CMU
and studied passwords from different groups of users. In addition to the difference in pass-
words from different composition policies, they discovered significant correlations between
a number of demographic and behavioral factors and password strength. For example, users
associated with the computer science school made passwords more than 1.8 times as strong
as those of users associated with the business school.
Egelman et al. [37] examined the impact of password meters on password selection and
reported that the presence of meters yielded significantly stronger passwords in a laboratory
experiment. However, the meters made no observable difference in a field study when
creating passwords for unimportant accounts.
Ur et al. [11] showed that scoring passwords stringently resulted in stronger passwords
in general. Additionally, participants who saw stringent password meters spent longer
creating their password and were more likely to change their password while entering it,
yet they were also more likely to find the password meter annoying. However, the most
stringent meter and those without visual bars caused participants to place less importance
on satisfying the meter. Participants who saw more lenient meters tried to fill the meter and
were averse to choosing passwords a meter deemed “bad” or “poor”.
Shay et al. [10] collected data about behaviors and practices related to the use and
creation of passwords from 470 computer users when they were required to change their
passwords because of a policy change. They found that, although most of the users were
annoyed by the need to create a complex password, they believed that they were more
secure.
Zhang et al. [12] investigated the passwords that users chose to replace expired ones.
They developed a framework and an efficient algorithm to build an search strategy to search
for a user’s new password from an old one. They were able to break future passwords from
past ones in 41% of accounts in an offline attack and 17% of accounts in an online attack.
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Das et al. [43] investigated how an attacker could leverage a known password from one
site to more easily guess that users password at other sites. They estimated that 43-51%
of users reuse the same password across multiple sites. For passwords transformed from
a basic password between sites, they developed a cross-site password-guessing algorithm,
which was able to guess 30% of transformed passwords within 100 attempts.
Huh et al. [13] proposed Surpass, which lets users replace few characters in a random
password to make it more memorable. They found that Surpass policies with 3 and 4 char-
acter replacements outperformed by 11% to 13% the original randomly-generated pass-
word policy in memorability, while showing a small increase in the percentage of cracked
passwords.
Shay et al. [44] investigated whether guidance and feedback could enable users to com-
ply with the strict password composition policies imposed by different websites. They
showed that password composition policies and password strength meters were not suffi-
cient for getting users to create secure passwords.
In 2014, de Carné de Carnavalet and Mannan [21] examined several password meters
in use at selected popular websites, and revealed how the meters worked. They found gross
inconsistencies, with the same password resulting in very different strength across different
meters.
Komanduri et al. [45] showed that Telepathwords, which makes realtime predictions
for the next character that user will type, could help users choosing stronger passwords.
2.3 Password Generation Strategies
The security community has been trying to come up with password generation strategies
that can help users generate secure and usable passwords. Candidate strategies have been
suggested by sources ranging from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [24] to online comics [25], and from security experts’ essays [26,27] to online help
forums.
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Perhaps the most widely recommended and studied strategy is that based on mnemonic
sentences: Take a memorable sentence, abbreviate the words, and combine them to form
a password. The strategy is generally known as the mnemonic sentence-based strategy
(for short, the mnemonic strategy). It appears that the general assessment is that this is a
good strategy. It is recommended by NIST [24] and by security experts [26, 27]. To our
knowledge, three studies on this method have been reported, by Yan et al. [46, 47], Vu et
al. [48], and Kuo et al. [49].
Evaluation of the Mnemonic Strategy. Yan et al. [46, 47] conducted a study with col-
lege students who were given accounts on a central computing facility. The students were
randomly assigned to three groups. The control group (95 members) were asked to create
a password with at least seven characters long that contained at least one non-letter. The
random password group (96 members) received a sheet of paper with the letters A through
Z and the numbers 1 through 9 printed repeatedly on it and were asked to close their eyes
and randomly pick eight characters. (They were also advised to keep a written record
with them until they had memorized the password.) The mnemonic password group (97
members) were told to create a sentence of 8 words and choose letters from the words to
make up a password, mixing upper-case and including at least one non-letter. They found
that very few users asked the system administrator to reset their passwords. Responses to
an email memorability survey showed that the mnemonic passwords were similar to the
control group in terms of difficulty to use, and the random passwords were found to be
significantly more difficult. An attack with dictionaries (with permutations with digits)
cracked 32% for the control group, 8% for the random password group, and 6% for the
mnemonic password group. The authors concluded “We’ve debunked another folk belief
that random passwords are better than passwords based on mnemonic phrases. In our
study, each appeared to be as strong as the other”.
Vu et al. [48] studied two variations of the mnemonic strategy: (A) Choose a sentence
containing at least 6 words, and use the first letters from each word as the password; (B)
strategy A with an additional requirement that users should embed a special character or
digit in the password. Forty psychology students were each asked to create 3 passwords
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using one of the above strategies. In terms of memorability, they found that participants
using strategy B “took two times longer to recall the passwords, made almost twice as
many errors before being able to recall the password, and completely forgot the password
twice as often”. Within 12 hours, the L0phtCrack4 (LC4) password cracker cracked all
passwords generated with strategy A, whereas only 5% of the passwords from strategy B
were cracked.
Kuo et al. [49] conducted a study in which 144 subjects were asked to generate
mnemonic passwords, with 146 subjects in the control group. For the control group, they
used John the Ripper’s 1.2 million-word English dictionary, and were able to crack 11% of
the 146 passwords. For the mnemonic group, they collected 129, 000 sentences from the
Internet and, with some mangling, created a 400, 000-entry mnemonic password dictionary.
Using this dictionary, they cracked 4% of the 144 mnemonic passwords. A bruteforce at-
tack cracked an additional 8% in the control group, and an additional 4% in the mnemonic
group. Kuo et al. also searched the Internet (using Google) for the sentences used by the
users to generate passwords, and were able to find 65% of them on the Internet. Based on
this evidence, the authors concluded that “Mnemonic phrase-based passwords are not as
strong as people may believe, ...”.
We argue that the fact that a password is generated by a sentence that can be found on
the Internet does not necessarily mean that it is weak, given that there are likely billions
or tens of billions of sentences on Google-indexed pages. Similarly, that a size-400, 000
dictionary can crack 4% of password seems more like an indicator of strength to us. Us-
ing a list of 400, 000 top passwords from Rockyou, one could crack 32% of the passwords
in the Yahoo password dataset [50], and 39% of the passwords in the Phpbb dataset [50].
Our interpretation of the data in [49] is that mnemonic sentence-based passwords are sig-
nificantly stronger than the baseline, as measured by passwords in the Yahoo and phpBB
dataset, with two caveats. First, this interpretation is based on cracking results obtained by
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using their particular dictionary. Second, the conclusion may not be statistically significant
because the dataset is small.
Other Related Work. The strategy of choosing 4 random words and concatenating them
was made famous by the xkcd comic [25]. Likewise, combining two or three unrelated
words and changing some of the letters to numbers or symbols has been recommended
by NIST [24]. However, we are unaware of human subject studies on such word-based
strategies.
Some have suggested that users should simply use password managers and remember
just one password. Password managers, however, create their own security, reliability, and
convenience problems [51–55]. Perhaps the biggest concern is that a password manager
software takes the security of all critical websites out of the hand of the user and puts it in
one piece of software, creating a single point of failure and an attractive target for attackers
at the same time. Recently, Xing et al. [56] showed that Unauthorized Cross-App Resource
Access (XARA) vulnerabilities on Apple OS X and iOS enable malicious applications to
read passwords saved into Apple Keychain and passwords saved in the popular 1Password
password manager. These results demonstrate the risk of relying on one password manager
for all critical websites.
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3. IMPROVING METHODOLOGY TO HELP PASSWORD
RESEARCH
A fundamental tool for password security research is that of probabilistic password models
(password models for short).
A probabilistic password model assigns a probability value to each string. Such models
are useful for research into understanding what makes users choose more (or less) secure
passwords, and for constructing password strength meters and password cracking utilities.
Guess number graphs generated from password models are a widely used method in pass-
word research. In this chapter, we show that probability-threshold graphs have important
advantages over guess-number graphs. They are much faster to compute, and at the same
time provide information beyond what is feasible in guess-number graphs. We also observe
that research in password modeling can benefit from the extensive literature in statistical
language modeling. We conduct a systematic evaluation of a large number of probabilistic
password models, including Markov models using different normalization and smoothing
methods, and find that, among other things, Markov models, when done correctly, perform
significantly better than the Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar model proposed in Weir
et al. [18], which has been used as the state-of-the-art password model in recent research.
3.1 Introduction
A password model assigns a probability value to each string. The goal of such a model
is to approximate as accurately as possible an unknown password distribution D. We di-
vide password models into two classes, whole-string models and template-based models. A
template-based model divides a password into several segments, often by grouping consec-
utive characters of the same category (e.g., lower-case letters, digits, etc.) into one segment,
and then generates the probability for each segment independently, e.g., [17,18]. A whole-
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string model, on the other hand, does not divide a password into segments, e.g., the Markov
chain model in [19].
We classify research involving password models into two types. Type-1 research aims
at understanding what makes users choose more (or less) secure passwords. To do this,
one obtains password datasets chosen by users under difference circumstances, and then
uses a password model to compare the relative strengths of these sets of passwords. Type-
2 research aims at finding the best password models. Such a model can then be used to
evaluate the level of security of a chosen password, as in password strength meters. Such a
model can also be used to develop more effective password cracking utilities, as a password
model naturally determines the order in which one should make guesses.
Type-1 research has been quite active in recent years. Researchers have studied the
quality of users’ password choices under different scenarios [8–12]. In this area, earlier
work uses either standard password cracking tools such as John the Ripper (JTR) [14], or
ad hoc approaches for estimating the information entropy of a set of passwords. One such
approach is NIST’s recommended scheme [15] for estimating the entropy of one password,
which is mainly based on their length.
Weir et al. [18] developed a template-based password model that uses Probabilistic
Context-free Grammar. We use PCFGW to denote the model is this chapter. In [16], they
argued that entropy estimation methods such as that recommended by NIST were inaccu-
rate metrics for password strength, and proposed to use the guess numbers of passwords.
The guess number of a password according to a password model is defined to be the rank of
the password in the order of decreasing probability. To compare two sets of passwords, one
plots the number of guesses vs. the percentage of passwords cracked by the corresponding
number of guesses in the testing dataset. Such guess-number graphs are currently the stan-
dard tool in password research. Plotting such graphs, however, requires the computation
of guess numbers of passwords, which is computationally expensive. For many password
models, this requires generating all passwords with probability above a certain threshold
and sorting them. Some template-based models, such as the PCFGW model, have the prop-
erty that all strings fitting a template are assigned the same probability. One is thus able to
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compute guess numbers by maintaining information about templates instead of individual
passwords. This is done in the guess calculator framework in [8,42], which is based on the
PCFGW model. This framework uses parallel computation to speed up the process, and is
able to go up to ≈ 4E14 [42]. Even with this approach, however, one is often limited by
the search space so that only a portion (typically between 30% and 60%) of the passwords
are covered [8, 42]. Such studies thus miss information regarding the stronger passwords.
We observe that for type-1 research, in which one compares the relative strength of
two sets of passwords, it is actually unnecessary to compute the guess numbers of all pass-
words. It suffices to compute the probabilities of all passwords in the datasets, which can
be done much faster, since the number of passwords one wants to evaluate (often much less
than 1E6) is in general extremely small compared to the maximum guess number one is
interested in. We propose to plot the probability threshold vs. the percentage of passwords
cracked curves, which we call probability-threshold graphs. In addition to being much
faster to compute, another advantage is that such a curve shows the quality of passwords in
the set all the way to the point when all passwords are cracked (assuming that the password
model assigns a non-zero probability to each allowed password).
A natural approach for password models is to use whole-string Markov chains. Markov
chains are used in the template-based model in [17], for assigning probabilities to segments
that consists of letters. Castelluccia et al. [19] proposed to use whole-string Markov models
for evaluating password strengths, without comparing these models with other models. At
the time of this chapter’s writing, PCFGW was considered to be the model of choice in
type-1 password research.
We find this current state of art unsatisfying. First, only very simple Markov models
have been considered. Markov models are known as n-gram models in the statistical lan-
guage literature, and there exist a large number of techniques developed to improve the
performance of such models. In particular, many smoothing techniques were developed
to help solve the sparsity and overfitting problem in higher-order Markov models. Such
techniques include Laplace smoothing, Good-Turing smoothing [57], and backoff [58].
Password modeling research has not taken advantage of such knowledge and techniques.
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Second, passwords differ from statistical language modeling in that passwords have a very
definite length distributions: most passwords are between lengths 6 and 12, and there are
very few short and long passwords. The n-gram models used in statistical language model-
ing generally have the property that the probabilities assigned to all strings of a fixed length
add up to 1, implicitly assuming that the length distribution is uniform. This property is
fine for natural language applications, because often times one only needs to compare prob-
abilities of sentences of the same (or very similar) length(s), e.g., when determining which
sentence is the most likely one when given a sequence of sounds in speech recognition. For
password models, however, assuming uniform length distribution is suboptimal. Finally,
different password modeling approaches have not been systematically evaluated or com-
pared against each other. In particular, a rigorous comparison of the PCFGW model with
whole-string Markov models has not been performed.
In this chapter, we conduct an extensive empirical study of different password models
using 6 real-world plaintext password datasets totaling about 60 million passwords, includ-
ing 3 from American websites and 3 from Chinese websites. We consider three different
normalization approaches: direct, which assumes that strings of all lengths are equally
likely, distribution-based, which uses the length distribution in the training dataset, and
end-symbol based, which appends an “end” symbol to each password for training and test-
ing. We consider Markov chain models of different orders, and with different smoothing
techniques. We compare whole-string models with different instantiation of template-based
models.
Some of the important findings are as follows. First and foremost, whole-string Markov
models, when done correctly, significantly outperform the PCFGW model [18] when one
goes beyond the first million or so guesses. PCFGW uses as input both a training dataset,
from which it learns the distribution of different templates, and a dictionary from which
it chooses words to instantiate segments consisting of letters. In this chapter, we consider
3 instantiations of PCFGW : the first uses the dictionary used in [18]; the second uses the
OpenWall dictionary; and the third generates the dictionary from the training set. We find
that the third approach works significantly better than the first and the second; in addition,
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all three instantiations significantly underperform the best whole-string Markov models.
Furthermore, higher orders of Markov chains show different degrees of overfitting effect.
That is, they perform well for cracking the high-probability passwords, but less so later
on. The backoff approach, which essentially uses a variable-order Markov chain, when
combined with end-symbol based normalization, suffers little from the overfitting effect
and performs the best.
3.2 Password Models and Metrics
In this section, we introduce probability-threshold graphs.
We use Σ to denote the alphabet of characters that can be used in passwords. We further
assume that all passwords are required to be of length between L and U for some values of






In the experiments in this chapter, we set Σ to include the 95 printable ASCII characters,
and L = 4 and U = 40. Sometimes the alphabet Σ is divided into several subsets, which
we call the character categories. For example, one common approach is to divide the 95
characters into four categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits, and special
symbols.
Definition 3.2.1 A password probability model (password model for short) is given by a
function p that assigns a probability to each allowed password. That is, a password model
p : Γ → [0, 1] satisfies




We say that a password model p is complete if and only if it assigns a non-zero proba-
bility to any string in Γ.
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For a password model p to be useful in practice, it should be efficiently computable; that
is, for any s ∈ Γ, computing p(s) takes time proportional to O(|Σ| · length(s)). For p to be
useful in cracking a password, it should be efficiently enumerable; that is, for any integer
N , it runs in time proportional to O(N · |Σ| · U) to output the N passwords that have the
highest probabilities according to p. If one desires to make a large number of guesses, then
the password generation also needs to be space efficient, i.e., the space used for generating
N passwords should grow at most sub-linearly in N . Ideally, the space usage (not counting
the generated passwords) should be independent from N .
We consider the following three methods/metrics when running a given password model
with a testing password dataset. Note that for type-1 research, we fix the model and com-
pare different datasets. For type-2 research, we fix a dataset and compare different models.
Guess-number graphs. Such a graph plots the number of guesses in log scale vs. the
percentage of passwords cracked in the dataset. A point (x, y) on a curve means that y
percent of passwords are included in the first 2x guesses (i.e., the 2x passwords that have
the highest probabilities). This approach is logically appealing; however, it is also highly
computationally expensive, since it requires generating a very large number of password
guesses in decreasing probability. This requirement makes it difficult when we want to
compare many different approaches. Furthermore, because of the resource limitation, we
are unable to see the effect beyond the guesses we have generated. These limitations moti-
vate us to use the following metrics.
Probability-threshold graphs. Such a graph plots the probability threshold in log scale
vs. the percentage of passwords above the threshold. A point (x, y) on a curve means that
y percent of passwords in the dataset have probability at least 2−x. To generate such a
figure, one needs only to compute the probabilities the model assigns to each password in
the testing dataset. For each probability threshold, one counts how many passwords are
assigned probabilities above the threshold. For a complete password model, such a curve
can show the effect of a password model on the dataset all the way to the point when all
passwords in the dataset are included.
24
Figure 3.1 shows a probability-threshold graph and the corresponding guess number
graph, for comparing the relative strength of two datasets Phpbb and Yahoo using a Markov
chain model of order 5 trained on the Rockyou dataset.
(a) Probability-threshold graph (b) Guess-number graph
Figure 3.1.: An example of probability-threshold graph and guess-number graph
An interesting question is how a probability-threshold graph relates to the correspond-
ing guess-number graph. If one draws conclusions regarding two curves based on the
former, do the conclusions hold in the latter?
When comparing the strength of two password datasets using a fixed model, the answer
is “yes”. The relationship of two guess-number curves (e.g., which curve is to the left of the
other, whether and when they cross, etc.) would be exactly the same as that demonstrated
by the beginning portions of the corresponding probability-threshold curves; because for
a given threshold, exactly the same set of passwords will be attempted. This effect can
be observed from Figure 3.1. The only information missing is that we do not know the
exact guess number corresponding to each probability threshold; however, this information
is not needed when our goal is to compare two datasets. In addition to being much faster to
compute, the probability-threshold graph is able to show the quality of passwords in the set
all the way to the point when all passwords are cracked (assuming that the password model
assigns a non-zero probability to each allowed password).
When comparing models with a fixed dataset, in general, the answer is no. In the
extreme case, consider a model that assigns almost the same yet slightly different prob-
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abilities to every possible password in Γ, while using the same ranking as in the testing
dataset. As a result, the probabilities assigned to all passwords would all be very small.
Such an unrealistic model would perform very well in the guess-number graph; however,
the probability-threshold graph would show extremely poor performance, since no pass-
word is cracked until a very low probability threshold is reached.
When comparing two password models, whether the conclusions drawn from a proba-
bility threshold graph can be carried over to the guess number graph depends on whether the
two models have similar rank distributions. Given a password model p, the rank distribution
gives for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · }, the probability of the password that has the i’th highest
probability. Thus, if two password models are known to generate very similar rank distribu-
tions, then any conclusion drawn from the probability-threshold graph will also hold on the
guess number graph, because the same probability threshold will correspond to the same
guess number. When two models generate somewhat different rank distributions, then one
needs to be careful when interpreting results obtained from probability-threshold graphs.
In particular, one may want to also generate the guess number graphs to check whether
the results are similar at least for the beginning portion of the probability-threshold graphs.
There is the main limitation of using probability-threshold graphs in type-2 research.
Average-Negative-Log-Likelihood (ANLL) and ANLLθ. Information encoded in a
probability-threshold curve can be summarized by a single number that measures the area
to the left of the curve, which turns out to be exactly the same as the Average Negative
Log Likelihood (ANLL). ANLL has its root in statistical language modeling. A statistical
language model assigns a probability to a sentence (i.e., a sequence of words) by means of
a probability distribution. Language modeling is used in many natural language process-
ing applications such as speech recognition, machine translation, part-of-speech tagging,
parsing and information retrieval. Password modeling can be similarly viewed as trying to
approximate as accurately as possible D, an unknown distribution of passwords. We do not
know D, and instead have a testing dataset D, which can be viewed as sampled from D.
We use pD to denote the probability distribution given by the dataset D. Representing the
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testing dataset D as a multi-set {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, where a password may appear more than







To see that ANLL equals the area to the left of the probability-threshold curve, observe
that when dividing the area into very thin horizontal rows, the length of a row with height
between y and y + dy is given by the number of passwords with probability p such that
y ≤ − log2 p < y + dy. By summing these areas up, one obtains the ANLL.
ANLL gives the same information as Empirical Perplexity, which is the most widely
used metric for evaluating statistical language models, and is defined as 2ANLL(D|p).
While using a single number to summarize the information in a probability-threshold
curve is attractive, obviously one is going to lose some information. As a result, ANLL
has some limitations. First, ANLL is applicable only for complete password models, i.e.,
those that assign a non-zero probability to each password. In the area interpretation, if a
password in the dataset is assigned probability 0, it is never guessed, and the curve never
reaches Y = 1, resulting in an infinite area. Second, ANLL includes information about
cracking 100 percent of the passwords, which may not be what one wants. Since it may be
infeasible to generate enough guesses to crack the most difficult passwords, one may care
about only the θ portion of passwords that are easy to crack. In that case, one could use
ANLLθ, which we define to be the area to the left of the curve below θ. In this chapter, we
use ANLL0.8 when comparing different models using one single number.
3.3 Design Space of Password Models
In this section, we explore the design space of password models.
We mostly consider approaches that construct password models without relying on an
external dictionary. That is, we consider approaches that can take a training password
dataset and learn a password model from it. The performance of approaches that rely on
external dictionaries depends very much on the quality of the dictionaries, and in particu-
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lar, how well the dictionaries match the testing dataset. Such approaches are not broadly
applicable, and it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness.
N-gram models, i.e., Markov chains, are the dominant approach for statistical lan-
guages. It is natural to apply them to passwords. A Markov chain of order d, where d is a
positive integer, is a process that satisfies
P (xi|xi−1, xi−2, . . . , x1) = P (xi|xi−1, . . . , xi−d)
where d is finite and x1, x2, x3, . . . is a sequence of random variables. A Markov chain with
order d corresponds to an n-gram model with n = d+ 1.
We divide password models into two classes, whole-string models and template-based
models. A template-based model divides a password into several segments, often by group-
ing consecutive characters of the same category into one segment, and then generates the
probability for each segment independently. A whole-string model, on the other hand, does
not divide a password into segments.
3.3.1 Whole-String Markov Models
Whole-string Markov models are used in John the Ripper (JTR) [14] and Castelluccia
et al.’s work on password strength estimation [19]. JTR in Markov mode uses a 1-order
Markov chain, in which the probability assigned to a password “c1c2 · · · cℓ” is
P (“c1c2 · · · cℓ”) = P (c1|c0)P (c2|c1)P (c3|c2) · · ·P (cℓ|cℓ−1),






where count(ci−1·) denotes the number of occurrences of ci−1 where it is followed by
another character (i.e., where it is not at the end of password), and count(ci−1ci) gives




count(ci−1ci). When we use Markov chains of order d > 1, we can prepend d
copies of the start symbol c0 to each password.
There are many variants of whole-string Markov models. Below we examine the design
space.
Need for Normalization. We note that models used in [14,19] are not probability models
because the values assigned to all strings do not add up to 1. In fact, they add up to U−L+1,
where U is the largest allowed password length, and L is the smallest allowed password










and thus the values assigned to all length-1 strings add up to 1. Assume that the values
assigned to all length-ℓ strings sum up to 1. We then show that the same is the case for
length ℓ+ 1 as follows.
#
c1c2···cℓ+1∈Σℓ+1











P (“c1c2 · · · cℓ”) = 1
The same analysis holds for Markov chains of order d > 1. To turn such models into
probability models, several normalization approaches can be applied:
Direct normalization. The approach of using the values directly in [14, 19] is equivalent
to dividing each value by (U − L + 1). This method, however, more or less assumes that
the total probabilities of passwords for each length are the same. This assumption is clearly
not the case in practice. From Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, which give the password length
distributions for the datasets we use in this chapter, we can see that passwords of lengths
between 6 and 10 constitute around 87% of all passwords, and passwords of lengths 11
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and 12 add an additional 7%, with the remaining 30 lengths (lengths 4,5,13-40) together
contributing slightly less than 6%.
Distribution-based normalization. A natural alternative to direct normalization is to
normalize based on the distribution of passwords of different lengths. More specifically,
one normalizes by multiplying the value assigned to each password of length m with the
following factor:
# of passwords of length m in training
total # of passwords in training
This approach, however, may result in overfitting, since the training and testing datasets
may have different length distributions. From Table 3.7, we can see that the CSDN dataset
includes 9.78% of passwords of length 11, whereas the PhpBB dataset includes only 2.1%,
resulting in a ratio of 4.66 to 1, and this ratio keeps increasing. At length 14, CSDN has
2.41%, while PhpBB has only 0.21%.
End-symbol normalization. We propose another normalization approach, which appends
an “end” symbol ce to each password, both in training and in testing. The probability
assigned by an order-1 Markov chain model to a password “c1c2 · · · cℓ” is
P (c1|c0)P (c2|c1)P (c3|c2) · · ·P (cℓ|cℓ−1)P (ce|cℓ),
where the probability of P (ce|cℓ) is learned from the training dataset. For a string
“c1c2 · · · cU” of the maximal allowed length, we define P (ce|cU) = 1.
In this approach, we also consider which substrings are more likely to occur at the end
of passwords. In Markov chain models using direct normalization, the prefix of a password
is always more likely than the actual password, which may be undesirable. For example,
“passwor” would be assigned a higher probability than “password”. The end symbol cor-
rects this situation, since the probability that an end symbol following “passwor” is likely
to be significantly lower than the product of the probability that “d” follows “passwor” and
that of the end symbol following “password”.
Such a method can ensure that the probabilities assigned to all strings sum up to 1 when
the order of the Markov chain is at least as large as L, the smallest allowed password length.
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To see this, consider the case when L = 1. Envision a tree where each string corresponds to
a node in the tree, with c0 being the root node. Each string “c0c1 · · · cℓ” has “c0c1 · · · cℓ−1”
as its immediate parent. All the leaf nodes are strings with ce as the last symbol, i.e., they
are actual passwords. Each edge is assigned the transition probability; thus, the values
assigned to all edges leaving a parent node add up to 1. Each node in the tree is assigned
a value. The root is assigned 1, and every other node is assigned the value of the parent
multiplied by the transition probability of the edge from its parent to the node. Thus, the
value assigned to each leaf node equals its probability under the model. We note that the
value assigned to each node equals the sum of values assigned to its children. It follows
that the total probabilities assigned to all leaves add up to be the same as those assigned to
the root, which is 1.
When the order of Markov chain, d, is less than L, the minimal required password
length, we may have the situation that the total probabilities add up to less than 1, because
non-zero probabilities would be assigned to illegal passwords of lengths less than L. The
effect is that this method is slightly penalized when evaluated using probability-threshold
graphs or ANLLs. We note that when a model wastes half of the total probability of 1 by
assigning them to passwords that are too short, the ANLLθ is increased by θ.
Choice of Markov Chain Order, Smoothing, and Sparsity. Another challenging issue is
the choice of the order for Markov chains. Intuitively, a higher-order Markov chain enables
the use of deeper history information than lower-order ones, and thus may be more accu-
rate. However, at the same time, a higher-order Markov chain runs the risk of overfitting
and sparsity, which causes reduced performance. Sparsity means that one is computing
transition probabilities from very small count numbers, which may be noisy.
In Markov chain models, especially higher order ones, many calculated conditional
probabilities would be 0, causing many strings assigned probability 0. This can be avoided
by applying the technique of smoothing, which assigns pseudocounts to unseen strings.
Pseudocounts are generally motivated on Bayesian grounds. Intuitively, one should not
think that things that one has not yet seen have probability 0. Various smoothing methods
have been developed for language modeling. Additive smoothing, also known as Laplace
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smoothing, adds δ to the count of each substring. When δ is chosen to be 1, this is known
as add-one smoothing, which is problematic because the added pseudo counts often over-
whelm the true counts. In this chapter, we choose δ to be 0.01; the intuition is that when
encountering a history “c1c2c3c4”, all the unseen next characters, after smoothing come up
to slightly less 1, since there are 95 characters.
A more sophisticated smoothing approach is Good-Turing smoothing [57]. This was
developed by Alan Turing and his assistant I.J. Good as part of their efforts at Bletchley
Park to crack German Enigma machine ciphers during World War II. An example illustrat-
ing the effect of Good-Turing smoothing is in [59], where Bonneau calculated the result
of applying Good-Turing smoothing to the Rockyou dataset. After smoothing, a password
that appears only once has a reduced count of 0.22, a password that appears twice has a
count of 0.88, whereas a password that appears k ≥ 3 times has a reduced count of ap-
proximately k − 1. The “saved” counts from these reduction are assigned to all unseen
passwords. Intuitively, estimating the probability of a password that appears only a few
times using its actual count will overestimate its true probability, whereas the probability
of a password that appears many times can be well approximated by its probability in the
dataset. The key observation underlying Good Turing smoothing is that the best estimation
for the total probability of items that appear exactly i times is the total probability of items
that appear exactly i+ 1 times. In particular, the total probability for all items unseen in a
dataset is best estimated by the total probability of items that appear only once.
Grouping. Castelluccia et al. [19] proposed another approach to deal with sparsity. They
observed that upper-case letters and special symbols occur rarely, and propose to group
them into two new symbols. Here we use Υ for the 26 upper-case letters and Ω for the 33
special symbols. This approach reduces the size of the alphabet from 95 to 38 (26 lower
case letters, 10 digits, and Υ and Ω), thereby reducing sparsity. It treats all uppercase letters
as exactly the same, and all special symbols as exactly the same. That is, the probability
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that any upper-case letter follows a prefix is the probability that Υ follows the prefix divided







We call this the “grouping” method.
We experimented with an adaptation of this method. When encountering an upper-case
letter, we assign probabilities in proportion to the probability of the corresponding lower-
case letter, based on the intuition that following “swor”, “D” is much more likely than Q,
just as d is much more like than q. When encountering a special symbol, we use the order-1
history to assign probability proportionally, based on the intuition that as special symbols
are rare, a shorter history is likely better. In the adaptation, the probability of the above
string will be computed as:
P [a|s0s0]
P [Υ|s0a]P [f |s0a]
#
α P [α|s0a]
P [Ω|aΥ]P [?|F ]
#
ω P [ω|F ]
P [b|ΥΩ],
where α ranges over all lower-case letters, and ω ranges over all special symbols.
Backoff. Another approach that addresses the issue of order, smoothing, and sparsity
together is to use variable order Markov chains. The intuition is that if a history appears
frequently, then we would want to use that to estimate the probability of the next character.
For example, if the prefix is “passwor”, using the whole prefix to estimate the next character
would be more accurate than using only “wor”. On the other hand, if we observe a prefix
that rarely appears, e.g., “!W}ab”, using only “ab” as the prefix is likely to be more accurate
than using longer history, which likely would assign equal probability to all characters. One
way to do this is Katz’s backoff model [58]. In this model, one chooses a threshold and
stores all substrings whose counts are above the threshold. Let πi,j denote the substring
of s0s1s2 · · · sℓ from si to sj . To compute the transition probability from π0,ℓ−1 to π0,ℓ,
we look for the smallest i value such that πi,ℓ−1 has a count above the threshold. There





. In case two, where πi,ℓ does not have a count, we have to
rely on a shorter history to assign this probability. We first compute b, the probability left
after assigning transition probabilities to all characters via case one. We then compute the
probabilities for all other characters using the shorter prefix πi+1,ℓ−1, which are computed
in a recursive fashion. Finally, we normalize these probabilities so that they add up to b.
Backoff models are significantly slower than other Markov models. The backoff models
used in experimentation are approximately 11 times slower than the plain Markov models,
both for password generation and for probability estimation.
3.3.2 Template-based Models
In the template-based approach, one divides passwords into different templates based
on the categories of the characters. For example, one template is 6 lower-case letters fol-
lowed by 3 digits, which we denote as α6β3. Such a template has two segments, one
consisting of the first 6 letters and the other consisting of last 3 digits. The probability of
the password using this template is computed as:
P (“passwd123”) = P (α6β3)P (“passwd”|α6)P (“123”|β3),
where P (α6β3) gives the probability of the template α6β3, P (“passwd”|α6) gives the prob-
ability that “passwd” is used to instantiate 6 lowercase letters, and P (“123”|β3) gives the
probability that “123” is used to instantiate 3 digits. To define a model, one needs to spec-
ify how to assign probabilities to templates, and to the different possible instantiations of a
given segment. Template-based models are used in [17] and the PCFGW model [18].
Assigning probabilities to templates. In [17], the probabilities for templates are manu-
ally chosen because this work was done before the availability of large password datasets.
In [18], the probability is learned from the training dataset by counting. That is, the prob-
ability assigned to each template is simply the number of passwords using the template
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divided by the total number of passwords. Using this approach means that passwords that
use a template that does not occur in the training dataset will have probability 0.
We consider the alternative of applying Markov models to assign probabilities to tem-
plates. That is, we convert passwords to strings over an alphabet of {α, β, υ,ω}, represent-
ing lower-case letters, digits, upper-case letters, and symbols respectively. We then learn
a Markov model over this alphabet, and assign probabilities to a template using Markov
models.
Assigning probabilities to segments. In [17], the probabilities of letter segments are
assigned using a Markov model learned over natural language, and the probabilities for
digit segments and symbol segments are assigned by assuming that all possibilities are
equally likely. In the PCFGW model [18], the probabilities for digit segments and symbol
segments are assigned using counting from the training dataset, and letter segments are
handled using a dictionary. That is, for an α6 segment, all length-6 words in the dictionary
are assigned an equal probability, and any other letter sequence is assigned probability 0.
For a β3 template, the probability of “123” is the number of times “123” occurs as a 3-digit
segment in the training dataset divided by the number of 3-digit segments in the training
dataset.
We consider template models in which we assign segment instantiation probabilities
via both counting and Markov models. Table 3.1 summarizes the design space of password
models we consider in this chapter.
PCFGW model does not fit in the models in Table 3.1, as it requires as input a dictionary
in addition to a training dataset. In this chapter, we considered 3 instantiations of PCFGW :
the first uses the dictionary used in [18]; the second uses the OpenWall dictionary; and the
third generates the dictionary from the training set. We note that the last instantiation is es-
sentially the template-based model using counting both for assigning template probabilities
and for instantiating segments.
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Table 3.1.: Design space for probabilistic password models
Whole-string Markov models
normalization methods: (1) direct, (2)
distribution-based, (3) end symbol
order of Markov chain: 1, 2, 3, 4, · · · or variable
(backoff)
dealing with sparsity: (1) plain, (2) grouping (3)
adapted grouping
smoothing methods: (1) no smoothing, (2) add-δ
smoothing, (3) Good-Turing smoothing
Template-based models
template probability assignment: (1) Counting,
(2) Markov model
segment probability assignment: (1) Counting, (2)
Markov model
3.3.3 Password Generation
To use a password model for cracking, one needs to be able to generate passwords in
decreasing probability.
In whole-string Markov-based methods, the password search space can be modeled as
a search tree. As described earlier, the root node represents the empty string (beginning
of the password), and every other node represents a string. Each node is labeled with the
probability of the string it represents.
One algorithm for password guess generation involves storing nodes in a priority queue.
The queue, arranged in order of node probabilities, initially contains the root node of the
search tree. We then iterate through the queue, popping the node with the greatest likeli-
hood at each iteration. If this is an end node (any non-root node for uniform or length-based
normalization, or nodes with end symbol for end-symbol normalization), we output the
string as a password guess. Otherwise, we calculate the transition probability of each char-
acter in the character set and add to the priority queue a new child node with that character
and the associated probability. This algorithm is guaranteed to return password guesses
in decreasing order of probability (as estimated by the model), due to the iteration order
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and property that each node’s probability is smaller than that of its parent. The algorithm
terminates once the desired number of guesses has been generated.
The priority-queue method, however, is not memory efficient, and does not scale for
generating a large number (e.g., over 50 million) of guesses. Since each node popped from
the queue can result in multiple nodes added to the queue, the queue size is typically several
times of the number of guesses generated. To reduce the memory footprint, we propose a
threshold search algorithm.
The threshold search algorithm, similar to the iterative deepening state space search
method, conducts multiple depth-first traversals of the search tree. In the i’th iteration, it
generates passwords with probabilities in a range (ρi, τi], by performing a depth-first traver-
sal of the tree, pruning all nodes with probability less than ρi, and outputting all passwords
with probability in the target range. To generate n password guesses, we start with a con-
servative range of (ρ1 =
1
n , τ1 = 1]. After the i’th iteration, if we have generated m < n
passwords so far, we start another iteration with (ρi+1 =
ρi
max(2,1.5n/m) , τi+1 = ρi]. That is,
when m < 0.75n, we halve the probability threshold. We have observed empirically that
halving ρ result in close to twice as many passwords being generated. We may overshoot
and generally more than n passwords, but are very unlikely to generate over 2n guesses.
The average runtime complexity of this algorithm as O(n), or linear on n. The memory
complexity (not including the model data or generated passwords) is essentially constant,
as the only data structure needed is a stack of capacity U + 1. We use this framework to
efficiently generate Markov model-based guesses in the experiments. Slight adjustments
need to be made for distribution-based normalization. This method, however, does not ap-
ply to template-based models. Through probability-threshold graphs, we have found that
unless Markov models are used to instantiate templates, template-based models perform
rather poorly. However, when Markov models are used, efficient generation for very large
numbers of passwords appears quite difficult, as one cannot conduct depth-first search and
needs to maintain a large amount of information for each segment. In this chapter, we do
not do password generation for template-based models other than the PCFGW model.
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3.4 Experimental Methodologies
In this section, we describe our experimental evaluation methodologies, including the
dataset we use and the choice of training/testing scenarios.
Datasets. We use the following six password datasets downloaded from public Web sites.
We use only the password information in these datasets and ignored all other information
(such as user names and/or email addresses included in some datasets). The RockYou
dataset [50] contains over 32 million passwords leaked from the social application site
Rockyou in December 2009. The PhpBB dataset [50] includes about 250K passwords
cracked by Brandon Enright from MD5 hashes leaked from Phpbb.com in January 2009.
The Yahoo dataset includes around 450K passwords published by the hacker group named
D33Ds in July 2012. The CSDN dataset includes about 6 million user accounts for the
Chinese Software Developer Network (CSDN), a popular IT portal and a community for
software developers in China [60]. The Duduniu dataset includes about 16 million ac-
counts for a paid online gaming site in China. The 178 datasets includes about 10 million
passwords for another gaming website in China. All 3 Chinese dataset were leaked in
December 2011.
The first 3 datasets are from American websites, and the last 3 are from Chinese web-
sites. The 6 datasets together have approximately 60 million passwords.
Data cleansing. We performed the following data cleansing operations. First, we removed
any password that includes characters beyond the 95 printable ASCII symbols. This step
removed 0.034% of all passwords. In the second step, we removed passwords whose length
were less than 4 or greater than 40. As almost any system that uses passwords will have a
minimal length requirement and a maximum length restriction, we believe that such pro-
cessing is reasonable. In total we removed 0.037% of passwords that are too short, and
0.002% of passwords that are too long. Length-4 passwords account for 0.225% of the
datasets, and we chose not to remove them. Table 3.2 gives detailed information on cleans-
ing.
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Table 3.2.: Results of removing passwords that are too long, too short, and non-ASCII passwords.

















RockYou 14325681 32575584 14541 18038 2868 7914 1290 1346 0.08%
PhpBB 183400 253512 45 45 944 1864 0 0 0.75%
Yahoo 342197 442288 0 0 283 497 0 0 0.11%
CSDN 4037139 6427522 314 355 465 754 0 0 0.02%
Duduniu 6930996 10978339 1485 1979 3685 10881 28 28 0.12%
178 3462280 9072960 0 0 3 5 1 1 0.00%
39
Dataset statistics. Table 3.3 shows the percentages of passwords that appeared
1, 2, 3, 4, 5+ times in all datasets. The detailed statistics for American datasets and Chi-
nese datasets are listed in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, respectively. Recall that the Good-Turing
method estimates that the total probabilities of unseen passwords to be that of unique pass-
words. We see that the two smallest datasets, PhpBB and Yahoo, have significantly higher
percentages of unique passwords, 64.16% and 69.83% respectively, compared to 36.43%
for Rockyou. When combining all 6 datasets, approximately 40% are unique.
Table 3.3.: Password count and frequency information of all datasets
All
all 59750205
Percentage due to Unique 40.92%
Percentage due to Twice 9.32%
Percentage due to 3 Times 4.02%
Percentage due to 4 Times 2.36%
Percentage due to 5+ Times 43.38%
Table 3.4.: Password count and frequency information of American datasets
All American RockYou PhpBB Yahoo
all 33271384 32575584 253512 442288
Percentage due to Unique 37.09% 36.43% 64.16% 69.83
Percentage due to Twice 8.15% 8.12% 9.79% 9.38%
Percentage due to 3 Times 3.58% 3.59% 3.86% 3.60%
Percentage due to 4 Times 2.25% 2.25% 2.31% 1.94%
Percentage due to 5+ Times 48.93% 49.61% 19.88% 15.25%
Table 3.6 and Table Table 3.7 show the length distributions of the password datasets
from English users and from Chinese users, respectively. The tables suggest that the most
common password lengths are 6 to 10, which account for 87% of the whole dataset. One
interesting aspect is that the CSDN dataset has much fewer length 6 and 7 passwords than
other datasets. One explanation is that the website started enforcing a minimal length-
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Table 3.5.: Password count and frequency information of Chinese datasets
All Chinese CSDN Duduniu 178
all 26478821 6427522 10978339 9072960
Percentage due to Unique 45.74% 55.72% 51.83% 31.30%
Percentage due to Twice 10.73% 10.79% 14.20% 7.80%
Percentage due to 3 Times 4.46% 4.55% 5.96% 3.65%
Percentage due to 4 Times 2.47% 2.51% 3.18% 2.19%
Percentage due to 5+ Times 36.41% 29.84% 24.83% 55.07%
Table 3.6.: Password length information for English datasets
All American RockYou PhpBB Yahoo
4 0.2444% 0.2164% 3.1833% 0.6215%
5 4.0466% 4.0722% 5.7110% 1.2028%
6 25.9586% 26.0553% 27.4212% 17.9994%
7 19.2259% 19.2966% 17.8169% 14.8313%
8 20.1374% 19.9886% 27.3967% 26.9336%
9 12.1343% 12.1198% 9.1562% 14.9125%
10 9.0805% 9.0650% 5.3276% 12.3795%
11 3.5711% 3.5659% 2.0985% 4.7976%
12 2.1347% 2.1053% 1.0611% 4.9124%
13 1.3008% 1.3170% 0.4307% 0.6005%
14 0.8490% 0.8609% 0.2142% 0.3373%
15 0.5431% 0.5515% 0.0935% 0.1890%
16 0.3870% 0.3931% 0.0505% 0.1286%
17 0.1208% 0.1225% 0.0142% 0.0592%
18 0.0759% 0.0770% 0.0110% 0.0283%
19 0.0486% 0.0494% 0.0036% 0.0199%
20 0.0412% 0.0415% 0.0032% 0.0400%
21-30 0.0947% 0.0964% 0.0056% 0.0067%
31-40 0.0053% 0.0055% 0.0012% 0.0000%
8 password policy early on, and only users who have accounts near the beginning have
shorter passwords.
Table 3.8 shows the character distribution. It is interesting to note that passwords in
American datasets consist of about 27% digits and 69% lower-case letters, while those in
Chinese datasets are the opposite, with 68% digits and 30% lower-case letters. This is
likely due to both the fact that the Roman alphabet is not native to Chinese, and the fact
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Table 3.7.: Password length information for Chinese password datasets
All Chinese CSDN Duduniu 178
4 0.2013% 0.1041% 0.4226% 0.0023%
5 0.3338% 0.5142% 0.5035% 0.0006%
6 11.2856% 1.2954% 9.1683% 20.9249%
7 13.6824% 0.2696% 16.3914% 19.9063%
8 25.8024% 36.3793% 23.0194% 21.6768%
9 21.9962% 24.1479% 24.6739% 17.2318%
10 15.0372% 14.4810% 20.0710% 9.3403%
11 6.1907% 9.7820% 3.4728% 6.9350%
12 2.6199% 5.7475% 1.1962% 2.1269%
13 1.1738% 2.6106% 0.5061% 0.9638%
14 0.8902% 2.4105% 0.3003% 0.5269%
15 0.4598% 1.1719% 0.1895% 0.2822%
16 0.2195% 0.7716% 0.0255% 0.0633%
17 0.0320% 0.1090% 0.0124% 0.0013%
18 0.0287% 0.0918% 0.0107% 0.0058%
19 0.0115% 0.0356% 0.0060% 0.0013%
20 0.0229% 0.0782% 0.0082% 0.0015%
21-30 0.0110% 0.0000% 0.0191% 0.0090%
31-40 0.0012% 0.0000% 0.0029% 0.0000%
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that digit sequences are easier to remember in Chinese. For each digit, there are many
Chinese characters that have similar sounds, making it easy to find digit sequences that
sound similar to some easy-to-remember phrases. Indeed, we found many such sequences
occurring frequently in Chinese datasets.1
Table 3.9 shows the frequencies of different patterns as well as the most popular pass-
words for each pattern in all datasets. The frequencies of these patterns in each dataset
are listed in Table 3.10. While all lower-case passwords are the most common in Ameri-
can datasets (41.65%), they account for only 8.93% of Chinese datasets. The overall most
common pattern is lowercase followed by digits (33.02%), due to the fact that this is the
most common in Chinese datasets (40.05%). This is followed by all lower-case, all dig-
its, and digits followed by lower-case; these top-4 patterns account for close to 90% of all
passwords. Upper-case letters are most commonly seen preceding a digit sequence, or in
all-uppercase passwords. We also note that the pattern distribution shows a lot of variation
across different datasets.
Training/Testing Scenarios. We now describe our selection of the training and testing
datasets. We decided against merging all datasets into one big dataset and then partitioning
it into training and testing, since we feel that represents unrealistic scenarios in practice.
For example, this causes similar length, character, and pattern distributions in training and
testing; furthermore, any frequent password tends to appear both in training and testing.
Instead, in each scenario, we chose some of the datasets for training, and another for testing.
Table 3.11 lists the 6 scenarios we use in this chapter. Scenarios 1-4 have training and
testing from within the same group (American or Chinese). We merge Yahoo and PhpBB
together because they are both small (containing less than one million passwords when
combined) when compared with other datasets (all contain more than 6 million). Scenarios
2-4 resemble cross-validation, rotating among the 3 Chinese datasets, each time training
with 2 and testing with the remaining 1. Scenario 5 trains on all Chinese datasets and test
on the American datasets Yahoo+PhpBB. Scenario 6 trains on Rockyou and tests on the
1One such sequence is “5201314”, which sounds similar to a phrase that roughly means “I love you forever
and ever”. Both “520” and “1314” are extreme frequent in Chinese datasets.
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Table 3.8.: Password characters information
All All American RockYou PhpBB Yahoo All Chinese CSDN Duduniu 178
all 490102135 262266576 256756616 1857611 3652349 227835559 60788099 93174301 73873159
digit 46.20% 27.28% 27.35% 23.12% 24.56% 67.99% 67.41% 64.74% 72.55%
lower 51.06% 68.87% 68.78% 73.65% 72.55% 30.55% 30.06% 33.79% 26.87%
special 0.48% 0.67% 0.68% 0.32% 0.49% 0.25% 0.62% 0.12% 0.13%
upper 2.26% 3.18% 3.19% 2.91% 2.39% 1.21% 1.91% 1.35% 0.46%
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Table 3.9.: Password pattern information: L denotes a lower-case sequence, D denotes
a digit sequence, U denotes a upper-case sequence, and S denotes a symbol sequence;
patterns differ from templates in that patterns do not record length of sequence.





All American All Chinese
LD 33.22% a123456 27.79% 40.05%
L 27.15% password 41.65% 8.93%
D 24.50% 123456 15.77% 35.48%
DL 4.81% 123456aa 2.57% 7.63%
LDL 1.60% love4ever 1.66% 1.53%
UD 1.48% A123456 1.33% 1.67%
U 0.94% PASSWORD 1.48% 0.26%
ULD 0.64% Password1 0.96% 0.24%
DLD 0.43% 123aa123 0.43% 0.44%
LDLD 0.42% hi5hi5 0.43% 0.40%
UL 0.40% Password 0.65% 0.09%
LSD 0.40% xxx 01 0.66% 0.27%
LSL 0.40% rock you 0.50% 0.08%
LS 0.38% iloveyou! 0.64% 0.07%
DU 0.23% 123456A 0.15% 0.34%
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Table 3.10.: Percentage of password patterns in datasets: L denotes a lower-case sequence,
D denotes a digit sequence, U denotes a upper-case sequence, and S denotes a symbol
sequence; patterns differ from templates in that patterns do not record length of sequence
American datasets Chinese datasets
Rockyou Phpbb Yahoo Csdn Duduniu 178
LD 27.71% 19.26% 38.31% 26.15% 55.57% 31.12%
L 41.70% 50.08% 33.05% 11.65% 7.29% 9.00%
D 15.94% 11.94% 5.86% 45.02% 19.48% 48.07%
DL 2.54% 2.05% 5.32% 5.89% 9.79% 6.25%
LDL 1.62% 3.66% 3.31% 1.64% 1.68% 1.27%
UD 1.35% 0.37% 0.56% 1.62% 2.57% 0.62%
U 1.50% 0.73% 0.40% 0.47% 0.21% 0.15%
ULD 0.94% 1.04% 2.48% 0.50% 0.26% 0.05%
DLD 0.42% 0.79% 0.94% 0.52% 0.44% 0.38%
LDLD 0.42% 1.03% 0.97% 0.47% 0.31% 0.47%
UL 0.65% 1.22% 0.70% 0.09% 0.15% 0.01%
LSD 0.66% 0.33% 0.17% 0.21% 0.05% 0.01%
LSL 0.50% 0.17% 0.39% 0.66% 0.21% 0.08%
LS 0.65% 0.16% 0.20% 0.14% 0.05% 0.04%
DU 0.15% 0.11% 0.06% 0.46% 0.46% 0.11%
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Chinese dataset CSDN. By comparing scenario 5 against 1, and scenario 6 against 2, one
can observe the effect of training on a mismatched dataset. We present detailed results
using graphs for scenario 1 and 2, and ANLL0.8 for other scenarios.
Table 3.11.: Six experimental scenarios.
# name Training Testing
1 Rock→Ya+Ph Rockyou Yahoo+PhpBB
2 Du+178→CSDN Duduniu+178 CSDN
3 CS+178→Dudu CSDN+178 Duduniu
4 CS+Du→178 CSDN+Duduniu 178
5 Chin→Ya+Ph Three Chinese Yahoo+PhpBB
6 Rock→CSDN Rockyou CSDN
3.5 Experimental Results
Experimental results are presented using guess-number graphs, probability-threshold
graphs, and ANLL0.8 values. The algorithm naming convention is as follows. Names for
whole-string models start with “ws”. For example, ws-mc-b10 is Markov chain with backoff
and frequency threshold 10, and ws-mci is order-i Markov chain with add-δ smoothing
for δ = 0.01. The postfix -g is for grouping, -ag for grouping after our adaption, -gts for
Good-Turing smoothing, and -end, -dir, and -dis are for the three normalization approaches.
Names for template-based models start with “tb”; for example, tb-co-mci is the template-
based model using the counting-based method for assigning probabilities to templates and
an order-i Markov chain model for segment instantiation. We note that using this notation,
tb-co-co is PCFGW with dictionary generated from the training dataset.
The Figures. Fig 3.2 and Fig 3.3 gives 8 graphs for Scenario 1. Fig 3.2(a) shows the
rank vs. probability based on generated passwords. One can see that for the three Markov
models shown there, one can translate log of rank into negative log of probability via an
additive factor in the range of 3 to 8. That is, a password that has probability 12y is likely
to have a rank of around 2y−a, which a is mostly between 3 and 8, and seems to gets close
to around 6 as x increases. We conjecture that this trend will further hold as x increases,
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(a) Rank vs. probability: (x, y) denotes the 2x
most likely password has probability 1
2y
; dashed
lines are y = x+ 3 and y = x+ 8
(b) Guess-number graph: (x, y) denotes 2x
guesses cover y portion of the dataset
(c) Superimposing guess number
and prob. threshold: for guess-number curves,
x stands for 2x guesses; for threshold curves, x
stands for probability threshold 1
2x
; dic-0294 is
used as dictionary for PCFGW
(d) Prob. threshold graph for comparing template-
based models (including PCFGW )
Figure 3.2.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenario 1:
Rock→Ya+Ph. (Part 1)
and the gap between different curves would shrink as x increases. One support is that these
curves have to cross at some point due to the fact that the probabilities for each model add
up to 1. Analyzing such Markov models to either prove or disapprove this conjecture is
interesting future research, since it affects to what extend one can use probability threshold
graphs instead of guess number graphs to compare these models with each other.
Fig 3.2(b) shows the guess-number graph. We include results from ws-mc5-end, three
instantiations of PCFGW (using dic-0294, the dictionary used in [18], using the Openwall
dictionary [61], and using a dictionary generated from the training dataset), and JTR in
three different modes (incremental bruteforce, Markov chain, and wordlist/dictionary mode
with Openwall dictionary). We can see that the three PCFGW and the three JTR methods
clearly underperform the Markov model. We note that jtr-mc1 seems to pick up rather
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(a) Prob. threshold graph for comparing the effect
of smoothing, all with end-based normalization
(b) Prob. threshold graph for comparing Markov
of different orders; with end-based normalization
and add-δ smoothing
(c) Prob. threshold graph for comparing the effect
of normalization
(d) Prob. threshold graph for passwords with
length no less than 8; comparing template-based
models (including PCFGW )
Figure 3.3.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenario 1:
Rock→Ya+Ph. (Part 2)
quickly, which matches the shape of ws-mc1 in 3.3(b). Another observation is PCFGW
with training dataset as dictionary (i.e., tb-co-co) outperforms the other two instantiations.
Fig 3.2(c) plots both guess-number curves and probability threshold curves for 3 pass-
word models on the same graph, and one can see that the guess-number curve for any model
approximately matches the the probability threshold curve if one shifts them to the right.
Fig 3.2(d) shows the probability threshold curves for all template-based models and
one whole-string model, namely ws-mc-b10-end. Here, Laplace smoothing with δ = 0.01
is applied to Markov chains in all template models. PCFGW with dic-0294 performs the
worst, and PCFGW with Openwall dictionary performs slightly better. Compared with
other models, these two cover the least passwords at any probability threshold. With prob-
ability threshold at 2−80, the former covers slightly over 50% of all passwords, and the
latter covers close to 60%. The two curves that both use counting to instantiate segments
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(tb-co-co and tb-mc5-co) almost overlap; they perform better than PCFGW with external
dictionaries. On lower probability thresholds, they, together with ws-mc-b10, are the best-
performing methods At threshold 2−80, they cover around 75% of passwords. This suggests
that learning from the dataset is better than using existing dictionaries in PCFGW . When we
replace counting with Markov models for instantiating segments, we see another significant
improvement at higher probability threshold. The model tb-co-mc5 covers more than 90%
of passwords (at threshold 2−80), and tb-mc5-mc5, which takes advantage of smoothing,
covers close to 100% passwords. This improvement, however, comes at the cost of slightly
worse performance than tb-co-co and tb-mc5-co at lower probability thresholds. In other
words, whether to use counting or Markov chains to generate probabilities for templates
shows a small difference. Using counting to instantiate segments shows an overfitting ef-
fect, performing well at low thresholds, but worse at higher ones. Whole-string Markov
with backup (ws-mc-b10-end) almost always has the best performance at any threshold.
Fig 3.3(a) compares the effect of no smoothing, add-δ smoothing, and Good-Turing
smoothing on Markov models of order 4 and order 5. When x < 35, smoothing makes
almost no difference, one simply sees that order 5 outperforms order 4. This is to be ex-
pected, since the smoothing counts make a difference only for strings of low probabilities.
For larger x values, however, smoothing makes a significant difference, and the difference
is much more pronounced for order 5 than for order 4. The order 5 model without smooth-
ing performs the worst, due to overfitting. Good-Turing smoothing under-performs add-δ
smoothing, and results in significant overfitting for order 5.
Fig 3.3(b) compares the effect of different orders in Markov chain models. We see that
higher-order chains perform better for smaller x values, but are surpassed by lower-order
chains later; however, backoff seems to perform well across all ranges of x.
Fig 3.3(c) demonstrates the effect of normalization. Direct normalization performs
the worst, while distribution based normalization performs slightly better than end-symbol
normalization.
As can be seen from Table 3.6, Yahoo+PhpBB have between 40% and 45% passwords
that are of length less than 8. Since many modern websites require passwords to be at
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least 8 characters long, one may question to what extent results from the above figures are
applicable. To answer this question, we repeat figure Fig 3.2(d) by using only passwords
that are at least 8 characters for evaluation. The result is shown in Fig 3.3(d). Note that
while all curves are somewhat lower than the corresponding ones in Fig 3.2(d); they tell
essentially the same story.
(a) Rank vs. probability: (x, y) denotes the 2x
most likely password has probability 1
2y
; dashed
lines are y = x+ 3 and y = x+ 8
(b) Guess-number graph: (x, y) denotes 2x
guesses cover y portion of the dataset
(c) Superimposing guess number
and prob. threshold: for cracking curve, x
stands for 2x guesses; for threshold curve, x
stands for probability threshold 1
2x
; dic-0294 is
used as dictionary for PCFGW
(d) Prob. threshold graph for comparing template-
based models (including PCFGW )
Figure 3.4.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenario 2:
Du+178→CSDN. (Part 1)
Fig 3.4 and Fig 3.5 gives the same 8 graphs for scenario 2, which use Chinese datasets
for training and testing. The observations made above similarly apply. One minor differ-
ence is that in Fig 3.2(d), the performance of PCFG with external dictionaries are worse
than in Scenario 1. Since the Chinese datasets consist of more passwords that use only digit
sequences, and thus are intuitively weaker, this may seem a bit counter-intuitive. This is
because PCFGW uses only digit sequences that appear in the training dataset to instantiate
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(a) Prob. threshold graph for comparing the effect
of smoothing, all with end-based normalization
(b) Prob. threshold graph for comparing Markov
of different orders; with end-based normalization
and add-δ smoothing
(c) Prob. threshold graph for comparing the effect
of normalization
(d) Prob. threshold graph for passwords with
length no less than 8; comparing template-based
models (including PCFGW )
Figure 3.5.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenario 2:
Du+178→CSDN. (Part 2)
password guesses, and thus does perform well when lots of digits are used. When Markov
chains with smoothing are used to instantiate the segments, one obtains a more significant
improvement than in Scenario 1.
Fig 3.6 and Fig 3.7 shows two of these graphs for each of the other 4 scenarios. These
two are the Fig 3.6(d) for a probability threshold graph Fig 3.6(b) for a guess number graph.
They mostly give the same observations. We note that in Fig 3.7(b), we see that PCFGW
with dictionary from the training dataset starts out-performing ws-mc5-end. Note that in
scenario, we train on the Chinese dataset and the use American datasets to evaluate, thus, a
higher-order Markov chain does not perform very well. From Fig 3.7(a), however, we can
see that the variable-order ws-mc-b10 remains the best-performing method.
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(a) Scenario 3: CS+178→Dudu: Prob. threshold
graph for comparing template-based models (in-
cluding PCFGW )
(b) Scenario 3: CS+178→Dudu: Guess-number
graph. (x, y) denotes 2x guesses cover y portion
of the dataset
(c) Scenario 4: CS+Du→178: Prob. threshold
graph for comparing template-based models (in-
cluding PCFGW )
(d) Scenario 4: CS+Du→178: Guess-number
graph. (x, y) denotes 2x guesses cover y portion
of the dataset
Figure 3.6.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenarios 3, 4.
Table 3.12.: ANLL0.8 results for scenarios 1, 2, 3. end, dir, and dis stand for end-symbol,
direct, and distribution-based normalization, respectively. We highlight the best results
within each scenario.
1: Rock→Ya+Ph 2: Du+178→CSDN 3: CS+178→Dudu
Algorithm end dir dis end dir dis end dir dis
ws-mc-b10 20.5 23.3 21.4 22.7 25.4 23.4 23.6 26.0 23.9
ws-mc-b25 20.8 23.6 21.7 22.8 25.5 23.5 23.8 26.1 24.1
ws-mc1 27.7 28.7 26.6 28.7 29.4 27.3 28.0 28.7 26.7
ws-mc2 25.8 27.1 25.0 25.8 26.7 24.7 25.9 27.0 24.9
ws-mc3 23.6 25.2 23.2 24.2 25.3 23.3 24.7 25.9 23.9
ws-mc4 21.7 23.7 21.8 23.3 24.8 22.8 24.1 25.6 23.6
ws-mc5 21.1 23.2 21.3 23.5 25.1 23.2 24.7 26.2 24.3
continued on next page
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Table 3.12.: continued
1: Rock→Ya+Ph 2: Du+178→CSDN 3: CS+178→Dudu
Algorithm end dir dis end dir dis end dir dis
ws-mc1-g 27.7 28.7 26.7 28.8 29.4 27.4 28.1 28.8 26.8
ws-mc2-g 25.8 27.2 25.1 25.9 26.8 24.8 26.0 27.0 25.0
ws-mc3-g 23.7 25.3 23.3 24.3 25.4 23.4 24.8 26.0 24.0
ws-mc4-g 21.8 23.8 21.8 23.4 24.9 22.9 24.2 25.7 23.7
ws-mc5-g 21.1 23.2 21.3 23.5 25.1 23.2 24.6 26.2 24.2
ws-mc6-g 21.3 23.3 21.4 25.3 26.8 24.9 25.9 27.4 25.4
ws-mc1-ag 27.6 28.7 26.6 28.7 29.3 27.3 28.0 28.7 26.7
ws-mc2-ag 25.8 27.1 25.0 25.8 26.7 24.7 26.0 27.0 25.0
ws-mc3-ag 23.6 25.3 23.3 24.2 25.3 23.3 24.7 26.0 24.0
ws-mc4-ag 21.7 23.7 21.8 23.3 24.8 22.8 24.1 25.6 23.7
ws-mc5-ag 21.0 23.1 21.2 23.4 25.0 23.1 24.6 26.1 24.2
ws-mc6-ag 21.3 23.3 21.3 25.1 26.7 24.7 25.9 27.3 25.3
ws-mc1-gts 27.7 28.7 26.6 28.7 29.4 27.3 28.0 28.7 26.7
ws-mc2-gts 25.8 27.1 25.1 25.8 26.7 24.7 25.9 27.0 24.9
ws-mc2-gts 23.6 25.3 23.3 24.2 25.3 23.3 24.7 26.0 24.0
ws-mc2-gts 22.0 23.9 22.0 23.5 24.9 23.0 24.3 25.8 23.9
ws-mc2-gts 22.5 24.4 22.5 24.7 26.1 24.3 26.8 28.0 26.1
tb-mc1-mc1 27.8 28.8 26.7 28.8 29.4 27.3 28.0 28.8 26.7
tb-mc2-mc2 26.2 27.3 25.3 26.2 26.9 24.9 26.4 27.3 25.3
tb-mc3-mc3 24.4 25.7 23.7 24.7 25.6 23.6 25.3 26.4 24.4
tb-mc4-mc4 22.8 24.3 22.3 23.9 25.0 23.0 24.7 26.0 24.0
tb-mc5-mc5 21.9 23.6 21.6 23.5 24.8 22.8 24.4 25.9 23.9
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(a) Scenario 5: Chin→Ya+Ph: Prob. threshold
graph for comparing template-based models (in-
cluding PCFGW )
(b) Scenario 5: Chin→Ya+Ph: Guess-number
graph. (x, y) denotes 2x guesses cover y portion
of the dataset
(c) Scenario 6: Rock→CSDN: Prob. threshold
graph for comparing template-based models (in-
cluding PCFGW )
(d) Scenario 6: Rock→CSDN: Guess-number
graph. (x, y) denotes 2x guesses cover y portion
of the dataset
Figure 3.7.: Guess number graphs and probability threshold graphs for Scenarios 5, 6.
Table 3.13.: ANLL0.8 results for scenarios 4, 5, 6. end, dir, and dis stand for end-symbol,
direct, and distribution-based normalization, respectively. We highlight the best results
within each scenario.
4: CS+Du→178 5: Chin→Ya+Ph 6: Rock→CSDN
Algorithm end dir dis end dir dis end dir dis
ws-mc-b10 19.3 22.0 20.2 24.8 26.9 25.1 26.4 28.9 27.2
ws-mc-b25 19.4 22.1 20.3 25.4 27.4 25.6 26.6 29.1 27.4
ws-mc1 24.8 25.6 23.7 30.9 31.7 29.9 31.1 31.3 29.6
ws-mc2 22.3 23.5 21.7 29.6 30.5 28.7 29.0 29.5 27.7
ws-mc3 20.8 22.3 20.5 27.2 28.4 26.6 27.8 28.5 26.7
ws-mc4 19.9 21.8 20.0 25.9 27.4 25.7 27.4 28.2 26.6
ws-mc5 19.5 21.6 19.8 26.4 27.8 26.0 27.9 29.0 27.3
continued on next page
55
Table 3.13.: continued
4: CS+Du→178 5: Chin→Ya+Ph 6: Rock→CSDN
Algorithm end dir dis end dir dis end dir dis
ws-mc1-g 24.8 25.6 23.8 30.9 31.7 29.9 31.1 31.4 29.6
ws-mc2-g 22.4 23.5 21.7 29.6 30.6 28.7 29.0 29.6 27.8
ws-mc3-g 20.9 22.4 20.6 27.2 28.5 26.7 27.9 28.5 26.8
ws-mc4-g 20.0 21.8 20.0 25.8 27.4 25.6 27.4 28.2 26.6
ws-mc5-g 19.5 21.6 19.8 25.9 27.4 25.6 27.7 28.8 27.1
ws-mc6-g 20.2 22.3 20.5 26.3 27.5 25.7 30.0 31.2 29.4
ws-mc1-ag 24.8 25.6 23.7 30.9 31.7 29.8 31.0 31.3 29.5
ws-mc2-ag 22.3 23.5 21.6 29.6 30.5 28.7 28.9 29.4 27.7
ws-mc3-ag 20.8 22.3 20.5 27.2 28.4 26.6 27.8 28.4 26.7
ws-mc4-ag 19.9 21.8 20.0 25.8 27.4 25.6 27.3 28.1 26.5
ws-mc5-ag 19.4 21.6 19.8 25.8 27.3 25.5 27.5 28.7 27.0
ws-mc6-ag 20.0 22.2 20.5 26.2 27.5 25.7 29.9 31.0 29.3
ws-mc1-gts 24.8 25.6 23.7 30.9 31.7 29.9 31.1 31.3 29.6
ws-mc2-gts 22.3 23.5 21.7 29.6 30.5 28.7 29.0 29.5 27.7
ws-mc2-gts 20.8 22.4 20.5 27.3 28.5 26.7 27.8 28.5 26.8
ws-mc2-gts 20.0 21.8 20.0 26.9 28.3 26.6 27.8 28.6 27.0
ws-mc2-gts 19.6 21.7 19.9 30.2 31.0 29.2 30.4 31.3 29.6
tb-mc1-mc1 24.9 25.6 23.7 30.9 31.7 29.9 31.0 31.3 29.5
tb-mc2-mc2 22.8 23.8 22.0 29.8 30.7 28.9 29.1 29.5 27.8
tb-mc3-mc3 21.6 22.8 21.0 27.8 28.8 27.0 27.9 28.5 26.8
tb-mc4-mc4 20.9 22.4 20.5 26.4 27.6 25.8 27.1 27.9 26.2
tb-mc5-mc5 20.4 22.1 20.3 25.8 27.2 25.4 26.8 27.8 26.1
ANLL Table. ANLL0.8 values for all six scenarios are given in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13.
In the tables, end, dir, and dis stand for end-symbol, direct, and distribution-based normal-
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ization, respectively. We highlight the best results within each scenario. Using this format,
we can compare more models directly against each other, with the limitation that these
results need to be interpreted carefully. Some models assign probability 0 to some pass-
words; their ANLLs are not well-defined and thus not included. Results for those models
are presented using graphs.
Many observations can be made from the tables. First, backoff with end-symbol nor-
malization is gives the best result overall, as it produces results that are among the best
across all scenarios. Especially, for Scenario 1, which we consider to be the most impor-
tant one, it produces the best overall result. Several other models perform quite close. It
seems that using a Markov chain of an order that is high enough, but not too high, and with
some ways to deal with overfitting, would perform reasonably well.
Second, for most other models, distribution-based normalization performs the best, fol-
lowed by end-symbol normalization. Direct normalization, which was implicitly used in
the literature, performs the worst. Yet, for backoff, end-symbol normalization performs the
best. There seems to exist some synergy between backoff and end-symbol normalization.
One possible reason is that as backoff uses variable-length Markov chains, it can recognize
long common postfixes of passwords so that it can end a password appropriately, instead of
depending only on the length of passwords for normalization. With fixed-length Markov
chains, one does not have this benefit.
Third, on the effect of smoothing, Good-Turing smoothing performs unexpectedly
poorly, especially for higher-order Markov chains; it seems that they tend to cause more
overfitting, a phenomenon also shown in Figure 3.3(a) and 3.5(a). For higher orders
Markov models, add-δ smoothing, grouping, adapted grouping, and template-based models
all perform similarly; they are just slightly worse than backoff with end-symbol normaliza-
tion.
Fourth, for most models, the Markov chain order that gives the best results varies from
scenario to scenario. For Scenario 1, order-5 appears to be the best. Yet for the scenarios
with Chinese datasets (2, 3), order 4 generally outperform order 5. One obvious reason is
the slightly smaller training dataset. Also, because the Chinese datasets use digits much
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more than letters, they contain even non-digit sequences for training, resulting in better
performance for lower-order Markov chains. Again, this demonstrates the benefit of using
a variable-order model like backoff, since one does not need to choose the appropriate
order.
Fifth, comparing the pair of scenarios 5 and 1, and the pair of 6 and 2, one can see a
difference in ANLL0.8 of about 2 to 4 in each case; this demonstrates the importance of
training on a similar dataset.
Sixth, comparing scenarios 2, 3, and 4, we can see that 178 is clearly the weakest pass-
word dataset among the 3, which is corroborated by evidence from Table 3.5 and Table 3.9.
In 178, 55% of passwords are those appearing more than 5 times (compared to 30% and
25% for CSDN and Duduniu); close to 21% are length 6 (compared to 1.3% and 9%); 48%
are all digits (compared to 45% for CSDN and 19.5% for Duduniu; recall that passwords
in CSDN tend to be significantly longer).
3.6 Conclusions
In summary, we make the following contributions in this chapter:
• We introduce the methodology of using probability-threshold graphs for password
research, which has clear advantages over the current standard approach of using
guess-number graphs for type-1 password research. They are much faster to construct
and also gives information about the passwords that are difficult to crack. In our
experiments, it took about 24 hours to generate 1010 passwords for plotting guess-
number graphs; which cover between 30% and 70% in the dataset. On the other
hand, it took less than 15 minutes to compute probabilities for all passwords in a size
107 testing dataset, giving strength information of all passwords in the dataset. We
note, however, that for type-2 research, in which one compares different password
models, one needs to be careful to interpret results from probability-threshold graphs
and should use guess-number graphs to corroborate these results.
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• We introduce knowledge and techniques from the rich literature in n-gram models
for statistical language modeling into password modeling, as well as identifying new
issues that arise from modeling passwords. We also identify a broad design space for
password models.
• We conduct a systematic evaluation of many password models, and make a number
of findings. In particular, we show that the PCFGW model, which has been assumed
to be the state of the art and is widely used in research, does not perform as well as
whole-string Markov models.
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4. IMPROVING PASSWORD POLICIES AND PRACTICE USED
BY WEBSITES
In Chapter 3, we have introduced metrics comparing probabilistic password models. Given
a model that can accurately measure the strength of passwords, a natural question raised is
how to apply the model in practice. In particular, how can the model be used to help users
choose strong passwords.
In this chapter, we address the question: How to best check weak passwords? We model
different password strength checking methods as Password Ranking Algorithms (PRAs),
and introduce two methods for comparing different PRAs: the β-Residual Strength Graph
(β-RSG) and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG). In our experiments,
we find some password datasets that have been widely used in password research con-
tain many problematic passwords that are not naturally created. We develop techniques to
cleanse password datasets by removing these problematic accounts. We then apply the two
metrics on cleansed datasets and show that several PRAs, including the dictionary-based
PRA, the Markov Models with and without backoff, have similar performances. If the size
of PRAs are limited in order to be able to be transmitted over the internet, a hybrid method
combining a small dictionary of weak passwords and a Markov model with backoff with a
limited size can provide the most accurate strength measurement.
4.1 Introduction
Password-based authentication is the most widely used authentication mechanism. De-
spite countless attempts at designing mechanisms to replace it, password-based authenti-
cation appears more widely used and firmly entrenched than ever [1, 28, 62]. One major
weakness of password-based authentication is the inherent tension between the security
and usability of passwords [2, 3]. More precisely, secure passwords tend to be difficult to
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memorize (i.e., less usable) whereas passwords that are memorable tend to be predictable.
Generally individuals side with usability of passwords by choosing predictable and weak
passwords [2, 4–7].
To deal with this, the most common approach is to forbid the use of weak passwords, or
give warnings for passwords that are “somewhat weak”. This approach requires an effective
way to identify weak passwords. One way is to use password composition policies, i.e.,
requiring passwords to satisfy some syntactical properties, e.g., minimum length and/or
categories of characters. An alternative is to use proactive password checkers that are based
on a weak password dictionary [32–34]. More recently, probabilistic password models,
which work by assigning a probability to each password, were introduced [17–19].
How to best check weak passwords is still an open question. A study in 2014 [21] ex-
amined several password meters in use at popular websites and found highly inconsistent
strength estimates for the same passwords using different meters. The report did not an-
swer the question of which meter is the best, nor what methods should be used to compare
them. Designing an effective password meter requires solving two problems: (1) How to
accurately assess the strength of passwords chosen by the users; and (2) How to commu-
nicate the strength information to and interact with the users to encourage them to choose
strong passwords. These two problems are largely orthogonal. In this chapter we focus on
solving the first problem.
We model different password strength assessing methods (including composition poli-
cies) as Password Ranking Algorithms (PRAs), which assign a rank to every password.
One state-of-the-art method for comparing PRAs is the Guess Number Graph (GNG),
which plots the number of guesses vs. the percentage of passwords cracked in the test
dataset. However, GNG measures only the total density of the uncracked passwords, but not
their distribution, which is critical in assessing the effectiveness to defend against guess-
ing attacks after deploying the PRA. To address this limitation of GNG, we propose the
β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG), which measures the strength of the β most common
passwords in the test dataset, after forbidding the weakest passwords identified by a PRA.
When a PRA forbids a large number of passwords that users are extremely unlikely to use,
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it performs poorly under β-RSG. To limit the influence of these passwords, we also propose
Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG), which ignores how passwords that do
not appear in the testing dataset are ranked. β-NRSG also has the advantage that we can
use it to evaluate blackbox password strength services for which one can query the strength
of specific passwords, but cannot obtain all weak passwords.
Surprisingly, we observe that all PRAs perform significantly worse on password
datasets from Chinese websites than on datasets from English websites, because some of
the most frequent passwords in the testing dataset are not recognized as weak passwords
by all the PRAs. Further investigation reveal that these passwords are in all likelihood due
to “fake accounts”, possibly created by site administrators to artificially boost the number
of registered users. The evidence for this includes that the user IDs associated with such
passwords look suspicious. These suspicious IDs fall into two categories: appending a
counter to a fixed prefix; and a large number of fixed-length strings that apparently look
random. While these datasets have been used in previous papers, we are the first to report
such fake accounts. We develop a data cleansing technique to identify and remove such
“fake” accounts in order to obtain a more accurate evaluation.
Our evaluation is based on the cleansed password datasets. We have compared the
Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar (PCFG) [18] method, Markov models with and with-
out backoff [17, 19], blacklists based on training datasets, the combined method proposed
by Ur et al. [22], password composition policies, as well as two versions of zxcvbn [23]. We
also show how GNG, β-RSG, and β-NRSG differ. We find that when one places no limit
on the mode size, several methods including the blacklist approach, Markov Models, and
the Combined method have similar performance. When one wants to check the strength of
passwords on the client side, without sending passwords over the network, the model size
must be limited. We find that a blacklist with a limited size still provide the most accurate
strength measurement for the most popular passwords. However, only a limited number of
passwords are covered.
We then propose a new client-end PRA that uses a hybrid method; it uses a small
blacklist to assess the strength of most popular passwords, and evaluate the other passwords
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based on a limited size Markov model with backoff. We show that the hybrid method
inherits the advantages of both methods, and consistently outperform the other client-end
PRAs.
4.2 How to Compare PRAs
In this section, we propose metrics evaluating password ranking algorithms (PRAs).
At the core of any password strength meter is a Password Ranking Algorithm (PRA),
which is a function that sorts passwords from weak (common) to strong (rare).
Definition 4.2.1 (Password Ranking Algorithm (PRA)) Let P denote the set of all al-
lowed passwords. A Password Ranking Algorithm r : P → Rnk is a function that maps
each password to a ranking in Rnk, where Rnk = {1, . . . , |P|} ∪ {∞}.
Intuitively, a password with rank 1 means that it is considered to be one of the weakest
password(s); and a password with rank ∞ means that it is considered to be strong enough
to not need a ranking. The above definition accommodates PRAs that rank only a subset of
all passwords as well as PRAs that rank some passwords to be of equal strength. A pass-
word composition policy can be modeled as a PRA that assigns a rank of 1 to passwords
that do not satisfy the policy, and ∞ otherwise. Probabilistic password models that assign
a probability to each password can be converted into a PRA by sorting, in decreasing order,
the passwords based on their probabilities in the model. Arguably, this captures the essen-
tial information for determining the strengths of passwords, since both cracking passwords
and choosing which passwords to forbid should be done based on the ranking.
4.2.1 Guess Number Graph (GNG)
The state-of-the-art method for comparing PRAs is the Guess Number Graph (GNG),
which plots the number of guesses vs. the percentage of passwords cracked in the dataset.
A point (x, y) on a curve means that y percent of passwords are included in the first x
guesses. When evaluating PRAs for their effectiveness in cracking passwords, GNG is an
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ideal choice. For the same x value, a PRA that has a higher y value is better. However,
one limitation of GNG is that it does not convey information regarding the distribution of
uncracked passwords. For example, suppose that two PRAs r1 and r2 both cover 40% of
passwords after making 106 guesses. Under r1 there remain uncovered 5 passwords each
appearing 200 times and a large number of passwords that appear just once. And under r2
there remain 500 passwords each appearing 2 times together with a similarly large num-
ber of passwords that appear just once. In this case, if we decide to forbid the first 106
passwords that are considered weak and an adversary is limited to 5 guess attempts per
account (e.g., because of rate limiting), the adversary can successfully break into 1,000
accounts based on r1, but only 10 accounts based on r2. Obviously, r1 is worse than r2,
even though they look the same under the GNG. Therefore, GNG is not appropriate for
the effectiveness of using a PRA for identifying and forbidding the usage of weak pass-
words, especially since the primary objective of checking password strength is to defend
against online guessing attacks, as offline attacks are best defended against by improving
site security and by using salted, slow cryptographic hash functions when storing password
hashes.
4.2.2 The β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG)
To deal with the limitation of GNG, we propose to use the β-Residual Strength Graph.
Each PRA r corresponds to a curve, such that a point (x, y) on the curve means that after
forbidding what r considers to be the x weakest passwords, the strength of the remaining
passwords is y. For the choice of y, we use the effective key-length metric corresponding
to the β-success-rate, proposed by Boztaş [29] and Bonneau [28], to measure the strength
of the probabilities of the remaining passwords, which we call the residual distribution.
More specifically, given a password dataset D, we use pD(w) to denote a password
w’s frequency in D, i.e., pD(w) =
number of times w occurs in D
|D| . Given a PRA r and a
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number x, let wi be the ith most frequent password in D that is not among the x weakest








Intuitively, β-RSG provides a measure of the strength of the remaining weakest passwords
after a certain number of weak passwords according to r are forbidden. It translates the
total frequencies of the β unremoved weakest passwords into a bit-based security metric,
which can be viewed as finding the entropy of a uniform distribution where the probability
of each element equals that of the average of these β passwords.
We need to choose appropriate values for β. In [28], λ̃10 is used, which corresponds
to an online attack setting where 10 guesses are allowed, which was recommended by
usability studies [30]. We adapt the setting.
4.2.3 The Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG)
Password composition policies (such as the ones that require mixing letters with digits
and special symbols), when viewed as PRAs, tend to perform poorly under the RSG, be-
cause they rule out a large number of passwords, e.g., all passwords that consist of only
letters. This observation demonstrates that one weakness of password composition policies
is that they prevent some strong passwords (such as unpredictable passwords consisting of
only letters) from being used. However, one may argue that this criticism is not completely
fair to them. The cost of forbidding a strong (i.e., rarely used) password is that users who
naturally want to use such a password cannot do so, and have to choose a different pass-
word, which they may have more trouble remembering. However, if users are extremely
unlikely to choose the password anyway, then there is very little cost to forbid it.
We thus propose a variation of RSG, which “normalizes” a RSG curve by considering
only passwords that actually appear in the testing dataset D. More specifically, a point
(x, y) on the curve for a PRA r means that after choosing a threshold such that x pass-
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words that appear in D are forbidden, the residual strength is y. We call this variation the
Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG). A NRSG curve can be obtained from
a corresponding RSG curve by shrinking the x axis; however, different PRAs may have
different shrinking effects, depending on how many passwords that are considered weak
by the PRAs do not appear in the testing dataset. Under β-NRSG, PRAs are not penalized
for rejecting passwords that do not appear in the testing dataset. A PRA would perform
well if it considers the weak (i.e., frequent) passwords in the dataset to be weaker than the
passwords that appear very few times in it. β-NRSG also has the advantage that we can
use it to evaluate blackbox password strength services for which one can query the strength
of specific passwords, but cannot obtain all weak passwords. We suggest using both RSGs
and NRSGs when comparing PRAs.
4.2.4 Client versus Server PRAs
A PRA can be deployed either at the server end, where a password is sent to a server
and has its strength checked, or at the client end, where the strength checking is written in
JavaScript and executed in the client side inside a browser. PRAs deployed at the server end
are less limited by the size of the model. On the other hand, deploying PRAs on the client
side increases confidence in using them, especially when password strength checking tools
are provided by a third party. Thus it is also of interest to compare the PRAs that have a
relatively small model size, and therefore can be deployed at the client end. We say a PRA
is a Client-end PRA if the model size is less than 1MB, and a Server-end PRA otherwise.
4.2.5 PRAs We Consider
The PRAs that are considered in this chapter are listed in Table 4.1. In Client-end PRAs,
the size of zxcvbn1, zxcvbn2 are 698KB and 821KB correspondingly. For password models
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Table 4.1.: Server-end PRAs and Client-end PRAs. Xc means reduced-size version of
model X in order to be deployed at the client side.
Server-end Markov Model [19], Markov Model with backoff, Probabilistic Context-
free Grammar [18], Google API, Blacklist, Combined [22]
Client-end zxcvbn1 [23], zxcvbn2 [23], Blacklistc, Markov Modelc, Markov Model
with backoffc, Hybrid
whose model sizes are adjustable, we make the model size to be approximately 800KB to
have a fair comparison.
PCFG. In the PCFG approach [18], one divides a password into several segments by
grouping consecutive characters of the same category (e.g., letters, digits, special symbols)
into one segment. Each password thus follows a pattern, for example, L7D3 denotes a
password consisting of a sequence of 7 letters followed by 3 digits. The distribution of
different patterns as well as the distribution of digits and symbols are learned from a training
dataset. PCFG chooses words to instantiate segments consisting of letters from a dictionary
where all words in the dictionary are assumed to be of the same probability. The probability
of a password is calculated by multiplying the probability of the pattern by the probabilities
of the particular ways the segments are instantiated.
Markov model. N-gram models, i.e., Markov chains, have been applied to pass-
words [19]. A Markov chain of order d, where d is a positive integer, is a process that
satisfies
P (xi|xi−1, xi−2, . . . , x1) = P (xi|xi−1, . . . , xi−d)
where d is finite and x1, x2, x3, . . . is a sequence of random variables. A Markov chain with
order d corresponds to an n-gram model with n = d+ 1.
We evaluate 5-gram Markov Model (MC5), as recommended in Chapter 3, within
Server-end PRAs setting. In order to fit the Markov Model into a Client-end PRA, if we
store the frequency of each sequence in a trie structure, the leaf level contains 95n nodes,
where 95 is the total number of printable characters. To limit the size of Markov model to
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be no larger than 1MB, n should be less than 4. We use 3-order Markov Model MC3 in our
evaluation.
Markov model with backoff. The model was proposed in Chapter 3. The intuition of
the model is that if a history appears frequently, then we would want to use that to estimate
the probability of the next character. In this model, one chooses a threshold and stores all
substrings whose counts are above the threshold, and use the frequency of these substrings
to compute the probability. Therefore, the model size of a Markov Model with backoff
depends on the frequency threshold selected. In this chapter, we consider two sizes of
Markov Model with backoff by varying frequency threshold. We first pick a relatively
small threshold 25 (MCB25), as suggested in Chapter 3, to construct a Server-end PRA.
Table 4.2.: Model size of Markov models with backoff using different frequency threshold.
Train
Frequency Threshold
25 200 500 1000 1500 2000
RockYou 18M 3.4M 1.7M 1M 712K 556K
Duduniu 7.8M 1.5M 604K 368K 268K 200K
For Client-end PRAs, similar to the Markov model, we record the model in a trie struc-
ture, where each node contains a character and the corresponding count of the sequence
starting from the root node to the current node. We measure the size of data after serializ-
ing the trie into JSON format. Table 4.2 shows the size of the models trained on Rockyou
and Duduniu dataset with different frequency thresholds. The size of the Markov Models
with backoff when trained on Duduniu dataset is significantly smaller than that of models
trained on the Rockyou dataset. This is primarily due to the difference in character distribu-
tion between English and Chinese users. English users are more likely to use letters while
Chinese users are more likely to use digits. As a result, the most frequent sequences in
Rockyou are mainly constructed by letters while those in Duduniu are mainly constructed
by digits. The difference in the size of the models comes from the different search space
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in letters and digits. In order to approximate the size of the model to that of zxcvbn, we
choose MCB1500 for English datasets and MCB500 for Chinese datasets.
Dictionary-based Blacklist. Dictionary-based blacklists for filtering weak passwords
have been studied for decades, e.g., [32–34]. Some popular websites, such as Pinterest
and Twitter, embed small weak password dictionaries, consisting of 13 and 401 passwords
respectively, on their registration pages. We use a training dataset to generate the blacklist
dictionary. The order of the passwords follows the frequency of passwords in the training
dataset in a reversed order. Assuming each password contains 8 characters on average, a
dictionary with 100,000 passwords is approximately 900KB. Such blacklist (Blacklistc) is
used in Client-end PRAs settings.
Combined Method. Ur et al. [22] proposed Minauto metric, which is the minimum guess
number for a given password across multiple automated cracking approaches. We imple-
ment a password generator which outputs passwords in the order of their corresponding
Minauto. Passwords with smaller Minauto are generated earlier. In the Combined PRA,
the rank of a password is the order of the passwords generated. In this chapter, Minauto is
calculated by combining 4 well-studied approaches: Blacklist, PCFG, Markov, and Markov
with backoff.
Google Password Strength API. Google measures the strength of passwords by assigning
an integer score ranging from 1 to 4 when registering on their website. We find that the
score is queried via an AJAX call and the API is publicly available1. We use this service to
assess the strength of passwords. We are not able to generate passwords and get the exact
ranking as the underlying algorithm has not been revealed.
Zxcvbn Version 1 Zxcvbn is an open-source password strength meter developed by
Wheeler [23]. It decomposes a given password into chunks, and then assigns each chunk an
estimated “entropy”. The entropy of each chunk is estimated depending on the pattern of
the chunk. The candidate patterns are “dictionary”, “sequence”, “spatial”, “year”, “date”,
“repeat” and “bruteforce”. For example, if a chunk is within the pattern “dictionary”, the
1https://accounts.google.com/RatePassword
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entropy is estimated as the log of the rank of word in the dictionary. Additional entropy is
added if uppercase letters are used or some letters are converted into digits or sequences
(e.g. a⇒@). There are 5 embedded frequency-ordered dictionaries: 7140 passwords from
the Top 10000 password dictionary; and three dictionaries for common names from the
2000 US Census. After chunking, a password’s entropy is calculated as the sum of its




A password may be divided into chunks in different ways, Zxcvbn finds the way that yields
the minimal entropy and uses that.
Zxcvbn Version 2 In October 2015, a new version of zxcvbn was published. Zxcvbn2
also divides a password into chunks, and computes a password’s strength as the “minimal
guess” of it under any way of dividing it into chunks. A password’s “guess” after being







where l is the number of the chunks. The factorial term is the number of ways to order l
patterns. The 10000(l−1) term captures the intuition that a password that has more chunks
are considered stronger. Another change in the new version is that if a password is decom-
posed into multiple chunks, the estimated guess number for each chunk is the larger one
between the chunks’ original estimated guess number and a min guess number , which
is 10 if the chunk contains only one character or 50 otherwise. While these changes are
heuristic, our experimental results show these changes cause significant improvements un-
der our methods of comparison.
There are some other subtle changes, such as one built-in dictionary is replaced. For
consistency, in this chapter, we use the original dictionaries in both two versions.
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Table 4.3 illustrates the penalty in entropy estimation for passwords which consist of
more than one chunk. The estimated entropy for such passwords significantly increase in
the second version of zxcvbn. Actually, password1 is decomposed as password and
1 in zxcvbn1 while viewed as only one chunk in zxcvbn2. If decomposed into 2 chunks in
zxcvbn2, the password’s estimated entropy is even larger.
Hybrid Method Observing the promising performance of dictionary methods and the
limited number of passwords covered (see Chapter 4.4.2 for details), we propose a hybrid
PRA which combines a blacklist PRA with a backoff model. In the hybrid PRA, we reject
passwords belonging to a blacklist dictionary or with low scores using the backoff model.
To make the size of the PRAs consistent, we further limit the size for both dictionary and
backoff model. We chose to use a dictionary containing 30 000 words, which takes less
than 300KB. In order to keep the total size of the model consistent, we used MCB2000 and
MCB1000 for English datasets and Chinese datasets, respectively.
4.3 Data Cleansing
Poor Performance of PRAs on Chinese Datasets. In our evaluation comparing PRAs,
we observe that almost all PRAs perform poorly on some Chinese dataset.
Figure 4.1 shows the results of an β-Residual Strength Graph(β-RSG) evaluation on
Xato (an English dataset) and 178 (a Chinese dataset). A point (x, y) on a curve means if
we want to reject the top x passwords from a PRA, the residual strength is y. It is clear
that the residual strength for 178 is much lower than that of Xato. In 178, even if 1 million
passwords are rejected, the residual strength is around or lower than 8 for all PRAs we
examined, which means the average of the remaining top 10 passwords’ probability is as
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(a) Xato, β = 10 (b) 178, β = 10
Figure 4.1.: β-Residual Strength Graph(β-RSG) on original Xato and 178 datasets. A point
(x, y) on a curve means if we want to reject the top x passwords from a PRA, the strength
of the remaining passwords is y.
high as 128 ≈ 0.39%. We find that 12 out of the top 20 passwords in 178 are not among the
first million weakest passwords for any PRA. This led us to investigate why this occurs.
Evidence of Suspicious IDs. We find that the dataset contains a lot of suspicious account
IDs which mostly fall in to two patterns: (1) Counter: a common prefix appended by a
counter; (2) Random: a random string with a fixed length. Table 4.4 lists some suspicious
accounts sampled from the 178 dataset, which we believe were created either by a single
user in order to benefit from the bonus for new accounts, or by the system administrator, in
order to artificially boost the number users on the sites. Either way, such passwords are not
representative of actual password choices and should be removed.
Table 4.4.: Examples of problematic IDs in 178 dataset.
Password Counter IDs (sampled) Random Ids (sampled)




. . .; qiujie0345
j3s1b901; ul2c6shx; a3bft0b8;
wzjcxytp; 7fmjwzg2; 0ypvjqvo






Table 4.5.: Number of accounts removed after identifying problematic IDs.
Dataset Yahoo Xato Duduniu CSDN 178
Removed 232 9577 9796 69317 1639868
Total 434131 9148094 7304316 6367411 8434340
Suspicious Account Detection We detect and remove suspicious passwords (accounts)
using the user IDs and email addresses. Yahoo and Duduniu datasets only have email
address available. We first remove the email provider, i.e., the postfix starting from @, and
then, treat the prefix of email addresses as account IDs. Rockyou and Phpbb datasets are
excluded in the following analysis, as we don’t have access to user IDs/emails.
We identify Counter IDs utilizing Density-based Spatial Clustering of Applications
with Noise (DBSCAN) [63]. DBSCAN [63] is a density-based clustering algorithm. It
groups together points that are closely packed together. DBSCAN requires two parameters:
ϵ and the minimum number of points required to form a dense region minPts. It starts
with an arbitrary starting point that has not been visited. This point’s ϵ−neighborhood is
retrieved, and if it contains sufficiently many points, a cluster is started. Otherwise, the
point is labeled as noise. Note that this point might later be found in a sufficiently sized
ϵ−environment of a different point and hence be made part of a cluster. If a point is found
to be a dense part of a cluster, its ϵ−neighborhood is also part of that cluster. Hence, all
points that are found within the ϵ−neighborhood are added, as is their own ϵ−neighborhood
when they are also dense. This process continues until the density-connected cluster is
completely found. Then, a new unvisited point is retrieved and processed, leading to the
discovery of a further cluster or noise.
In our case, each ID is viewed as a point, and the distance between two IDs are measured
by the Levenshtein distance, which measures the minimum number of single-character
edits. Given a password, we first extract all the corresponding IDs in the dataset, and then
generate groups of IDs, where the IDs in the same group share a common prefix with length
at least 3. The grouping is introduced to reduce the number of points to be clustered, as
calculating pairwise distance of a large number of data points is slow. Next, we apply
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DBSCAN with ϵ = 1 and minPts = 5 to each group. Finally, we label all IDs in clusters
with size at least 5 as suspicious.
Random IDs are identified based on probabilities of IDs, which are calculated utilizing
a Markov Model. Intuitively, Random IDs are ids whose probabilities are “unreasonably
small”. Observing that Random IDs are generally with the same length, for a fixed pass-
word, we propose to analyze the corresponding IDs with different lengths separately.
(a) English datasets (b) Chinese datasets
Figure 4.2.: CDF of − log10 p for all IDs with length 10 in all datasets. p is the probability
of IDs. The dashed lines are CDF of normal distribution with the same mean and standard
deviation
Figure 4.2 shows CDF of − log10 p of all IDs with length 10, which is the most fre-
quently chosen ID length, from the 5 datasets containing IDs. For each dataset, we calculate
probabilities of IDs utilizing 5-order Markov Model trained on itself. The dashed lines in
the graph illustrate CDF of normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation
as the corresponding distribution. The figures show that except 178 dataset, the distribu-
tions of − log10 p fits relatively well with the corresponding normal distributions, especially
for English datasets. The difference between the distribution from Chinese datasets, 178 in
particular, and the corresponding normal distribution is larger, we believe the probability
distribution of IDs in the dataset is biased by the problematic IDs. The graph indicates that
the probabilities of IDs can be approximated by lognormal distribution.
Therefore, we perform “fake” account removal for IDs with the same length based on
− log p, where p is probabilities of IDs. Note that in a normal distribution, nearly all values
are within three standard deviations of the mean (three-sigma rule of thumb), we therefore,
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believe µ + 3σ is a reasonable upper-bound for “real” IDs, where µ and σ are mean and
standard deviation of − log p, respectively.
In addition, if most of the IDs corresponding to a high-frequency password P in dataset
D are detected as suspicious, and P does not appear in password datasets other than D, we
remove all accounts associated with the P .
Table 4.6.: Top 10 passwords with most accounts removed from English datasets. pwdr/o












Table 4.7.: Top 10 passwords with most accounts removed from Chinese datasets. pwdr/o
means the original count of pwd in the dataset is o, and r accounts are removed.
Rank Duduniu Csdn 178
1 aaaaaa3103/10838 dearbook44636/44636 qiulaobai57963/57963
2 1111111203/21763 xiazhili3649/3649 wmsxie12348258/49162
3 1234561076/93259 123456782222/212743 12345647536/261692
4 9958123461/3981 1234567891482/234997 w2w2w235762/35762
5 a5633168457/457 111111111301/76340 wolf863731909/31909
6 woshi912416/416 code89251285/1285 550838625715/25715
7 5ggggg328/328 ms0083jxj1268/1268 wpc00082122733/22733
8 liuchang319/2140 05962514787910/910 11111120564/122512
9 jkljkljkl0281/346 google250559/559 589703719266/19266
10 34537058gu275/275 lilylily395/765 js7777718835/18835
Results of Cleansing. Table 4.5 lists the number of suspicious accounts removed. In
general, the suspicious accounts count for a small portion in English and Duduniu datasets.
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However, the number of suspicious accounts detected in CSDN and 178 datasets are sig-
nificantly larger. In 178 dataset, about one fifth accounts are suspicious. Table 4.6 and
Table 4.7 lists the top 10 passwords with most accounts removed in each dataset. Despite
the accounts correspond to uncommon passwords, a significant number of accounts with
popular passwords, such as 123456, are removed as well. Evidences suggest that some
datasets contain many waves of creation of suspicious accounts, some using common pass-
words such as 123456, as illustrated in Table 4.4.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Experimental Datasets and Settings
We evaluate PRAs on seven real-world password datasets, including four datasets from
English users, Rockyou [50], Phpbb [50], Yahoo [50], and Xato [64], and three datasets
from Chinese users, CSDN [60], Duduniu, and 178.
Some PRAs require a training dataset for preprocessing. For English passwords, we
train on Rockyou and evaluate on (1) Yahoo + Phpbb; (2) Xato, as Rockyou is the largest
password dataset available. We combine Yahoo and Phpbb datasets because the size of
them are relatively small. For Chinese passwords, the evaluation was conducted on any
pair of datasets. For each pair, we trained PRAs on one dataset and tested on the other. We
present results of using Duduniu as the training dataset.
Probabilistic Password Models. For all probabilistic password models we evaluate, we
generate 108 passwords following the descending order of probabilities. The order of the
password generated is essentially the ranking of the password in the corresponding PRA.
Blacklist PRAs. We directly use the training dataset as blacklist. Namely, in the PRA,
the ranking of a password is the order of its frequency in the training dataset. We vary the
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size of blacklist by removing the lowest-rank passwords in order to adjust the number of
passwords rejected.
Zxcvbn Password Generation. Zxcvbn was designed to evaluate password strength
only. We implemented a password generator following the logic, which takes an input as
the maximum entropy, and generates all passwords whose entropy is less than that value.
The password generation is a recursive depth-first search process. We start from an empty
string. In each iteration, we append a chunk to the current string. If the current entropy is
less than the maximum entropy allowed, we record the password, and continue the recur-
sion process. Note that we might duplicated generate passwords as each password might
have multiple ways to be decomposed into patterns. Therefore, after the password gen-
eration, we conduct a further post-processing step. If a password appears multiple times,
we keep the one with the lowest entropy, and then sort all the unique passwords based on
entropy.
In practice, an integer score from 0 to 4 is calculated from entropy and each value is
assigned with a description (e.g., Weak, Medium, Strong). Passwords with entropy less
than 20 are assigned with a score is 0, and are usually rejected. We first tried to create
all passwords within 20-bits of entropy. However, after 1 billion attempts, we still haven’t
finished generating passwords starting with “mary”, which is the first word in female names
dictionary. The number of passwords considered as weak by zxcvbn is much larger than any
of the known weak password dictionary. Alternatively, we generated 10,478,853 unique
passwords with entropy less than 4 for zxcvbn1, and 1,834,980 unique passwords with
entropy less than 12 for zxcvbn2.
Adapting Zxcvbn to Chinese datasets. Zxcvbn was originally designed for English
speaking users, as it supports English words only [23]. In order to adapt the method for
evaluating Chinese passwords, we create another dictionary for evaluating Chinese pass-
words. We construct such a Chinese dictionary using the Duduniu dataset. For each pass-
word in Duduniu, we first split the word into chunks based on character types, e.g. letters,
digits, and symbols. We then, count the frequencies of letter chunks after turning all letters
into lower cases. Finally, we generate the dictionary by outputing all the letter chunks that
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contains at least three characters and with frequencies of at least 100 in the descending
order of their frequencies. There are 5,553 words in the dictionary.
Table 4.8.: Top 20 words in the new dictionary for Chinese passwords used in zxcvbn.
Rank Words
1–5 asd woaini wang abc zhang
6–10 liu qwe love qaz yang
11–15 chen zxc aaa wei www
15–20 long lin xiao aaaaaa huang
Table 4.8 lists the first 20 words in the reverse order of their frequencies. Most of the
common words used are the syllables of last names in Chinese, e.g. wang, zhang, liu, etc.
The rest of them are either keyboard patterns or letter sequences. Not many English words
appears in the dictionary. There are many three letter combinations in the dictionary, such
as wjq, ljh, zjh. We believe these are initials of the syllables in Chinese names. There is
no need to construct separate name dictionaries as the most common names are already
covered.
We were able to generate 9,316,973 passwords with entropy less than 3 for zxcvbn1,
and 1,913,061 unique passwords with entropy less than 12 for zxcvbn2.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrates the Guess Number Graph (GNG), the β-Residual
Strength Graph (β-RSG), and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG) eval-
uated on Xato and 178 datasets, respectively. The corresponding training datasets are Rock-
you and Duduniu. The evaluation on the other datasets leads to similar results.
Figure 4.3(a) and Figure 4.4(a) show the evaluation of the Guess Number Graph (GNG).
Both Client-end and Server-end PRAs, except Google’s password strength assessment from
which we are not able to generate passwords, are measured. We do not plot the Blacklist
PRA with limited size, as it overlaps with the regular Blacklist PRA. We plot scatter points
for zxcvbn to avoid ambiguity, since it generates multiple passwords with the same entropy.
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(a) GNG, Xato (b) β-RSG, Xato, β = 10
(c) β-NRSG, Xato, Server-end, β = 10 (d) β-NRSG, Xato, Client-end, β = 10
Figure 4.3.: The Guess Number Graph (GNG), the β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG),
and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG) evaluated on Xato dataset.
A point (x, y) on a curve means that y percent of passwords in the test dataset are included
in the first x guesses.
Figure 4.3(b) and Figure 4.4(b) illustrate the β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG) for
β = 10. In the evaluation, we vary the number of passwords rejected x in PRAs (i.e.,
passwords ranked as top x are not allowed). In the figures, a point (x, y) on a curve means
if we want to reject top x passwords from a PRA, the residual strength is y. For a fixed x, a
larger y indicates smaller portion of accounts will be compromised within β guesses after
rejecting x passwords. Comparing Figure 4.1(b) and Figure 4.4(b), we can observe that the
performance of PRAs on cleansed data siginificantly boost, which confirm the need of data
cleansing.
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(a) GNG, 178 (b) β-RSG, 178, β = 10
(c) β-NRSG, 178, Server-end, β = 10 (d) β-NRSG, 178, Client-end, β = 10
Figure 4.4.: The Guess Number Graph (GNG), the β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG),
and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG) evaluated on 178 dataset.
The Normalized β-Residual Strength Graphs (β-NRSG) for Server-end PRAs are illus-
trated in Figure 4.3(c) and Figure 4.4(c), and the Client-end PRAs’ evaluation is shown in
Figure 4.3(d) and Figure 4.4(d). In addition to PRAs compared in GNG and β-RSG, we
evaluate the effect of composition policies and Google’s password strength API as well.
Three commonly used composition rules are examined. Composition rule 1 is adapted by
Ebay.com, which ask for at least two types of characters from digits, symbols and letter.
Composition rule 2 is adapted by Live.com, which also ask for two types of characters, but
it further split letters into uppercase and lowercase letters. Composition rule 3 is adapted by
most of the online banking sites (e.g. BOA). At least one digit and one letter are required.
Server-end PRAs. In general, Server-end PRAs (Blacklist, MC5, MCB25, Combined)
outperform Client-end PRAs (Hybrid, MC3, MCB1500/MCB500), which confirms that a
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PRA’s accuracy grows with the size of its model, and Server-end PRAs are recommended
for websites where security is one of the most important factors, e.g., online banks.
The Google password strength API, which is only evaluated in β-NRSG (Figure 4.3(c)
and Figure 4.4(c)) is the top performer on both English and Chinese datasets. The three
points from left to right in each graph illustrate the effect of forbidding passwords whose
score is no larger than 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In practice, all passwords with score 1 are
forbidden. The high residual strength indicates that most of the high-frequency passwords
are successfully identified.
For the other Server-end PRAs, the three metrics (Figure 4.3(a, b, c) and Figure 4.4(a,
b, c)) all suggest that several PRAs including the Blacklist PRA, the Markov Model with
backoff with a frequency threshold of 25 (MCB25), the 5-order Markov Model, and the
Combined method [22] have similar performance, and they are almost always on the top of
the graphs, which is consistent with the results in the previous works [22, 41].
Client-end PRAs. From Figure 4.3(d) and Figure 4.4(d), it is clear that composition rules
do not help prevent weak passwords, as the corresponding points are far below the other
curves. In addition, the composition rules generally reject more than one tenth of passwords
in the datasets, which might lead to difficulty and confusion in password generation, and is
not appropriate.
Among the other Client-end PRAs, the Blacklist PRA outperform the others when the
number of passwords rejected is small. However, because of the limited size, the small
blacklist can only cover a small proportion of passwords (less than 10,000) in the testing
dataset. The reduced-size Markov models (MC3 and MCBc) perform siginificantly worse
than the corresponding Server-end models (MC5 and MCB25), especially when the num-
ber of passwords rejected is relatively large. The low order Markov models cannot capture
most of the features in the real passwords distribution and the strength measurement is not
accurate. MCBc performs similar to the Blacklist PRA when x is small, as the frequencies
of the most popular patterns are high enough to be preserved, with the cost of losing most
of the other precise information. As a result, the performance of MC3 is better than MCBc
with the growth of x.
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A noticable improvement of zxcvbn2 over zxcvbn1 can be observed in all the three met-
rics (Figure 4.3(a, b, d) and Figure 4.4(a, b, d)). The figures also suggest that zxcvbn is not
optimized for passwords created by non-English speaking users, as the performance of the
PRAs significantly drops in the evaluation on Chinese datasets.
The Hybrid Method. Observing the promising performance of Blacklist methods and the
limited number passwords covered in the testing dataset, we propose a hybrid PRA which
combines a blacklist PRA with a backoff model. In the Hybrid PRA, we first reject pass-
words based on the order in the Blacklist, and apply the backoff model after the Blacklist
is exhausted. To make the size of the PRA consistent, we further limit the size for both the
Blacklist and Markov Model with backoff. We set the frequency threshold to 2000 for the
English password datasets and 1000 for the Chinese password datasets (see Table 4.2 for
model sizes). We further reduce the size of the Blacklist to 30,000 words, resulting in a
dictionary smaller than 300KB. The total size of the hybrid model is less than 800KB. The
figures (Figure 4.3(a, b, d) and Figure 4.4(a, b, d)) show that the hybrid method inherits
the advantage of Blacklist PRA and Markov Model with backoff. Hybrid method can ac-
curately reject weak passwords, and can provide a relatively accurate strength assessment
for any passwords. As a result, it is almost always on the top of all client-end PRAs, and is
even comparable with Server-end PRAs in β-RSG and β-NRSG measurements.
Differences Among the Three Metrics. Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 list the y values in GNG
and β-RSG when x = 104 and x = 106 evaluated on English datasets and Chinese datasets,
respectively. From the tables, we can observe that although the percentage of passwords
cracked by PRAs significantly increase from when rejecting ten thousand passwords to
when rejecting one million passwords, the difference between y values in β-RSG is lim-
ited, especially for the top-performing PRAs, such as the blacklist method. The different
behavior between GNG and β-RSG indicates that the percentage of passwords cracked,
which is shown in GNG, cannot infer the residual strength, which is the observation from
β-RSG. A high coverage and a low coverage in password cracking might result in similar
residual strength, as the most frequent remaining passwords might be similar. The result
from the table confirms that if the thread model is online guessing attacks in which the
82
Table 4.9.: y values of GNG and β-RSG when x = 104 and x = 106 evaluated on English
datasets. Y+P stands for Yahoo + Phpbb. β = 10
English Datasets
GNG RSG
Dataset Y+P Xato Y+P Xato
x 10K 1M 10K 1M 10K 1M 10K 1M
MC5 14% 34% 13% 36% 12.7 13.1 13.4 14.2
MC3 7.3% 21% 6.9% 24% 11.5 12.4 12.1 12.8
MCB25 16% 35% 14% 36% 12.8 13.2 13.5 13.9
MCBc 11% 22% 10.0% 25% 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9
zxcvbn 0.7% 1.4% 0.5% 1.3% 10.1 10.8 10.0 11.0
zxcvbnv2 2.5% 13% 2.4% 13% 11.2 12.8 11.3 13.3
Blacklist 16% 38% 14% 38% 12.8 13.3 13.5 14.3
PCFG 2.2% 22% 3.9% 29% 10.2 11.9 10.6 12.0
Hybrid 16% 27% 14% 29% 12.8 13.0 13.5 13.9
Combined 13% 36% 13% 37% 12.8 13.2 13.2 14.3
Table 4.10.: y values of GNG and β-RSG when x = 104 and x = 106 evaluated on Chinese
datasets. β = 10
Chinese Datasets
GNG RSG
Dataset CSDN 178 CSDN 178
x 10K 1M 10K 1M 10K 1M 10K 1M
MC5 16% 26% 22% 36% 10.2 10.3 9.7 10.9
MC3 13% 23% 18% 33% 9.7 9.9 9.1 10.2
MCB25 17% 27% 23% 36% 10.3 10.4 9.9 10.4
MCBc 16% 25% 21% 33% 10.1 10.3 9.3 10.2
zxcvbn 0.1% 3.5% 0.3% 3.4% 6.6 7.1 7.0 7.5
zxcvbnv2 3.5% 11% 4.8% 9.8% 7.1 8.9 7.8 8.1
Blacklist 17% 26% 23% 35% 10.3 10.3 10.0 10.4
PCFG 16% 21% 15% 24% 9.7 9.8 8.3 8.7
Hybrid 17% 25% 23% 34% 10.3 10.3 10.0 10.4
Combined 17% 27% 22% 36% 10.3 10.3 9.5 10.5
number of attempts allowed by an adversary is limited, GNG cannot accurately measure
the crack-resistency of PRAs, and β-RSG is a more appropriate metrics in this use case.
The low marginal effect in β-RSG also indicates that websites might not need to reject too
many passwords if the major concern is online guessing attacks.
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From Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, perhaps the most noticable difference among the met-
rics is the relative order of the PCFG method, two versions of zxcvbn, and the Hybrid
method, compared with the other Client-end PRAs.
The PCFG method performs reasonably well in GNG, but poorly in β-RSG and β-
NRSG. While PCFG can cover many passwords in the testing datasets, which leads to the
low total density of passwords not cracked in GNG, some of the high-frequency passwords
remain uncovered. As a result, the residual strength of PCFG is lower than most of the
other PRAs.
On the other hand, the hybrid method and zxcvbn2 perform much better in β-RSG and
β-NRSG than in GNG. Although the high-ranking passwords in the PRAs only include
a relative low number of unique passwords in the testing datasets, the popularly selected
passwords are mostly covered. Therefore, after rejecting the top-ranking passwords from
the PRAs, an adversary can only break into a limited number of accounts within a small
number of guesses, which results in a high residual strength.
Another obervation is that the performance of the two zxcvbn PRAs, especially zxcvbn2
significantly boost in β-NRSG comparing with that in β-RSG. The residual strength re-
sulted by zxcvbn2 is even higher than the size-limited Markov Models (MC3 and MCBc).
The observation indicates that the relative poor performance of zxcvbn in β-RSG is mainly
due to the penalization from the large number of passwords, which are extremely not likely
to be used, generated.
Overall, several Server-end PRAs including the Blacklist PRA, the Markov Models, and
the Combined method result in similar perfomances. The hybrid method, which inherits
the advantage of Blacklist PRAs and Markov Model with backoff, outperform the other
Client-end PRAs.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we model different password strength checking methods (including
password strength meters) as Password Ranking Algorithms (PRAs), and we introduce two
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metrics: the β-Residual Strength Graph (β-RSG) and the Normalized β-Residual Strength
Graph (β-NRSG), to compare them using real world password datasets. In our evaluation,
we find unreasonably high frequency of some suspicious passwords. We remove the as-
sociated accounts by identifying suspicious account IDs. We then, apply the metrics on
cleansed datasets, and show that dictionary-based PRA has similar performance with the
sophisticated PRAs. If the size of PRAs are limited in order to be fit into a client, a hybrid
method combining a small dictionary of weak passwords and a Markov Model with backoff
with a limited size can provide the most accurate strength measurement.
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5. UNDERSTANDING MNEMONIC SENTENCE-BASED
PASSWORD GENERATION STRATEGIES
Besides weak passwords checking by websites/servers, another way to avoid weak pass-
words is to educate users in password creation techniques, i.e, password generation strate-
gies, and help users creating secure and memorable passwords.
Perhaps the most widely recommended and studied strategy is that based on mnemonic
sentences: Take a memorable sentence, abbreviate the words, and combine them to form a
password. The strategy is generally known as the mnemonic sentence-based strategy (for
short, the mnemonic strategy).
In this chapter, We evaluated the security of 6 mnemonic strategy variants in a series
of online studies involving 5484 participants. In addition to applying the standard method
of using guess numbers or similar metrics to compare the resulted passwords, we also
measured the total density of the most frequently chosen sentences as well as the result-
ing passwords. While metrics similar to guess numbers suggest that all variants provided
highly secure passwords, statistical metrics told a more interesting and nuanced story. In
particular, differences in the exact instructions had a tremendous impact on the security
level of the resulted passwords. We examined the generation usability and memorability
of mnemonic strategies in another online study with 1265 participants. We found that dif-
ferences in the exact instructions also affect the usability of the mnemonic strategies, and a
tradeoff between security and memorability was observed.
5.1 Introduction
The security community has been trying to come up with password generation strategies
that can help users generate secure and usable passwords. Candidate strategies have been
suggested by sources ranging from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
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(NIST) [24] to online comics [25], and from security experts’ essays [26, 27] to online
help forums. However, these suggestions are often based on intuitions instead of scientific
knowledge. Little is actually known about which strategies are effective in helping users
create usable and secure passwords.
Perhaps the most widely recommended and studied strategy is that based on mnemonic
sentences: Take a memorable sentence, abbreviate the words, and combine them to form
a password. The strategy is generally known as the mnemonic sentence-based strategy
(for short, the mnemonic strategy). It appears that the general assessment is that this is a
good strategy. It is recommended by NIST [24] and by security experts [26, 27]. To our
knowledge, three studies on this method have been reported, by Yan et al. [46, 47], Vu et
al. [48], and Kuo et al. [49]. One standard approach for evaluating the strength of passwords
is to use password cracking tools or models to check how many collected passwords can
be cracked [8, 9, 11, 42, 45, 65]. Based on this, Yan et al. [46, 47] claimed that passwords
generated using the mnemonic strategy are as strong as random passwords, while others
reached a somewhat mixed conclusion regarding its security [48, 49].
These existing studies, however, have several limitations. First, they are based on sam-
ples of small sizes, with less than 150 passwords under the strategy in each of the three
studies. Second, relying only on checking how many passwords can be cracked to assess
the security is flawed. Although such assessment provides useful information about how
such passwords fare against today’s state of the art cracking methods, the results are often
caused by the incompatibility of the cracking techniques and the nature of the passwords,
as in the case of evaluating the mnemonic strategies. Even developing a strategy-specific
cracking method, as done in [49], is insufficient. It is always possible that one has over-
looked some highly effective attack techniques. Third, each study considers only one ver-
sion of instructions for the mnemonic strategy.
We conduct a much larger study to evaluate 6 variants of the mnemonic strategy and
compare against a control group. When assessing the security of the strategies, we go
beyond the methods used in existing studies in two ways. First, we adopt the approach of
using statistical quantities to measure the distributions of the passwords, as articulated by
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Bonneau [28]. In particular, we chose to use the β-guess-rate (λβ) [29], which measures
the expected success for an attacker limited to β guesses per account. As our dataset sizes
(close to 800) are much smaller than the ones studied in [29], many other metrics considered
in [29] cannot be applied. We chose to use β = 1 and β = 10, both because they were
suggested in [30] as appropriate for defense against online guessing attacks and because
a larger β is not very meaningful for our sample sizes. Second, we develop a method
specific for attacking passwords resulted from the mnemonic strategy, and demonstrate the
effectiveness of this attack.
The usability of the variants is evaluated in a separate user study, in which password
creation time, short-term and long-term password memorability, and the workload required
in both password creation and retention are evaluated.
Our studies were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They were found to be
eligible for exemption from IRB review because it is research involving survey procedures,
and human subjects cannot be identified from the recorded information. In the studies,
participants were warned not to use their real passwords.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the security of password
generation strategy variants on a large scale. We recruited a total number of 5, 484 par-
ticipants, for an average of 783 participants per condition, when evaluating the security of
the strategies. In addition, we recruited 1265 participants for evaluating the usability of
two variants against a control condition. To our knowledge, we are the first to observe and
experimentally validate the influence of the instructions and the examples accompanying
the strategy description on the security of the passwords generated with that strategy. It
is intuitively understood that precise instructions and demonstrative examples can improve
the ease of applying a strategy to generate passwords (i.e., usability). However, the rela-
tionship between the level of security, the instruction wording, and the examples has not
been studied before.
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5.2 Study 1: Security
In this section, we present an overview of the first study and the methodology used for
evaluating security of the strategies.
We study 6 variants of mnemonic strategies. In such a strategy, a participant is asked to
first select an easy-to-remember sentence, and then convert the sentence into a password.











1. Think of a memorable sentence or phrase contain-
ing at least seven or eight words. For example, “Four
score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth
on this continent”.
2. Select a letter, number, or a special character to
represent each word. A common method is to use
the first letter of every word.For example: four –>4,








1. Think of a memorable sentence or phrase that is
meaningful to you, and other people are unlikely to
use. The sentence or phrase should contain at least
eight words. For example, “I went to London four
and a half years ago”.
2. Select a letter, number, or a special character to
represent each word. A common method is to use the
first letter of every word. For example: went ⇒ w,
four ⇒ 4, and ⇒ &. Combine them into a password:
iwtl4&ahya.














1. Think of a memorable sentence or phrase that is
meaningful to you, and other people are unlikely to
use. The sentence or phrase should contain at least
eight words.
2. Select a letter, number, or a special character to
represent each word, and combine them to create the
password.













1. Think of a memorable sentence or phrase contain-
ing at least eight words.
2. Select a letter, number, or a special character to
represent each word, and combine them to create the
password.
The following are some examples:
“In June 2013, my wife and I visited Tokyo, Kyoto,
and Sapporo” might become “i63mw&ivTk&$”.
“Run 5 miles per week for my first half marathon”
might become “r5mpw4mfhm”.
“My high school classmates had a reunion in July
2014” might become “Mhscharij2”.
“I sold my gold Toyota corolla when it had close to
120000 miles” might become “i$mgtcwIhc21m”.
“Danny bought the book The Razor’s Edge from me
for five dollars” might become “Dbtbtrefm45d”.
“Save money for traveling with my parents to Ger-
many” might become “S$4twmp2G”.












1. First create a personally memorable sentence
(choose your own sentence – something personal).
2. Then use some personally memorable tricks to
modify that sentence into a password.
The following are some examples:
“This little piggy went to market” might become “tlp-
WENT2m”.
“When I was seven, my sister threw my stuffed rabbit
in the toilet” might become “WIw7,mstmsritt”.
“Wow, does that couch smell terrible” might become
“Wow...doestcst”.
“Long time ago in a galaxy not far away at all” might
become “Ltime@go-inag faaa!”.
“Until this very moment, these passwords were still
secure” might become “utvm,tpwstillsecure”.












1. Please create a simple sentence of 8 words and
choose letters from the words to make up a password.
You should put some letters in upper case to make the
password harder to guess; and at least one number
and/or special character should be inserted as well.
2. Use this method to generate a password of 7 or 8
characters.
An example of such a composition might be using
the phrase is “It’s 12 noon I am hungry” to create
the password “I’s12&Iah” which is hard for anyone
else to guess but easy for you to remember. By all
means use a foreign language if you know one: the
password “AwKdk.Md” from the phrase “Anata wa
Kyuuketsuki desu ka ... Miyu desu” would be an ex-
ample. You could even mix words from several lan-
guages. However, do not just use a word or a name
from a foreign language.
Table 5.1 gives the detailed descriptions of the 6 variants in our study. We urge readers
to read Table 5.1 before proceeding, as the differences in the strategy descriptions are an
important part of the study. Below is a summary.
• MneGenEx (Mnemonic-Generic-Example, with generic instruction and a generic ex-
ample, similar to what used in Kuo et al. [49]),
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• MnePerEx (Mnemonic-Personalized-Example, with emphasis on using personalized
choices of sentences that other people are unlikely to use and a personalized exam-
ple),
• MnePer (Mnemonic-Personalized, with emphasis on personalized choice of sen-
tences, but no example),
• MneEx (Mnemonic-Example, with multiple personalized examples, but no emphasis
on personalized choices of sentences),
• MneSchEx (Mnemonic-Schneier-Example, with some emphasis on personalized
choices and mixed examples, suggested by Schneier in [26, 27]),
• MneYanEx (Mnemonic-Yan-Example, with some emphasis on personalized choices
in some examples, used by Yan et al. [46, 47] in their studies).
In addition to the 6 variants, a control group Control, in which we ask for passwords
containing at least 8 characters without any extra restriction, was included in the study as
well.
5.2.1 Study Design
We conducted the study through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and all partic-
ipants were at least 18 years old. We limited our data collection to participants from the
United State because the strategies were constructed using the English language. The study
was divided into 7 rounds, one for each of the 7 conditions. Participants were allowed to
participate in only one round. If a participant was in more than one rounds of the study, we
kept only the data from the first time that the participant was in.
Participants were asked to type the sentence used in the intermediate step. After that,
participants were asked to enter the password they created twice, and the password typed
in each time had to match each other before they could proceed.
We warned participants not to use their actual passwords. In the study, we forbade
passwords that were the same as the examples and that did not appear to be generated
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following the instructions. In MneGenEx, MnePerEx, MnePer, and MneEx, we required
the length of the password to be identical to the number of words, and further checked if a
letter in a password can be found in the corresponding word in the sentence; no check was
performed for digits and special symbols in the password. In MneSchEx and MneYanEx,
a participant was allowed to keep a complete word in the resulting password; thus we
cannot use the above approach. Instead, we required that the sequence of letters (ignoring
special symbols or digits) in a password was a subsequence of the sequence of letters in the
sentence.
5.2.2 Methodology
Our goal in this study is to assess the security of the passwords generated by the differ-
ent password generation strategy variants. The traditional approach to assess the strength
of passwords generated under a given setting is to use password cracking tools or proba-
bilistic password models to plot guess number graphs [8,9,11,42,45,49,65] or probability
threshold graphs.
The above approach can assess the security of passwords against current password
cracking tools and probabilistic password models, which are adapted to today’s pass-
word distributions; however, it cannot adequately assess the strength of password strate-
gies against attacks targeting it. If any strategy is widely used, then attackers may develop
strategy-specific methods which can efficiently guess the passwords. For example, if the
mnemonic strategy is widely used, one attack strategy is conduct a dictionary attack which
use password datasets created using the strategy as the dictionary. Alternatively, an adver-
sary can create a dictionary of sentences that people are likely to use, and then generate
guesses from the sentences.
An alternative approach, as articulated by Bonneau [28], is to measure the probability
distribution induced by the strategy. A number of metrics on the strength of password
distributions have been proposed by Bonneau [28]. In the case of evaluating passwords
obtained from user subject studies, the datasets are quite small (on the scale of several
95
hundreds in our case). One metric that is appropriate for small datasets is the β-guess-rate
(λβ) [29], which is the total probability of the most common β passwords. λβ measures
the expected success for an attacker limited to β guesses per account, with some small β.
Brostoff and Sasse [30] suggested 10 as the allowed failure counts before the account is
locked.
We choose to use quantities for estimating λ1 and λ10 given our sample sizes. Given
a sample set S, we use top(S) to denote the number of times that the most frequent item
occurs in S, and top10(S) to denote the total number of the times the 10 most frequent
items occur in S. The estimated density of top 1 and top 10 passwords are calculated by
λ̃1 =
top(S)
|S| and λ̃10 =
top10(S)
|S| , where |S| is the size of S.
We want to tell whether the differences in these metrics between two datasets are mean-
ingful or not, given that we have small datasets. To address the issue, for a given β, we
test the null hypothesis that the total density of top β passwords in the two datasets are the














are the two proportions from the two samples, i.e., total
density of top β passwords in two datasets, D1 and D2; n1 and n2 are the size of D1 and
D2; p is pooled sample proportion, which is estimated by
x1+x2
n1+n2
; and x1 and x2 are the total
frequencies of top β passwords in D1 and D2.
We also apply these metrics to the sentences used in generating passwords, because
passwords based on the same sentence are not independent of each other.
5.3 Results From Study 1
We recruited 864, 793, 797, 795, 982, and 870 participants for the 6 variants of
mnemonic strategies. After removing duplicate participants, the number of participants we
accepted was 864, 777, 753, 745, 868, and 799, respectively. The number of participants
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recruited in the control group (Control) is 678. In total, 5,484 (3,205 female) participants
were involved. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to over 50, with about 70% between
23 to 50 years. Most of the participants were college students or professionals who had
bachelor or higher degrees. The demographic distributions in the 7 groups were similar.
(a) 5-order Markov Model (b) Google API (c) Zxcvbn
Figure 5.1.: Comparison of strength of passwords resulted from different mnemonic strate-
gies using probabilistic models and password strength meters.
5.3.1 Analyzing Passwords Using Probability Models and Password Strength Me-
ters.
We evaluate the strength of passwords generated using the strategies as well as two
commonly used datasets Yahoo and Phpbb against today’s attacks utilizing (1) the 5-order
Markov Model trained on Rockyou dataset, (2) Google password strength API1, and (3)
Zxcvbn [23] deployed by Dropbox. Google password strength API produces an integer
score from 1 to 4 for a password. Passwords with score 1 are considered too weak and are
forbidden by Google, and passwords with score 4 are considered strong. Zxcvbn gives an
estimation of minimum entropy for a password. The entropy is calculated by first divid-
ing the password into chunks, and then combining the entropy estimated for each chunk.
Different ways of dividing the password results in different estimated entropy, and Zxcvbn
uses the smallest entropy as its output.
In Fig 5.1(a), each curve conveys the strength of a password dataset evaluated by a
5-order Markov Model trained on Rockyou dataset. A point (x, y) on a curve means that
1https://accounts.google.com/RatePassword
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in the corresponding dataset, y percentage of passwords have probability no less than 2−x.
Curves in Fig 5.1(b) and Fig 5.1(c) illustrate the evaluation based on Google password
strength API and zxcvbn, respectively. A point (x, y) on a curve means y percentage pass-
words in the corresponding dataset has a score no higher than x. In the graphs, a lower
curve means passwords from the corresponding strategy are considered stronger.
In all the three graphs, the curve for the control group (Control) is below the curves
for Yahoo and Phpbb, indicating that passwords created in the study are stronger than that
in real-world datasets. Therefore, the security of passwords created in the study can serve
as a lower-bound measurement. On the other hand, curves for Yahoo, Phpbb, and Control
are significantly higher than the other curves. This indicates that according to the met-
rics, passwords created without any specific strategy are significantly weaker than the other
datasets. When guessing according to the order suggested by the metrics, more passwords
in Yahoo, phpbb, and Control will be cracked than passwords from any mnemonic strategy.
For example, if all passwords with score less than 25 measured by Zxcvbn are attempted,
more than 50% of passwords from Yahoo, Phpbb, and Control will be covered, while in the
6 mnemonic strategies, the percentage of passwords cracked is less than 15%. However,
this conclusion is due to the fact that the model or the meters are designed to evaluate gen-
erally selected passwords, which is broadly similar to passwords in Yahoo and Phpbb, and
passwords generated from the mnemonic strategies result in quite different distributions.













Table 5.2 shows the average length of passwords generated from the 6 variants and
the control group (Control) as well as passwords in Yahoo and Phpbb datasets. From the
table, we can observe that passwords generated in MneSchEx is longer than passwords
generated by other strategies. Another observation is the relative long passwords in Control
comparing with passwords in Yahoo and Phpbb datasets. The average length of passwords
in Control is even longer than passwords from some variants of mnemonic-based strategies,
which confirms that passwords created in the study is stronger than typical users’ choices.
Table 5.3.: λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10 (top10) in Control as well as samples with size 800 from
Rockyou, Phpbb, and Yahoo. ESD means the average is E and the standard deviation is
SD.
Strategy Count









Control 678 1.2%(8) 0.9%(6) 3.4%(23) 2.9%(20)
Rockyous 800 1.0%0.3%(7.7) 0.9%0.4%(7.5) 3.1%0.5%(25.0) 3.1%0.5%(24.4)
Phpbbs 800 1.2%0.4%(9.5) 1.2%0.4%(9.5) 3.8%0.6%(30.2) 3.8%0.5%(30.2)
Yahoos 800 0.4%0.2%(3.5) 0.4%0.2%(3.5) 2.1%0.3%(16.5) 2.0%0.3%(16.3)
5.3.2 Strength of Mnemonic Sentences
We evaluate the strength of sentences used in mnemonic strategies as well as the re-
sulted passwords utilizing λ̃1 and λ̃10 metrics. Table 5.3 shows the λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10 (top10)
values of passwords generated by the control group (Control). Also shown in the table are
the quantities evaluated on sets of 800 passwords randomly sampled from three commonly
used password datasets Rockyou, Phpbb and Yahoo. Table 5.4 gives the λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10
(top10) values of sentences and the resulted passwords for all mnemonic sentence-based
variants.
The Control Group (Control). In Control, the λ̃1 and λ̃10 are 0.9% and 2.9%, respec-
tively, which are close to the quantities from the real-world datasets. For instance, Rockyou
dataset has a λ̃1 as 0.9% and a λ̃10 as 3.1%. Although the passwords created in the study
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Table 5.4.: λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10 (top10) in mnemonic strategies.
Strategy Count













MneGenEx 864 2.5%(22) 0.9%(8) 0.8%(7) 7.8%(68) 5.3%(46) 4.1%(36)
MnePerEx 777 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10)
MnePer 745 0.7%(5) 2.3%(17) 2.3%(17) 2.8%(21) 5.8%(43) 5.6%(42)
MneEx 868 0.7%(6) 0.2%(2) 0.2%(2) 2.2%(19) 1.7%(15) 1.3%(11)
MneSchEx 753 0.4%(3) 0.5%(4) 0.3%(2) 2.8%(21) 1.7%(13) 1.5%(11)
MneYanEx 799 0.3%(2) 0.3%(2) 0.3%(2) 1.6%(13) 1.5%(12) 1.4%(11)
Control 678 N/A 1.2%(8) 0.9%(6) N/A 3.4%(23) 2.9%(20)
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are stronger than those in real-world datasets, according to the existing strength metrics, as
illustrated in Fig 5.1, the strengths of the weakest passwords are similar. If an adversary
is limited to try 10 passwords per account (e.g., by rate limiting), approximately the same
portion of accounts will be compromised.
Finding 1: Using generic instructions and examples results in weak passwords.
MneGenEx used the instructions as in [49] and one of the examples used in [49]. We
were truely surprised by the high frequencies of the most common sentences and pass-
words. Among the 864 participants, there were 57 sentences chosen more than once, for
a total of 179, and the 10 most popular sentences (top10) were picked 68 times. 22 par-
ticipants chose the famous quote “to be or not to be, that is the question”. This yielded
λ̃1 = 2.5%, λ̃10 = 7.8%. See Table 5.5 for other commonly chosen sentences, which were
also well-known quotes in general, and the resulted passwords.
Table 5.5.: Popular passwords and probability for top 5 frequently chosen sentences in
mnemonic strategies.
Rank Sentences Passwords Frequency
MneGenEx (864)
1
to be or not to be, that is the
question (22)
2bon2btit? (7); 2bon2btitq (6);
tbontbtitq (1); 2Bon2Btit? (1);
2B0n2bt1tq (1); 2bontbtitq (1);
2brn2btstq (1); 2brn2btit? (1)
2.55%
2
the quick brown fox
jumped over the lazy
dog (9)
tqbfjotld (2); Tqbfjotld (2);
t@bfj0tld (1); tqb4j0tld (1);




one small step for man, one
giant leap for mankind (6)
1ssfm1glfm (3); 1ss4m1gl4m (1);
1$$4m1gl4m (1); ossfmoglfm (1)
0.69%
continued on next page
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Table 5.5.: continued
Rank Sentences Passwords Frequency
4
a penny saved is a penny
earned (5)




in the beginning, god cre-
ated the heavens and the
earth (5)
itbGcth&te (1); 1t8GctH&t3 (1); it-
bGcth&tE (1); ItbGctHatE (1); Nt-
bGcth (1)
0.58%
MnePerEx (777) No collisions found.
MnePer (745)
1
I love you to the moon and
back (4)
12345678 (1); !l0t7m@b (1);
ily2tmnb (1); !@#$%ˆ&* (1)
0.67%
2
it was the best of times it
was the worst of times (3)
iwtb0*iwtw0* (1); Iwtbotiwt-
wot (1); 233425233525 (1)
0.40%
3
the quick brown fox




don’t look a gifthorse in the
mouth (2)
dlaghitm (1); d*1gh0t% (1); 0.27%
5
down by the bay where the
watermelons grow (2)
dbhaw!rg (1); DBTBWTWG (1) 0.27%
MneEx (868)
1
the quick brown fox
jumped over the lazy
dog (6)
tqbfjotld (1); 7qbxj07ld (1);
tQbfj0tld (1); +qbfj0+ld (1);
tqbfj0tld (1); tQbfôtzd (1)
0.69%
2
to be or not to be that is the
question (3)
2Bon2Btit? (1); 2bontbtitq (1);
2bon2b,it? (1)
0.35%
continued on next page
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Table 5.5.: continued
Rank Sentences Passwords Frequency
3
my very educated mother
just served us nine piz-
zas (2)
Mvemj$u9p (1); mvemjsu9p (1) 0.23%
4
I like big butts and I cannot
lie (2)
1lbba1cl (1); 1lbb&1cnl (1); 0.23%
MneSchEx (753)
1
four score and seven years
ago (3)




the quick brown fox jumps
over the lazy dog (3)
tqbFOXjotlDOG (1); tqbfjotld (1);
Tqbfjotld (1)
0.40%




4 I love to eat pizza (2) eyeL2EZa (1); ILtePi&&a (1); 0.27%
5 I love dark chocolate (2) eyeluvdrkchoco (1); heartDlate (1); 0.27%
MneYanEx (799)
1
the quick brown fox




i like big butts and i cannot
lie (2)
ilbbaicl (1); Ilbbaicl (1); 0.25%
3
the quick brown fox
jumped over the dog (2)
Tqbf&jotD (1); TQbfdreg (1); 0.25%
In terms of resulting passwords, if passwords are case-insensitive, 36 passwords gener-
ated by following the MneGenEx strategy appeared more than once, and the most common
password was chosen 8 times, with λ̃10 = 5.3%. Even taking case-sensitivity into ac-
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count, there were still 27 non-unique passwords, with the top count number to be 7, and
λ̃10 = 3.1%, as the majority of the participants did not use upper-case letters. Compar-
ing λ̃10 resulted from Control (2.9%) and MneGenEx (4.1%), it appears that the password
distribution resulted from MneGenEx is likely to be weaker than Control.
Finding 2: Instructions specifically requesting personalized sentences and appropri-
ate examples lead to strong passwords. MnePerEx explicitly asked people to choose
personalized sentences that other people are unlikely to choose with an example “I went to
London four and a half years ago”. Among the 777 participants, there was no sentence or
password selected more than once. We observed that 536 sentences start with “I” or “my”,
suggesting a personalized choice. In comparison, such sentences appeared only 125 times
in MneGenEx. We noted that not all participants chose personalized sentences. Common
sentences such as “to be or not to be, that is the question” still occur in the dataset. Because
they occur with much lower frequencies, we did not observe any collision in the dataset.
With larger datasets, collisions are bound to occur. As a result, the λ̃10 (1.3%) in sen-
tences selected in MnePerEx was significantly smaller than the quantity from MneGenEx
(z = 6.26, p < 0.001), and the comparison of the resulted passwords between MneGenEx
and MnePerEx leads to similar results. This indicates that in terms of security, MnePerEx
is significantly better than MneGenEx based on λ̃1 and λ̃10 metrics.
Finding 3: Commonly suggested instantiations are worse than MnePerEx. Seeing
results from MneGenEx and MnePerEx, it was clear to us that the instructions played an
extremely critical role in the level of security. We then tried to evaluate the precise instruc-
tions suggested in Bruce Schneier’s two blog posts [26, 27]. We noted that the instructions
in the two posts were slightly different. Our version, MneSchEx, was based on the ver-
sion in [26], which was the more elaborated one. MneSchEx had several differences from
MnePerEx. First, it gave 4 examples, some of which are popular, e.g., “Long time ago in
a galaxy not far away at all”, others are more personalized “When I was seven, my sister
threw my stuffed rabbit in the toilet”. Second, in the examples, some words are completely
kept. Third, while the instructions said “Choose your own sentence – something personal”;
it did not include the phrase “other people are unlikely to use”.
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The results came back at somewhere in between MneGenEx and MnePerEx. Among
753 participants, 9 different sentences were not uniquely chosen, with the most common
sentence appearing 3 times and the λ̃1 was 0.4%. The λ̃10 of sentence selected was 2.8%.
There was only a single password selected twice. The λ̃10 from MneSchEx was significantly
larger than that from MneGenEx (z = 4.47, p < 0.001), and was significantly smaller than
MnePerEx (z = 2.08, p = 0.019). One might notice that if passwords are not case-sensitive,
the frequency of the most common password was more than the max count of sentences.
The four repeated passwords actually came from 3 variations of the same sentence “the
quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog”, “the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy
dogs”, and “the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog”.
We also studied the effect of the instructions and examples used in Yan et al. [46, 47]
(MneYanEx). In MneYanEx, the instructions for creating passwords was relatively generic.
However, “hard for anyone else to guess” was explicitly mentioned in the examples. As
a result, both the λ̃1 (0.3%) and λ̃10 (1.6%) in sentence choices from MneYanEx was less
than those from MneSchEx, but is more than that from MnePerEx. The difference in the
λ̃10 between MneYanEx and MneGenEx was significant (z = 5.91, p < 0.001). 3 sentences
were chosen twice.
Finding 4: Both personalized sentences and high-quality examples are needed to
achieve better security. Another question is whether the instructions or the examples have
more influence on the unpredictability of the chosen sentences and consequently the gen-
erated passwords. This led us to study the two variants MnePer and MneEx. MnePer asked
for personalized sentences in instructions, but did not provide any example; while MneEx
did not explicitly ask for personalized sentence in the instructions, but provided a list of
personal sentences as examples. For MnePer, the most popular one was chosen 5 times
(λ̃1 = 0.7%), and λ̃10 was 2.8%. λ̃10 from MnePer was significantly smaller than that from
MneGenEx (z = 4.42, p < 0.001), and was significantly larger than that from MnePerEx
(z = 2.11, p = 0.017). For MneEx, the most popular one was chosen 6 times (λ̃10 = 0.7%),
and λ̃10 was 2.2%. λ̃10 from MnePer was significantly smaller than that from MneGenEx
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(z = 5.41, p < 0.001), and was larger than that from MnePerEx (z = 1.39, p = 0.083).
There was no significant difference between the MnePer and MneEx.
An unexpected finding is that in MnePer, while the 10 most popular sentences were
chosen only 19 times, λ̃10 in password choices was 5.6% (top10 = 42). In all other strate-
gies, the λ̃10 in password selections was less than that in sentence selections, since the same
sentence can result in different passwords. Why do we have higher frequency in popular
passwords than in popular sentences? Examining the dataset we found that a significant
fraction of users choose pure digit sequence passwords (such as 12345678, 233425233525)
that did not appear to match the sentences. (Since we allow letters to be replaced with dig-
its, we did not check for such situations.) It appears that when users are not shown any
examples, some users do not know how to follow the instruction.
Overal, our results suggest that neither explicit request for personalized sentences nor
high-quality examples by itself suffice (in fact, neither appears to be more important than
the other), and one needs both to get high security.
Table 5.6.: Potential popular and personalized sentence counts evaluated by Google search
results.
Strategy MneGenEx MnePerEx MnePer MneEx MneSchEx MneYanEx
Popular 242(28%) 13(1.7%) 42(5.6%) 27(3.1%) 89(12%) 126(16%)
Personal 521(60%) 757(97%) 680(91%) 825(95%) 635(84%) 644(81%)
Sentence Popularity. We further examined the popularity of the sentences by searching
them on Google using exact matching, and obtain the estimated number of results. Ideally,
a “true” personalized sentence should have 0 result returned. On the other hand, famous
quotes and popular sentences yielded a high number of results. For example, the 5 sen-
tences with highest estimated result numbers are “to be or not to be”, “the quick brown fox
jumps over the lazy dog”, “when you wish upon a star”, “do, or do not, there is no try”,
and “you can’t always get what you want”, which are all famous quotes. We say that a sen-
tence is popular if Google’s estimated result number is more than 100, and that a sentence
is personalized if the estimated result number if less than 5. Table 5.6 shows the num-
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bers of popular and personalized sentences for all mnemonic-based strategies. From the
table, we can observe that the rates of popular sentences were reduced dramatically from
28% to around 4% when either personalization instructions or examples were introduced,
and the combination of them further reduced the rate to 1.7%. This latter finding confirms
the necessity of combining explicit request for personalization sentences and high-quality
examples.
5.3.3 Cracking Mnemonic Passwords
We now develop a method for cracking passwords generated using the mnemonic strat-
egy. Our goal is to demonstrate that the step of converting sentences to passwords provides
only limited extra entropy. Given the sentences, we can crack more than half of the pass-
words selected by the users in between 5 and 10 guesses.
For ease of exposition, we first explain our method for case-insensitive passwords.
When generating passwords by following the mnemonic strategy, a word can theoretically
be mapped to any character; however, given a word, the number of characters that are cho-
sen by the users is limited in practice. People generally just pick the first letter of each
word. When ignoring case differences, on average, each word is converted to 4 possible
characters.
Table 5.7 lists the character usage in passwords generated in mnemonic strategies. In
the table, Upper, Lower, Digit and Symbol means the number of corresponding type of
character used in passwords. First means the number of words whose first character is
directly used in the password. First + Leet means the number of words whose first character
or the Leet substitution of the first character is used in the password. Total Trans means the
total number of pairs of word and resulted characters. Unique Trans means the number of
word-character pairs that only appear once in the dataset. Distinct Words are the number of
distinct words used in all sentences.
From Table 5.7, we can see that on average 81.2% of the words are converted into
their first character; furthermore, about 3.3% of the time, an additional leet substitution is
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applied. For mappings not using the first letters, the characters chosen are almost fixed for
a given word; most of them are based on pronunciation or the meaning of the word. For
instance, “to” is mapped to “2”, “question” is mapped to “?”, and “first” is mapped to “1”.
Given a training dataset which contains pairs of sentences and passwords, we first learn
the probability distribution of the word-to-character mappings. We classify words into
normal words and special words. Normal words are typically mapped to the first character,
with a possible leet substitution. For each letter, we maintain a probability distribution of
how that letter is likely to mapped into. Special words are often not mapped to its first
letter. For each special word, we maintain a probability distribution for its mappings.
The classification of words is an iterative process. At the beginning, we assume that all
words which appear at least 5 times are normal words. In each iteration, we first calculate
the probability distribution of each character by averaging the converted character distri-
bution of all corresponding words. Then, we find the L1 distance between the converted
character distribution of each word and the probability distribution of its first character. If
the L1 distance is larger than a certain threshold, we say that the word is a special word. In
our experiment, the threshold value we use is 0.6. We repeat the process until no words are
removed from normal words.
For password cracking, given a sentence, we first generate a guess by taking the first
character of all the words. Then, we generate the passwords by converting words into
characters. We assume that in a sentence, the same words are always converted in the
same way, and different words are converted into characters independently. Therefore, the
probability of each generated password is the product of the probabilities of the transitions
from all unique words to characters. We generate passwords in the descending order of
probability.
We evaluate the method on the sentences and passwords we collected from MneGenEx,
MnePerEx, MnePer, MneEx by cross validation, i.e., we train the model on data from three
strategies and attempt to crack passwords in the other strategy. MneSchEx and MneYanEx
are excluded in the evaluation, as in the two strategies, a word is not always converted into
one character. The percentage of passwords cracked when varying the number of guesses
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Table 5.7.: Character usage in mnemonic strategies.






MneGenEx 6838.6% 607376.4% 79210.0% 3995.0% 663383.5% 1942.4% 7947 175822.1% 2034
MnePerEx 5597.8% 546576.7% 74110.4% 3645.1% 608085.3% 1742.4% 7129 171824.1% 1954
MnePer 81712.0% 429063.2% 112316.6% 5548.2% 502774.1% 3324.9% 6784 222832.8% 2334
MneEx 99412.2% 553968.1% 104612.9% 5536.8% 665181.8% 2773.4% 8132 254731.3% 2207
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is illustrated in Figure 5.2(a). For all of the strategies, we can crack 60% of the passwords
within 10 guesses, where most of them are in the first 5 attempts.
The method performs less effective on MnePer and MneEx. From Table 5.7, we can
observe that the percentages of unique conversions from a word to a character contribute to
32.8% and 31.3% of all such conversions in MnePer and MneEx. The quantities are much
higher than those from MneGenEx (22.1%) and MnePerEx (24.1%). The more unique con-
versions leads to more character mappings that are never guessed. Table 5.7 also shows that
participants in MneEx and MnePer are more likely to use digits, symbols, and upper-case
letters than participants in MneGenEx and MnePerEx. One likely explanation is that just a
single example is presented in MneGenEx and MnePerEx; while no example is presented
in MnePer and six examples are given for MneEx. It is possible that both no example and
lots of examples cause people to be more creative in mapping words to characters.
(a) case-insensitive (b) case-sensitive
Figure 5.2.: Percentage of passwords cracked within 10 attempts for case-insensitive pass-
words, and 20 attempts for case-sensitive passwords.
We adapt our method to be case-sensitive when guessing as follows. The training pro-
cess is identical to the case-insensitive condition. When generating password guesses,
every time a password (with the highest probability) is generated, instead of 1 guess, 4
guesses are made. We try the original password, capitalize all letters, capitalize the first let-
ter, and capitalize all letters whose corresponding words are capitalized. The performance
of the method on case-sensitive passwords is shown in Figure 5.2(b). More than 50% of
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passwords in all the 4 strategies can be guessed in 20 attempts, with most successes from
the first 10 guesses.
Crack from Scratch. Now, we apply the cracking method described above to a real-world
scenario, in which sentence selection in the testing dataset is unknown. Given a training
dataset, we generate candidate passwords as follows. We first order the sentences selected
in the training dataset by the descending order of their frequencies. Then, starting from the
most popular sentence, for each sentence, we generate 20 case-sensitive guesses.
(a) MneGenEx (b) MnePer
(c) MnePerEx (d) MneEx
Figure 5.3.: Guess number graph on passwords created by using mnemonic strategies.
Fig 5.3 shows the effect of our method evaluated on the four datasets by cross validation,
i.e., for each testing dataset, the training dataset is the union of the other three datasets. In
the graphs, each curve represents a cracking method, and a point (x, y) on the curve means
y percentage of passwords in the testing dataset are cracked within x attempts. We also plot
the curves of 5-order Markov Model (MC5), PCFG method (PCFG) trained on Rockyou
dataset, and two blacklist-based methods, which use Rockyou (Rockyou) dataset and the
passwords in the training datasets (Train), respectively. Because of the limited number of
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sentences in the training dataset (less than 2400), we are able to generate less than 50,000
candidate passwords using the new method, and used 50,000 as the number of passwords
generated for all methods.
The evaluation on MneGenEx is illustrated in Fig 5.3(a). From the figure, we can ob-
serve that all the generic cracking methods perform poorly, and can crack no more than
0.4% passwords within 50,000 guesses. In fact, the only passwords covered by the meth-
ods are “!@#$%ˆ” and “!@#$%ˆ&*”, which are apparently created without following the
strategy. On the other hand, 3.2% of the passwords in MneGenEx are covered in the 211
passwords in the training datasets, which confirm the need to using strategy-specific meth-
ods. Our proposed method can crack 6.4% passwords with 50,000 guesses. We expect
performance of the method will increase with the size of training data. The performance of
our method as well as the dictionary obtained from the training dataset drops significantly
on the other datasets, and passwords from MnePerEx appears to the strongest. Less than
1% passwords in MnePerEx are cracked with 50,000 guesses. The reduced performance
of the methods is mainly due to the requirement of personalized sentence choice and the
resulted increasing number of unique sentences. The result is consistent with the findings
from λ̃1 and λ̃10 analysis described in Section 5.3.2.
One may also notice that in MnePer, the relative order of the methods is quite different.
This is because of high frequency of passwords generated not following the strategy, such
as 12345678 (17), !@#$%ˆ&* (6), 123456789 (5). These passwords are hard to predict
based on our method, but are easy to guess based on the other methods. As a result, our
method performs worse than all the other methods in the graph.
5.4 Study 2: Usability
We conducted another user study evaluating the usability of the mnemonic strategies
from two aspects: (I) Creation usability: Time and effort required from the user to generate
a password by following the given strategy; (II) Memorability: long-term retention of the
password generated with the given strategy. In this study, three strategies were evaluated,
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MneGenEx, MnePerEx, which are evaluated as the most and the least secure mnemonic
strategy in the previous analysis, and Control, which serves as a baseline.
Time used for password generation, the success rate of password recall, and password
recall time were measured. We also examined the effort that participants spent during
password generation and retention utilizing the NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) [66], in
which the workload is rated on 6 subscales: mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, performance, effort and frustration. In the NASA-TLX, participants rated the
workload of each subscale ranging on a linear scale from 0 to 20, where 0 means very low
workload and 20 means high workload.
5.4.1 Study Overview
This study was conducted on MTurk in two phases. The first phase was similar to the
previous experiment except as noted. At the beginning, we explicitly told participants that
they would be asked to return and use the password in about one week, and they could
take whatever measures they would normally take to remember and protect the passwords.
Also, a concrete creation scenario was provided to simulate a real-world password gen-
eration context. Specifically, each participant was asked to create an online account for
a bank named “Provident Citizens Bank”. One strategy randomly selected from Control,
MneGenEx, and MnePerEx was assigned to each participant for password generation. For
participants using MneGenEx and MnePerEx, the sentence creation and password genera-
tion were separated into two pages, such that the created sentence was not visible to partic-
ipants during password generation, in order to mimic the password generation environment
in practice. Participants were allowed to arbitrarily switch back and forth between the two
pages.After the password generation, each participant was asked to measure the workload
spent on creating the passwords utilizing the NASA-Task Load Index. About half of the
participants were randomly selected to recall the password that they had just created at
the end of the study, to evaluate the impact of short-term rehearsal on long-term password
recall.
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Participants were invited back for the second phase by email. We sent the invitation
emails through MTurk starting from the 6th day after participants finished the first phase.
For those participants who did not come back to the study, we re-sent the same invitation
email for another two days. In the second phase, participants were instructed to login to
“Provident Citizens Bank” with the password they created and then to update the password.
Each participant was allowed up to 4 attempts until failure. If a participant could not recall
the password within the first 2 attempts, the strategy was displayed as a hint. Regardless of
the performance in the login process, all participants were asked to evaluate the workload
during password recall by using the NASA-TLX afterwards.
Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 list the general statistics of the first-phase and second-phase
study, respectively. In the first phase, for each condition, we list the number of participants,
average password creation time, and statistics for short-term password recall (if applica-
ble) including success rate before and after seeing the strategy as a hint, failure rate after
4 attempts, and time used in password recall. In the second phase, we list the number
(percentage) of participants that returned to the study; statistics about long-term password
recall, including the number (percentage) of participants who did not write down pass-
words; the success/failure rate and average time used in password recall for those who did
not write passwords down; the number (percentage) of participants who used the strategy
provided to update their passwords. In the table, Succ1 means the the number of partici-
pants who successfully recall the password within 2 attempts. Succ2 means the the number
of participants who successfully recall the password in the third or fourth attempts, and the
strategy was displayed as a hint. No WDP means the number of participants who did not
write down passwords. Time is measured in seconds.
5.4.2 First Phase Results
We recruited 425, 400, and 435 participants for Control, MneGenEx, and MnePerEx,
accordingly, with a total of 1260 (614 females). The participants’ ages ranged from 18
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to over 50, with 76% between 23 to 50 years. Most participants were college students or
professionals who had bachelor or higher degrees.






Recall Time Succ1 Succ2 Failed Time
Control
Yes 217 38.7 213(98%) 1(0%) 3(1%) 26.0
No 208 39.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 425 39.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
MneGenEx
Yes 185 177.2 178(96%) 5(3%) 2(1%) 30.6
No 215 146.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 400 160.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A
MnePerEx
Yes 221 133.3 212(96%) 3(1%) 6(3%) 30.4
No 214 149.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 435 141.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Password Creation Time. The average time used in password creation for each strat-
egy is listed in Table 5.8. The password creation time was significantly different among
the three strategies. As expected, participants spent the least time when there was no re-
striction (Control), and time spent in Control is significantly less than that MneGenEx and
MnePerEx (p < 0.001). Compared with MneGenEx, password generation time was shorter
in MnePerEx (t = 2.14, p = 0.033). That’s mainly due to the additional requirement for
personalized choice that narrowed down the search space of sentences and resulted in a
faster decision.
Workload. Fig 5.4(a) shows the average ratings in each subscale of NASA-TLX for the
three strategies. Overall, the perceived workload was relatively low, with the average rat-
ings for all subscales being below or close to 10. The workload required in Control were
lower than that from the two mnemonic strategies. The workload required in MneGenEx
115
Table 5.9.: Statistics for second-phase usability study for mnemonic strategies.
Strategy
Short Phase 2
Term Number Long-term Recall Update
Recall Returned No WDP Succ1 Succ2 Failed Time Use Strategy
Control
Yes 169(78%) 140(83%) 51(36%) 9(6%) 80(57%) 43.6 N/A
No 154(74%) 125(81%) 48(38%) 9(7%) 68(54%) 48.6 N/A
All 323(76%) 265(82%) 99(37%) 18(7%) 148(56%) 46.0 N/A
MneGenEx
Yes 156(84%) 129(83%) 62(48%) 10(8%) 57(44%) 70.1 105(67%)
No 166(77%) 142(86%) 47(33%) 13(9%) 82(58%) 113.1 113(68%)
All 322(80%) 271(84%) 109(40%) 23(8%) 139(51%) 92.6 218(68%)
MnePerEx
Yes 180(81%) 146(81%) 44(30%) 8(5%) 94(64%) 112.9 124(69%)
No 161(75%) 135(84%) 38(28%) 9(7%) 88(65%) 103.5 116(72%)
All 341(78%) 281(82%) 82(29%) 17(6%) 182(65%) 108.4 240(70%)
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and MnePerEx is similar, and MnePerEx results in a lower workload in most of the sub-
scales. This is consistent with the comparison in password creation time.
Short-term Memorability. About half of the participants in each strategy were asked
to recall the password at the end of the first phase. From Table 5.8, we can observe that
regardless of the strategy used, almost all participants could enter the correct password.
(a) Password Generation (b) Password Recall
Figure 5.4.: Mean scores of TLX as a function of strategy and subscale for Control,
MneGenEx, and MnePerEx. Error bars represent standard errors of the scores.
5.4.3 Second Phase Results
Approximately 78% of participants from each strategy condition returned to the second
phase of the study.
Long-term Memorability. For participants who came back for the study, approximately
83% indicated that they did not write down the password or the sentence (in MneGenEx
and MnePerEx), and the ratio for the three strategies is similar, indicating that participants
using mnemonic stratetics were as confident as those in the control group, that they could
remember the passwords. We analyzed the password memorability from the participants
who claimed that they did not write down passwords or sentences.
The ratio of participants recalled the passwords successfully within first two attempts
range from 29% to 40%, depending on the strategy used, and an extra 7% of participants
were able to recall the passwords when the strategy was displayed as a hint. The per-
formance of Control and MneGenEx are similar (χ2 = 1.31, p = 0.521). Both Control
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(χ2 = 4.66, p = 0.097) and MneGenEx (χ2 = 10.31, p = 0.006) perform significantly bet-
ter than MnePerEx, indicating that the long-term memorability of MnePerEx is relatively
bad. When there was a short-term recall, the long-term recall success rates were generally
increased for each strategy, and the increase in rates was larger for the mnemonic strategies,
especially for the MneGenEx strategy.
Long-term Recall Time. The password recall time in Control was shorter than that for
MneGenEx (t = 4.64, p < 0.001) or MnePerEx (t = 2.82, p = 0.005), whereas there was
no significant difference between MneGenEx and MnePerEx (t = 0.67, p = 0.505). Again,
whether or not short-term recall had been required did not have any significant impacts.
Workload. The workload of password retention evaluated by TLX is illustrated in
Fig 5.4(b). Comparing Fig 5.4(a) and Fig 5.4(b), perhaps the most noticeable difference is
that the subscale of performance in Fig 5.4(b) is almost double that in Fig 5.4(a), which was
mainly due to large portion of failed recall. Except physical demand and temporal demand,
which are not directly related to the task, the average rates of all the other 3 subscales also
increased dramatically, suggesting that password recall was more difficult than password
generation.
For the subscales, mental workload and frustration ratings of mnemonics strategies
were higher than those of the Control, and the rating for MneGenEx is slightly higher than
MnePerEx, which is consistent with the first phase results, suggesting the overhead from
the extra requirements of the mnemonic strategies and MnePerEx is considered to be easier
to use than MneGenEx.
Password Update. At the end the task, we asked participants to update the password,
without any restriction except that the password could not be the same as the old one. For
MneGenEx and MnePerEx, after the password was created, we asked participants whether
they used the strategy we provided. About 70% of participants said “yes” to the question,
and the percentage for MnePerEx was slightly higher. The results indicated that most of
the participants were willing to use the instructed strategy even if not forced to do so.
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Overall, the study suggests that although workload required for MneGenEx are sig-
nificantly larger than that for Control, no significant difference in password memorabil-
ity between the two strategies is observed, which is consistent with the previous litera-
ture [46, 47]. However, MnePerEx, which shows advantage over MneGenEx in terms of
security, has a quite different behavior. It is considered to be easier to use than MneGenEx,
with the cost of higher failure rate in long-term memorability.
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We conducted our study with the MTurk population, which is more diverse than the
participants in typical laboratory studies [67]. The use of MTurk also allowed us to re-
cruit more participants and collect data with larger samples, which cannot be easily done
in traditional in-person data collection. We found that passwords created in the control
group (Control) is stronger than that of the existing real-world password datasets, such as
Rockyou. Therefore, the security of passwords created in the study can serve as a lower-
bound measurement.
In this chapter, we investigated the security and usability of 6 variants of mnemonic
strategies. Our studies improved the understanding of password generation strategies
through the following contributions.
• We showed that using the standard cracking-based methodology, password sets ob-
tained under all variants had similar strengths and were all much more secure than
the baseline. However, using β-guess-rates, we found that using generic instructions
that had been suggested in the literature resulted in 2.5% of the group choosing the
same sentence, and the top 10 sentences chosen by 7.8% of the group. We have also
found that converting a sentence to a password added very limited entropy. These
two facts together suggested that this variant of mnemonic strategy is no more secure
than the baseline.
• We showed that combining explicit instruction of choosing a personalized sentence
that is unlikely to be chosen by others, with the inclusion of such personalized ex-
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amples, dramatically increased the security of the resulting passwords. Furthermore,
using only the explicit instruction or the examples alone resulted in less secure dis-
tributions.
• We showed that the instructions for the mnemonic strategy found in the literature
and recommended by security experts were not optimal in inducing secure password
distributions.
• We found that requiring personalized choice of sentences in mnemonic strategies
effected the usability of the mnemonic strategy. With the additional requirement, the
strategy turned out to be easier to use in terms of password creation. However, the
performance of long-term memorability decreased.
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6. UNDERSTANDING WORD-BASED PASSWORD GENERATION
STRATEGIES
In this chapter, we evaluate variants of another commonly suggested password generation
strategy made famous by the xkcd comic [25]. In the xkcd comics, one is suggested to
choose 4 random words and concatenate the words to make a password. Similar strategies
were also recommended by the security community. For example, combining two or three
unrelated words and changing some of the letters to numbers or symbols [24]; mixing
letters from two words was suggested in [31], etc.
Observing that password creation steps in these strategies are similar: first pick 2 to
4 words, then somehow combine the words into a password; and passwords are generally
constructed based on words, we categorize these strategies as word-based password strate-
gies. In this chapter, we analyze the security and usability of 7 variants of word-based
strategies in a series of human subject studies which are similar to those described in Chap-
ter 5.
6.1 Introduction
Beyonds mnemonic sentence-based strategies, word-based strategies are commonly
recommended [24, 25, 31] as well. In such strategies, a password is generally created in
a two-step process: first choose some unrelated or random words (usually 2 to 4), then
combine the words into a password.
Despite the popularity of the strategies, to the best of our knowledge, the strategies have
not been evaluated in any human subject studies and little is known about the effectiveness
of them in helping users create usable and secure passwords.
In this chapter, we examine the security and usability of 7 variants of the strategy in a
series of studies. The security of the variants was evaluated in a study conducted on MTurk
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in which a total number of 5, 484 participants were involved. In the study, each participant
was asked to create 1 or 2 passwords following different variants of the strategy. When
assessing the security of the variants, we adopt the approach of using statistical quantities
to measure the distributions of the passwords, as articulated by Bonneau [28]. In particular,
we chose to use the β-guess-rate (λβ) [29], which measures the expected success for an
attacker limited to β guesses per account. We chose to use β = 1 and β = 10, as they were
suggested in [30] as appropriate for defense against online guessing attacks and because a
larger β is not very meaningful for our sample sizes.
The usability of the variants is evaluated in a separate user study, in which password
creation time, short-term and long-term password memorability, and the workload required
in both password creation and retention are evaluated.
Our studies were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and the studies were similar
to those described in Chapter 5.
6.2 Study 1: Security
In this section, we present an overview of the first study.
We study 7 variants of word-based strategies. In such a strategy, a participant is asked to
first select a few (2, 3, or 4) unrelated words, and then combine (e.g., through concatenation,
interleaving of the words, connected with punctuation) them to obtain the password. For
instance, if the user is asked to select 3 words, and selects the words, “correct”, “horse”, and
“stable”, then one possible password according to this strategy can be “correcthorsestable”.
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1. Choose 4 unrelated words that make sense to you.
For example, “correct, horse, battery, staple”.
2. Combine them in order into one string and use that





1. Choose 3 unrelated words that make sense to you.
For example, “correct, horse, battery”.
2. Combine them in order into one string and use




1. Choose 3 unrelated words that make sense to you.
2. Combine them in order into one string and use








1. Choose two or three unrelated words.
2. Combine the words and change some of the letters
to numbers or special characters.
Examples:
“bank” and “camera” might become
“B@nkC@mera”.
“mail” and “phone” might become “m4!lf0N3”.










1. Choose two unrelated words of approximately the
same length. For example, “house” and “plane”.
2. Interleave the two words (Start from the first let-
ter of the first word and the first letter of the second
word, and repeat this until you get to the last letter






1. Choose two unrelated short words. For example,
“house” and “plane”.
2. Concatenate them together with a punc-






1. Choose two unrelated short words.
2. Concatenate them together with a punctuation
character between them.
Table 6.1 gives details of the 7 variants in our study. We urge readers to read the table
before proceeding, as the differences in the strategy descriptions are an important part of
the study. Below is a summary.
• 4WordEx (4-Words-Example, 4 unrelated words, with the xkcd example [25]),
• 2WordMixEx (2-Words-Mix-Example, interleaving 2 words, with an example, used
in [31]),
• 2WordPunEx (2-Words-Punctuation-Example, two words with a punctuation con-
necting them, with an example),
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• 3WordEx (3-Words-Example, 3 unrelated words, with an example),
• 3or2WordEx (2-or-3-Words-Example, 2 or 3 unrelated words with some letters re-
placed with special symbols or digits, with examples, suggested in [24]),
• 3Word (3-Words, 3 unrelated words, no example),
• 2WordPun (2-Words-Punctuation, two words with a punctuation, no example).
In addition to the 7 variants, a control group Control, in which we ask for passwords
containing at least 8 characters without any extra restriction, was included in the study as
well.
Table 6.2.: Word-based strategies used in each round of the study.
Study Number Strategies
1 864 4WordEx, 2WordMixEx
2 777 4WordEx, 2WordPunEx
3 753 3WordEx, 3or2WordEx





We conducted the study through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and all partic-
ipants were at least 18 years old. We limited our data collection to participants from the
United State because the strategies were constructed using the English language. The study
has 7 rounds. Except the control group (Control in Round 7), in each round, participants
were asked to create passwords for one or two variants of word-based strategy. The vari-
ants presented in each round as well as the number of participants recruited are listed in
Table 6.2. If multiple variants were studied in one round, the order of the variants presented
was randomized among participants. Participants were allowed to participate in only one
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round. If a participant was in more than one rounds of the study, we kept only the data from
the first time that the participant was in.
In the study, participants were asked to type the words used in the intermediate step. Af-
ter that, participants were asked to enter the password they created twice, and the password
typed in each time had to match each other before they could proceed.
We warned participants not to use their actual passwords. In the study, we forbade pass-
words that were the same as the examples and that did not appear to be generated following
the instructions. In all the variants of word-based strategies except 3or2WordEx, once the
words were chosen, the sequence of letters in the passwords was fixed. We checked if the
password one generated matched with the words. In 3or2WordEx, since we asked partici-
pants to change some letters to numbers or special symbols, and participants were allowed
to, e.g., replace syllables with letters with similar pronunciation (e.g., “ph”→“f”), we only
required that there were non-letter characters in the passwords.
6.3 Results From Study 1
We evaluate the security of passwords as well as words used in password creation uti-
lizing the same metrics described in Chapter 5.
6.3.1 Analyzing Passwords Using Probability Models and Password Strength Me-
ters.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the evaluation of the strength of passwords generated using the
strategies as well as two commonly used datasets Yahoo and Phpbb against today’s attacks
utilizing (1) the 5-order Markov Model trained on Rockyou dataset, (2) Google password
strength API1, and (3) Zxcvbn [23] deployed by Dropbox.
In all the three graphs, the curve for the control group (Control) is below the curves for
Yahoo and Phpbb, indicating that passwords created in the study are stronger than that in
real-world datasets. Therefore, the security of passwords created in the study can serve as
1https://accounts.google.com/RatePassword
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(a) 5-order Markov Model (Part 1) (b) 5-order Markov Model (Part 2)
(c) Google API (Part 1) (d) Google API (Part 2)
(e) Zxcvbn (Part 1) (f) Zxcvbn (Part 2)
Figure 6.1.: Comparison of strength of passwords from different word-based strategies and
datasets using probabilistic models and password strength meters.
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a lower-bound measurement. On the other hand, curves for Yahoo, Phpbb, and Control are
significantly higher than the other curves in most of the graphs. The only exception is that
Figure 6.1(e), the performance of 2WordPunEx and 2WordPun is relatively good. This is
because in zxcvbn, the entropy of passwords created in the two strategies are the sum of the
entropy of the two selected words and the entropy of the punctuation. Since the entropy of
a single charater (the punctuation) is limited, the estimated entropy in zxcvbn is approxi-
mately the entropy of two words. The comparison between Yahoo, Phpbb, Control and the
other strategies indicates that according to the metrics, passwords created without any spe-
cific strategy are significantly weaker than the other datasets. When guessing according to
the order suggested by the metrics, more passwords in Yahoo, phpbb, and Control will be
cracked than passwords from any word-based strategy. However, this conclusion is due to
the fact that the model or the meters are designed to evaluate generally selected passwords,
which is broadly similar to passwords in Yahoo and Phpbb, and passwords generated from
the word-based strategies result in quite different distributions.
Among the word-based strategies, the variants requiring more words are evaluated as
stronger in general. The only exception is 2WordMixEx. Based on Markov Model and
zxcvbn, 2WordMixEx performs similar to 4WordEx in terms of security. After interleaving
letters, the resulted passwords are likely to be considered as random strings by the models
and password meters, which results in high entropy assigned.
6.3.2 Analyzing Passwords Using Statistical Quantities.
We evaluate the strength of words used in strategies as well as the resulted passwords
utilizing λ̃1 and λ̃10 metrics. The evaluation of Control is listed in Table 5.3 and has been
discussed in Chapter 5. Table 6.3 gives the λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10 (top10) values of sentences and
the resulted passwords for all mnemonic sentence-based variants.
When counting the collisions in word selections, the order of the words is not taken
into account, i.e., we first sort the chosen words and then evaluated on the sorted words. In
2WordMixEx, the minimum length requirement of passwords is 6, while the other variants
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Table 6.3.: λ̃1 (top) and λ̃10 (top10) in word-based strategies.
Strategy Count













3WordEx 753 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10)
3Word 745 0.3%(2) 0.3%(2) 0.3%(2) 1.6%(12) 1.6%(12) 1.5%(11)
3or2WordEx 753 0.3%(2) 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 2.1%(16) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10)
2WordMixEx 864 3.8%(33) 2.0%(17) 2.0%(17) 6.8%(59) 6.1%(53) 6.0%(52)
2WordMixEx8 761 0.5%(4) 0.5%(4) 0.5%(4) 3.7%(28) 3.2%(24) 3.0%(23)
2WordPunEx 777 0.4%(3) 0.3%(2) 0.3%(2) 3.2%(25) 1.5%(12) 1.5%(12)
2WordPun 745 0.4%(3) 0.1%(1) 0.1%(1) 2.6%(19) 1.3%(10) 1.3%(10)
4WordEx 3307 0.1%(2) 0.1%(2) 0.1%(2) 0.5%(15) 0.4%(14) 0.4%(13)
3WordAll 1709 0.2%(3) N/A N/A 1.1%(19) N/A N/A
2WordAll 2927 1.2%(34) N/A N/A 2.7%(79) N/A N/A
Control 678 N/A 1.2%(8) 0.9%(6) N/A 3.4%(23) 2.9%(20)
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all require passwords with at least 8 characters. If we remove all passwords whose length is
less than 8 in 2WordMixEx, we are left with 761 passwords. We label this set of passwords
as 2WordMixEx8.
We observe that there is no significant differences in terms of λ̃1 and λ̃10 for variants
requiring the same number of words. We find that the most frequently used words in each
variant and present the results in Table 6.4. The table suggests that the most popular words
are almost identical in all the variants.
Table 6.5.: Popular passwords and probability for top 5 frequently chosen word combina-
tions in word-based strategies.
Rank Words Passwords Frequency
4WordEx (3307)
1 ate cat dog food (2) dogatecatfood (2); 0.06%
2 brown fox quick the (2) thequickbrownfox (2); 0.06%












3WordEx (753) No collisions found.
3Word (745)
1 battery horse staple (2) horsebatterystaple (2); 0.27%
2 i love you (2) Iloveyou (1); iloveyou (1); 0.27%
3or2WordEx (753)
1 blanket dog (2) d@gblank*t (1); d@gb1anket (1); 0.27%
2 cat school (2) c4t$c#00l (1); c4t$ch00l (1); 0.27%
3 car house (2) H0us3c@r (1); h0us3ca7 (1); 0.27%
continued on next page
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Table 6.5.: continued
Rank Words Passwords Frequency
4 dog phone (2) p40ned0g (1); d09ph0n3 (1); 0.27%
5 fuck you (2) Fuck&you (1); f@#$ y@u (1); 0.27%
2WordMixEx (864)
1 cat dog (33) cdaotg (17); dcoagt (16); 3.8%
2 chair table (4) tcahbalier (3); cthaabilre (1); 0.46%
3 hate love (4) lhoavtee (4); 0.46%
4 house mouse (4)
hmoouussee (2); mhoouussee (1);
MHOOUUSSEE (1);
0.46%
5 chair couch (3) ccohuacihr (2); 0.35%
2WordPunEx (777)
1 dog tree (3)
tree&dog (1); dog!tree (1);
dog+tree (1);
0.39%
2 car tree (3) tree:car (1); tree-car (1); car!tree (1); 0.39%
3 house tree (3)
tree-house (1); tree&house (1);
tree!house (1);
0.39%
4 car horse (3) horse!car (2); horse+car (1); 0.39%
5 cat chair (3)




1 hate love (3)
love;hate (1); love*hate (1);
love$hate (1);
0.40%
2 ninja tiger (2) ninja@tiger (1); tiger ninja (1); 0.27%
3 box house (2) box.house (1); box!house (1); 0.27%
4 dog flying (2) dog.flying (1); dog!flying (1); 0.27%
continued on next page
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Table 6.5.: continued
Rank Words Passwords Frequency





1 battery horse staple (3) N/A 0.18%
2 i love you (2) N/A 0.12%
3 car dog house (2) N/A 0.12%
4 bat corn dog (2) N/A 0.12%
5 car dog poker (2) N/A 0.12%
2WordAll (2927)
1 cat dog (34) N/A 1.2%
2 hate love (8) N/A 0.27%
3 house mouse (6) N/A 0.21%
4 cats dogs (6) N/A 0.21%
5 dog phone (5) N/A 0.17%
Two Words. When asked to choose two random words and merge their letters one by
one (2WordMixEx), 19 pairs of words were selected more than once, for a total of 77, and
the 10 most popular pairs of words (top10) were picked 59 times. 33 participants chose the
words “cat dog”. This yielded λ̃1 = 3.8%, λ̃10 = 6.8%. If we remove the passwords with
length less than 8 from 2WordMixEx, then λ̃1 and λ̃10 are reduced to 0.5% and 3.7%, as the
most frequently appeared words are “cat dog”.
Beyond “cat dog”, the other frequently chosen word combinations were “house mouse”,
and “hate love”. See Table 6.5 for other commonly chosen words, and the resulted pass-
words.
Although the instructions explicitly asked the users to choose two unrelated words in
the description, people leaned towards choosing two words that were somewhat related to
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Table 6.4.: Word frequency in word-based strategies.
Strategy Total W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
4WordEx 13504 dog (3802.81%) cat (2661.97%) car (2251.67%) phone (1721.27%) house (1601.18%)
3WordEx 2259 dog (572.52%) cat (441.95%) car (391.73%) house (220.97%) love (200.89%)
3Word 2235 dog (753.36%) cat (472.10%) car (371.66%) love (261.16%) blue (231.03%)
3or2WordEx 1717 dog (502.91%) cat (392.27%) car (281.63%) phone (281.63%) tree (181.05%)
3or2WordEx 2w 1084 dog (272.49%) phone (211.94%) cat (201.85%) book (121.11%) chair (100.92%)
3or2WordEx 3w 633 dog (233.63%) car (203.16%) cat (193.00%) tree (101.58%) phone (71.11%)
2WordMixEx 1727 cat (472.72%) dog (472.72%) mouse (321.85%) phone (221.27%) book (221.27%)
2WordPunEx 1554 dog (654.18%) cat (493.15%) car (362.32%) tree (231.48%) house (211.35%)
2WordPun 1490 dog (493.29%) cat (463.09%) car (191.28%) apple (130.87%) house (120.81%)
3WordAll 5127 dog (1553.02%) cat (1102.15%) car (961.87%) love (510.99%) blue (440.86%)
2WordAll 5854 dog (1883.21%) cat (1622.77%) car (761.30%) phone (671.14%) mouse (601.02%)
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each other. This observation can be explained by Spreading Activation, which has been
recognized in Cognitive Psychology [68]. A fairly widely accepted view is that memory
is organized as a network of associations, and when one activates one item it will activate
related ones.
For 2WordPunEx, 17 word combinations were chosen more than once, and λ̃10 is 3.2%.
For 2WordPun, 8 word combinations were chosen more than once, and λ̃10 is 2.6%. The
λ̃10’s in password selections for 2WordPunEx and 2WordPun are much less than those
in the word selections, this is primarily due to the choice of punctation. No significant
difference is observed in λ̃10 in word selections from the three two-word variants.
Combining all variants that require 2 words and those who chose only two words in
3or2WordEx, 2, 927 word pairs were collected, with 88 word combinations selected more
than once, and λ̃1 = 1.2%, λ̃10 = 2.7%. The quantities are similar to that from Control, and
no significant difference is observed (z = 0.98, p = 0.16). Observing that both λ̃1 and λ̃10
from word combination selections are larger than those of password choices in Rockyou
dataset, the security provided by 2-word based variants is far from satisfactory. Additional
entropy (e.g., adding punctuation between words) can be introduced during the step where
words are transformed into password but they are likely to be predictable. Table 6.6 lists
the 5 most popular chosen punctuations in 2WordPunEx and 2WordPun as well as their
frequency. From the table, we can observe that the top 5 punctuations count for more
than 70% of all punctuation choices. If the word combination is known, more than 70%
passwords will be cracked within 5 attempts.
Table 6.6.: Punctuation frequency in 2WordPunEx and 2WordPun.
Strategy Total P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
2WordPunEx 777 +(24%) !(13%) -(12%) .(11%) &(11%)
2WordPun 745 .(31%) !(26%) -(12%) ,(6%) ?(3%)
Three Words. For the two three-words variants, the only two word combinations selected
more than once are “battery horse staple” and “I love you”. The former is the first three
words from the example in the xkcd comics. Not surprisingly, λ̃1 and λ̃10 from three-word
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based variants are all much lower than those from the two-word based variants. Observing
that there is no significant difference between 3WordEx and 3Word (for λ̃10, z = 0.45, p =
0.325), we combine all variants requiring three words in order to get a larger sample of data.
For all the 1, 709 passwords collected from 3WordEx, 3Word, and those in 3or2WordEx that
use three words, the observed λ̃1 is 0.2% and λ̃10 is 1.1%, both are significantly less than
that from two word variants and the control group (Control), indicating that passwords
created using three word variants are likely to be stronger than the baseline.
Four Words. For the 3, 307 total passwords collected from the four words strategy, λ̃1
and λ̃10 are 0.06% and 0.4%. λ̃10 observed in the 4 word variant is even smaller than that
of 3 word variant (z = 2.69, p = 0.004).
Overall, λ̃1 and λ̃10 in words selection reduce with the increasing number of words
required. Since the entropy introduced in the step converting words into passwords is
limited, the results indicate that variants requiring more words provide stronger passwords,
where at least three words is sufficient to provide passwords stronger than those chosen by
typical users without any strategy specified.
6.4 Study 2: Usability
We conducted a two-phase user study evaluating the usability of the word-based strate-
gies. The study design was almost identical to that described in Chapter 5.4 except that the
usability of Control, 3WordEx, and 4WordEx was evaluated in this section.
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 list the general statistics of the first-phase and second-phase
study, respectively. In the first phase, for each condition, we list the number of participants,
average password creation time, and statistics for short-term password recall (if applica-
ble) including success rate before and after seeing the strategy as a hint, failure rate after
4 attempts, and time used in password recall. In the second phase, we list the number
(percentage) of participants that returned to the study; statistics about long-term password
recall, including the number (percentage) of participants who did not write down pass-
words; the success/failure rate and average time used in password recall for those who did
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not write passwords down; the number (percentage) of participants who used the strategy
provided to update their passwords. In the table, Succ1 means the the number of partici-
pants who successfully recall the password within 2 attempts. Succ2 means the the number
of participants who successfully recall the password in the third or fourth attempts, and the
strategy was displayed as a hint. No WDP means the number of participants who did not
write down passwords. Time is measured in seconds.
6.4.1 First Phase Results
We recruited 425, 388, and 403 participants for Control, 3WordEx, and 4WordEx, ac-
cordingly, with a total of 1216 (624 females).






Recall Time Succ1 Succ2 Failed Time
Control
Yes 217 38.7 213(98%) 1(0%) 3(1%) 26.0
No 208 39.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 425 39.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
3WordEx
Yes 194 74.9 192(99%) 1(1%) 1(1%) 25.5
No 194 68.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 388 71.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
4WordEx
Yes 202 95.7 200(99%) 0(0%) 2(1%) 28.8
No 201 92.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
All 403 94.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Password Creation Time. The average time used in password creation for each strategy
is listed in Table 6.7. The password creation time was significantly different among the
three strategies. As expected, participants spent the least time when there was no restriction
(Control), and time spent inControl is significantly less than that 3WordEx (t = 10.506, p <
0.001) and 4WordEx (t = 12.67, p < 0.001). The time required for selecting an additional
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Table 6.8.: Statistics for second-phase usability study for word-based strategies.
Strategy
Short Phase 2
Term Number Long-term Recall Update
Recall Returned No WDP Succ1 Succ2 Failed Time Use Strategy
Control
Yes 169(78%) 140(83%) 51(36%) 9(6%) 80(57%) 43.6 N/A
No 154(74%) 125(81%) 48(38%) 9(7%) 68(54%) 48.6 N/A
All 323(76%) 265(82%) 99(37%) 18(7%) 148(56%) 46.0 N/A
3WordEx
Yes 151(78%) 121(80%) 37(31%) 11(9%) 73(60%) 187.8 105(70%)
No 149(77%) 126(85%) 29(23%) 10(8%) 87(69%) 66.2 107(72%)
All 300(77%) 247(82%) 66(27%) 21(9%) 160(65%) 125.8 212(71%)
4WordEx
Yes 156(77%) 128(82%) 42(33%) 9(7%) 77(60%) 77.1 102(65%)
No 155(77%) 116(75%) 25(22%) 5(4%) 86(74%) 75.2 99(64%)
All 311(77%) 244(78%) 67(27%) 14(6%) 163(67%) 76.2 201(65%)
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word was significant as well. Time spent in 4WordEx was significantly longer than that in
3WordEx (t = 4.54, p < 0.001).
Workload. Fig 6.2(a) shows the average ratings in each subscale of NASA-TLX for the
three strategies. Overall, the perceived workload was relatively low, with the average rat-
ings for all subscales being below or close to 7. Among the 6 subscales, physical demand
was rated the lowest in general, as it is not critical to the current task. The temporal effort
and overall performance among the three strategies were similar, because all participants
successfully created their passwords. For the other three subscales, the workload required
in Control is similar to that in 3WordEx, indicating that using 3WordEx did not require-
ment extra workload in creating passwords comparing with the baseline. However, the
three subscales for 4WordEx was significantly higher. The difficulty in creating passwords
significantly increased when the fourth word was required.
Short-term Memorability. About half of the participants in each strategy were asked
to recall the password at the end of the first phase. From Table 6.7, we can observe that
regardless of the strategy used, almost all participants could enter the correct password.
(a) Password Generation (b) Password Recall
Figure 6.2.: Mean scores of TLX as a function of strategy and subscale for Control,
3WordEx, and 4WordEx. Error bars represent standard errors of the scores.
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6.4.2 Second Phase Results
Approximately 77% of participants from each strategy condition returned to the second
phase of the study.
Long-term Memorability. For participants who came back for the study, approximately
80% indicated that they did not write down the password or the words (in 3WordEx and
4WordEx), and the ratio for the three strategies was similar, indicating that participants
were confident that they could remember the passwords without writing them across the
strategies, and they did not believe passwords created in word-based strategies were harder
to recall. We analyzed the password memorability from the participants who claimed that
they did not write down passwords or sentences.
About 37% of participants in Control and about 27% participants using word-based
strategies recalled the passwords successfully within first two attempts. When the strat-
egy was displayed as a hint, the ratio of participants were able to recall the passwords
increase ranging from 5% to 9% depending on the strategy. Control gave the low-
est failure rate (56%) in long-term password recall, followed by 3WordEx (65%), and
4WordEx (67%). The performance of Control was significantly better that from 3WordEx
(χ2 = 6.67, p = 0.036), and 4WordEx (χ2 = 6.54, p = 0.038), and no significant differ-
ence between 3WordEx and 4WordEx was observed (χ2 = 1.42, p = 0.492). When there
was a short-term recall, the long-term recall success rates were generally increased for each
strategy, and the increase in rates was larger for the word-based strategies. However, the
difference among the strategies was not significant.
Long-term Recall Time. The password recall time in Control was similar to 3WordEx
(t = 1.25, p = 0.21), but was significantly shorter than that for 4WordEx (t = 5.25, p <
0.001). The comparison result is consistent with the comparison of password creation
among the strategies. Again, whether or not short-term recall had been required did not
have any significant impacts.
Workload. The workload of password retention evaluated by TLX is illustrated in
Fig 6.2(b). Comparing Fig 6.2(a) and Fig 6.2(b), perhaps the most noticeable difference is
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that the subscale of performance in Fig 6.2(b) is almost double that in Fig 6.2(a), which was
mainly due to large portion of failed recall. Except physical demand and temporal demand,
which are not directly related to the task, the average rates of all the other 3 subscales also
increased dramatically, suggesting that password recall was more difficult than password
generation.
For the subscales, mental workload and frustration ratings of word-based strategies
were higher than those of the Control, suggesting the overhead from the extra requirements
of the word-based strategies. No significant difference is observed between 3WordEx and
4WordEx, which is consistent with the comparison in success rate in long-term retention.
Password Update. At the end the task, we asked participants to update the password,
without any restriction except that the password could not be the same as the old one. For
3WordEx and 4WordEx, after the password was created, we asked participants whether they
used the strategy we provided. About 71% of participants using 3WordEx said “yes” to the
question, and the ratio is higher than that for 4WordEx (65%). The results indicated that
most of the participants were willing to use the instructed strategy even if not forced to do
so, and 3WordEx is more preferable.
Overall, the study suggests that both 3WordEx and 4WordEx perform worse than
Control in terms of long-term password retention. Although 3WordEx and 4WordEx have
similar failure rate in long-term password retention, paricipants believed 4WordEx was
harder to use than 3WordEx. 3WordEx outperform 4WordEx in almost all the measure-
ments. Comparing with 3WordEx, passwords from 4WordEx takes longer time and more
workload to create, and participants are less willing to use the strategy.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the security and usability of 7 variants of word-based
password creation strategies. We showed that popular words, such as “cat” and “dog” were
commonly selected among the variants, and the security of the variants depended on the
number of words required. Using the standard cracking-based methodology, password sets
140
obtained under all variants were all much more secure than the baseline. However, using
β-guess-rates, we found that variants with two words required were likely to produce pass-
words with similar security level to the baseline. On the other hand, requiring 3 or 4 words
significantly reduced the number of word combinations that are chosen more than once,
suggesting significantly stronger resulted passwords, where the variant requiring 4 words
performs better. In terms of usability, both 3WordEx and 4WordEx performed worse than
Control in terms of long-term password retention, and no significant difference between
3WordEx and 4WordEx was observed. However, 4WordEx was considered to be harder to
use than 3WordEx. Comparing with 3WordEx, passwords from 4WordEx took longer time
and more workload to create, and participants were less willing to use the strategy.
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7. SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we improved the eco-system of passwords from multiple aspects.
First, we provided methodology to help password research. We introduced probability
threshold graphs for evaluating password datasets. We introduced knowledge and tech-
niques from the rich literature of statistical language modeling into password modeling.
We also identified new issues (such as normalization) that arise from modeling passwords,
and a broad design space for password models, including both whole-string models and
template-based models. Third, we have conducted a systematic study of many password
models, and obtained a number of findings. In particular, we showed that the PCFGW
model, which has been assumed to be the state of the art and has been widely used in
password research, underperformed whole-string Markov models in our experiments. We
expect that the new methodology and knowledge of effectiveness of Markov models can
benefit future password research.
Second, we improved the password policies and practice used by websites by address-
ing the question how to best check weak passwords. In particular, we modeled different
password strength checking methods (including password strength meters) as Password
Ranking Algorithms (PRAs), and we introduced two metrics: the β-Residual Strength
Graph (β-RSG) and the Normalized β-Residual Strength Graph (β-NRSG), to compare
them using real world password datasets. In our evaluation, we found unreasonably high
frequency of some suspicious passwords. We removed the associated accounts by identify-
ing suspicious account IDs. We then, applied the metrics on cleansed datasets, and showed
that dictionary-based PRA had similar performance with the sophisticated PRAs. If the
size of PRAs are limited in order to be fit into a client, a hybrid method combining a small
dictionary of weak passwords and a Markov Model with backoff with a limited size can
provide the most accurate strength measurement.
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Finally, we studied the most commonly suggested password creation strategies. We
investigate the security and usability of 6 variants of mnemonic sentence-based strategies
and 7 variants of word-based strategies. Regarding mnemonic sentence-based strategies,
we showed that using the standard cracking-based methodology, password sets obtained
under all variants have similar strengths and were all much more secure than the base-
line. However, using β-guess-rates, we found that different instructions had tremendous
impact on the security level of the resulted passwords. In particular, the instructions for
the mnemonic strategy found in the literature and recommended by security experts are not
optimal in inducing secure password distributions. However, combining explicit instruc-
tions of choosing a personalized sentence that is unlikely to be chosen by others, with the
inclusion of corresponding examples, dramatically increased the security of the resulting
passwords. For word-based strategies, we showed that popular words, such as “cat” and
“dog” were commonly selected among the variants, and the security of the strategies de-
pended on the number of words required. Using β-guess-rates, we found that variants with
two words required are likely to produce passwords with similar security level to the base-
line. On the other hand, the requirement of 3 or 4 words significantly reduced the number
of word combinations that are chosen more than once, suggesting significantly stronger
resulted passwords, where the variant requiring 4 words performed better. In terms of us-
ability, both 3-word based strategies and 4-word based strategies performed worse than the
control group in terms of long-term password retention. The extra difficulty in password
creation introduced by requiring the fourth word was observed.
Overall, in this dissertation, we discussed metrics evaluating password datasets and
password models. Based on that, we improved password policies used by websites. If
weak passwords are checked and filtered properly, typical users will be encouraged or
even forced to create passwords that are less predictable and more crack-resistant. On
the other hand, users need knowledge and skills, which is generally known as password
creation strategies, to create strong and memorable passwords. We study the security and
memorability of passwords induced by several commonly suggested strategies. We expect
a combination of proper weak password checking by websites and the skill of creating
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strong and memorable passwords by users has significant impact on reducing weak and
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